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THE WARFARE OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

The Warfare
of
Democratic
Ideals

FRANCIS M. MYERS



The Antioch Press - - - Publishers

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Library of Congress
Catalog Card Number
56-6504

Printed in the United States of America
by The Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio

*To Max and Rhoda Otto
whose wisdom has been a constant
source of light and warmth.*

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5-25-62

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgment is hereby made to the following publishers, organizations, or individuals who have kindly granted permission to quote from the works listed:

Sheed and Ward: *Medieval Universalism*, by Etienne Gilson. Geoffrey Bles, Ltd.: Jacques Maritain's *Degrees of Knowledge, Science and Wisdom*, and *True Humanism*. Charles Scribner's Sons: *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* by Etienne Gilson and *Types of Philosophy* by W. E. Hocking; also (as holders of the United States rights) Maritain's *Science and Wisdom* and *True Humanism*. Yale University Press: *The Folklore of Capitalism* by Thurman Arnold, *Ethics and Language* by C. L. Stevenson, *A Common Faith* by John Dewey, and W. E. Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience, Man and the State*, and *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*. The Catholic University of America: *The Ecclesiastical Prohibition of Books* by Rev. Joseph M. Pernicone. National Catholic Welfare Council: *Catholic Principles of Politics* by Ryan and Boland, and the Encyclical of Pope Pius XI, "Divini Redemptoris." Beacon Press: *American Freedom and Catholic Power* by Paul Blanshard. Philosophical Library: *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, ed. Dagobert Runes. T. V. Smith: his *The Democratic Tradition in America*. Henry Holt and Co.: *A History of Political Theory* by G. H. Sabine and John Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct, The Public and Its Problems* and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. Harper and Brothers: *What Man Can Make of Man*, by W. E. Hocking. The University of Chicago Press: *Freedom of the Press* by W. E. Hocking, copyright 1947 by the University of Chicago; and "A Declaration by the Committee of Experts brought together by UNESCO . . ." included in *Democracy in a World of Tensions*, copyright 1951 by the University of Chicago. Appleton-Century-Crofts: *The Human Enterprise* by M. C. Otto, copyright 1940. Harvard University Press: Ralph Barton Perry's *General Theory of Value* (1950) and *Realms of Value* (1954). The Macmillan Co.: *Scholasticism and Politics* by Jacques Maritain (copyright 1940), *Catholic Dictionary* ed. Donald Attwater (copyright 1931), *Which Way Democracy*, Wilfred Parsons (copyright 1939), *Elements of Analytic Philosophy* by Arthur Pap (copyright 1949). G. P. Putnam's Sons: John Dewey's *The Quest for Certainty* (copyright 1929) and *Freedom and Culture* (copyright 1939). The Vanguard Press: Ralph Barton Perry's *Puritanism and Democracy* (copyright 1944) and *Shall Not Perish from the Earth* (copyright 1940). Prentice-Hall: *Basic Problems of Philosophy* by Bronstein, Krikorian and Wiener (copyright 1947), *Problems of Ethics* by Moritz Schlick, authorized translation by David Rynin (copyright 1939). Dover Publications and Victor Gollancz, Ltd.: *Language, Truth, and Logic* by A. J. Ayer.

Preface

The title of this book may seem melodramatic to the reader after he has become acquainted with the contents. He should be warned that within are few flourishes, excursions, alarums or explosions. The "warfare" of the title does not refer to direct combat among men. It refers to incompatibility among ideals.

But ideals do not exist by themselves. They are, according to the hypothesis of this book, part of man's equipment for controlling his destiny. As such they have consequences. When ideals are both vital and incompatible, they lead to conflict; and that conflict is among men.

The immediate social impact of opposed ideals, however, is not my main concern in this book. My primary aim is to clarify fundamental issues regarding the meaning of democracy and, in doing so, to formulate a workable criterion by which alternative meanings may be examined and judged.

The philosophers discussed here are representatives of alternative philosophies of democracy; they were chosen, where possible, because of their clarity in stating underlying assumptions and their thoroughness in following out the consequences of those assumptions. My respect for them has, with few exceptions, increased over the years that I have read and re-read what they have to say. And they have helped me become increasingly sure of the need, in general, to understand divergent ideas and ideals from the points-of-view of those who differ. But respect and understanding need not imply agreement. We are not helped, in the long run, by agreement for the sake of agreement or by soft-hearted attempts to ignore real conflicts.

To discuss "the warfare of democratic ideals" is not to seek prolongation of that warfare; but neither is it to seek the elimination of conflicts as such. Peace is not found in the absence of conflict. Peace results from the control of conflicts, so that opponents at least do not destroy each other. More positively, peace

may mean the growing ability to create conditions in which conflicts can be used as stimuli to still greater creativity directed to the enhancement of living.

The task is difficult and complex, and it offers no guarantee of success. But we do need to try to understand one another. We need to see our problems clearly, to search imaginatively for possible solutions, and to be honest in submitting those solutions to the most rational tests of truth that we can devise. We may indeed fail. What chances there are for a more satisfactory outcome depend on our willingness to meet the challenge together.

As he goes on from here in the book the reader will probably suspect that it first took form as a doctoral dissertation. He will be correct. It was my good fortune to work at the University of Wisconsin under the guidance of the late Horace S. Fries, who died all too young. I must try to express now, as I did not when he was alive, my abiding gratitude for his encouragement as a teacher, his warmth as a friend, and his adventuresomeness as a philosopher.

Much of the work which went into this book was made possible by grants from the Social Science Foundation and the Bureau of Research in Humanities and Social Development (BHSD) of the University of Denver.

A number of people read all or part of the manuscript of this book, in some stage of its development, although none of them should bear responsibility for what it now contains. I owe many thanks to all of them for their critical help and for their encouragement. I want in particular to thank two persons. John C. Livingston, now of Sacramento State College, read the whole manuscript in nearly final form. His comments and suggestions have been most helpful, and he made them, in trying circumstances, with excellent humor. M. C. Otto read all but Chapters VI and VII of the manuscript. I am sure that I cannot adequately say how indebted I am to him, not only for the keenness of his criticism, but above all for his rare qualities as a philosopher, teacher and human being.

Denver, Colorado
January 8, 1956

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THE WARFARE OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

Introduction

There is at least one novel quality in the current warfare of democratic ideals. Probably never before has there been so much disagreement and confusion as to the determination of the meaning of democracy.

During the last official shooting war, a famous American fighter pilot, Colonel Robert L. Scott, Jr., spoke for many when he said:

I don't know exactly what democracy is. . . . But as we used to talk things over in China, we all used to agree that we were fighting for The American Girl. She to us was America, Democracy, Coca-Colas, Hamburgers, Clean Places to Sleep, or the American Way of Life. . . .¹

Colonel Scott reminds one of a late medieval knight with his song of courtly love, though the knight now rides an airplane and gets his phrases from advertisements. Similar sentiments have often been expressed by others. Such opinions leave us no better off morally than our enemies. But though we may reject this technological chivalry as a way of life, that rejection does not end the confusion over the meaning of democracy.

Not many years ago there was published "A declaration by the committee of experts brought together by UNESCO to consider the causes of ambiguity and confusion in the present use of the term 'democracy' and their role in political disputes today, May 7, 1949." The first point of the Declaration states:

In spite of the violence of conflict concerning basic social and political ideas and concerning means of international cooperation, agreements in statement of purpose and in aspiration appear in a

controversial context of contradictory interpretations of the intentions that motivate the statement or of facts that seem to belie them. The agreements are themselves involved in the ideological conflict. Yet the unanimity which appears in the statements of aims is an impressive fact. For the first time in the history of the world no doctrines are advanced as anti-democratic. . . . This acceptance of democracy as the highest form of political or social organization is the sign of a basic agreement in the ultimate aims of modern social and political institutions—an agreement that the participation of the people and the interests of the people are essential elements in good government and in the social relations which make good government possible.

This Declaration and the accompanying "Report on the Analysis of the Questionnaire" insist that there is "basic agreement" on "common purposes." At the same time the experts point out an extreme variety of "interpretations" of those common purposes, some of which could have been accepted by Hitler or Mussolini. The result is evidence of thorough conflict over the meaning of what was said to have been agreed upon. The committee concludes its Declaration with a call for the clarification of conflicting meanings of democracy by "an appeal to world opinion," and for the resolution of these conflicts through "the free interchange of information, of cultural materials, and of persons."² Yet it is surely no secret that one of the main barriers to such "free interchange" is to be found in some of these "interpretations" of democracy which are held to be in "fundamental agreement" with the other interpretations.

With these warnings, let me nevertheless begin with an extremely broad definition of democracy and say that it is the right of men to self-determination. The definition marks out a sphere of reference, but says nothing as to the kind of self-determination or its extent. It is a definition to which all who claim to be democrats might give assent. Insofar as their use of words is relevant to their actions, however, they are found to be committed to very different types of democracy. And we need to be aware of these

differences. We need agreements, of course. But if they are arrived at simply to be agreeable, if they obscure genuine difficulties, they can be disastrous, as they frequently have been. My hope is to clarify fundamental issues in the meaning of democracy and to formulate a way of dealing with these issues.

The confusion I have been talking about is caused, on the intellectual level, by conflicting philosophies, each claiming to furnish the theoretical basis of democracy. There is lack of clarity concerning both the nature of these claims and their consequences in society. The problem may be stated in two ways. If one starts with the various interpretations of democracy, they all make important assumptions which, when developed, reveal various attitudes toward fellowmen and toward the universe. Or, starting with the general aspects of philosophy, there are contrary theories of reality, of knowledge, of human nature, and of the good life. In each case these theories have consequences for democratic action which should be examined.

In some of the philosophies to be investigated, the social philosophy has been explicitly stated, so that my task will be to examine this in the light of the rest of the philosophy. In other instances, the thinkers have made no effort at an explicit philosophy of democracy, and yet, since they exhibit their beliefs as truths and, therefore, as beliefs demanding consideration and acceptance, it is fair to investigate the effect of these beliefs on human lives. If they have no effect at all, there is no reason to pay attention to them.

Although I shall be dealing with philosophies in their technical elaboration, my main concern will be with the impact of these philosophies at the street corner. The man standing there has inherited a traffic-jam of ideas that hinders him from getting wherever he wants to go. And worse: as he looks across the intersection he sees that the roads leading away are unpaved and, a little farther, fade out into the open unknown country. He sees that most of the people striking out return to the well-travelled and well-marked streets, because their mass-produced vehicles are not made for rough-going. He sees the country-side littered with

abandoned wrecks. So what if he does get across the street? Where is he going? And how will he travel?

What, then, are some of the ideas modern men go by when they attempt to think about democracy?

On the one hand they are told that moral beliefs are impotent gestures of biological and social forces, and can claim significance, therefore, neither as descriptions of reality nor as rational guides to action. On the other hand men are told that moral standards inhere unchangingly in an Ultimate Reality, and must be known before life can rightly be lived.

In taking the first position, Thurman Arnold refers to moral beliefs as "creeds." He suggests that political action is most competent when it abandons attempts at consistent thinking and just proceeds to act. Democracy became increasingly successful when it recognized this. As he puts it:

Democracy ceased being a creed. It simply became a name for a type of organization controlled by voters. From this point of view men made two great discoveries in the art of government:

1. They discovered that it is immaterial whether democracy is morally beautiful or not. They recognized as a fact that it was more important that an institution keep in touch with the mass of its members than that it follow rational principles. . . .

2. They discovered that all sorts of symbols are necessary for the preservation of the political fact of democracy, many of which violate its creeds.

Arnold goes so far as to say that "Institutional creeds . . . must be false in order to function effectively"; that is, "they must express contradictory ideals and must authoritatively suppress any facts which interfere with those ideals."³

Thurman Arnold takes his admonitions about consistency seriously enough so that his intellectual lineage cannot be traced directly or unequivocally to any of the philosophical positions that I shall be examining. But his arguments rest on certain assumptions concerning knowledge and morality. These assumptions have been stated most insistently by a group of philosophers

calling themselves "Logical Positivists" or "Logical Empiricists." They regard their philosophical function to be one of purely philosophical analysis in which, presumably, human needs and wants do not enter. One influential member of this group—the English philosopher, A. J. Ayer—has given this statement of his theory of the moral expressions of human beings:

. . . sentences which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable—because they do not express genuine propositions.⁴

These intellectually formulated ideas did not take shape in a vacuum. They are expressions of widespread moral dispositions that have been growing, though seldom with clearly defined outlines, for many years. Even so these philosophical ideas have in their turn, I feel sure, affected the public's opinions. And so we have the popular statement that "One person's opinions are as good as the next person's." This result may not have been desired by the philosophers, and their ideas are not to be accepted or rejected simply because of the result. Yet if moral beliefs are as meaningless as a burp or a belch, one person's (moral) opinions *are* as good as the next person's—even if that means that none of them is worth anything.

The problem does not end here. When a man declares the equal validity (or invalidity) of all moral beliefs, he seldom, if ever, is including his own. That, of course, is something else again. Or if he is disturbed by a situation in which all are presumed to be right, even though the universal rightness doubly confirms the existing conflicts, then he may rely on another conviction that somewhere, somehow, there is a Higher Power which will make sure that everything will turn out all right in the end.

When *this* conviction predominates, our American citizen may pay attention to the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt in his address to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 4, 1939:

Storms from abroad directly challenge three institutions indispensable to Americans, now as always. The first is religion. It is the source of the other two—democracy and international good faith. Religion, by teaching man his relationship to God, gives the individual a sense of his own dignity and teaches him to respect himself by respecting his neighbors.⁵

Those who adhere to this type of philosophy may be deeply concerned for human welfare, but feel hopeless if men have only themselves and the support of nature to rely upon. They believe there must be something about the ultimate constitution of the universe that assures the good outcome of human effort.

One priest of the Roman Catholic Church states its attitude in his interpretation of that sentence in the Declaration of Independence which holds that men are "endowed by their Creator with" the "unalienable Rights" of "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness."

By asking a modern man concerning his adherence to it, we can judge if he is any longer an adherent of the American political system, for that system is built on it as a first principle.

To accept that basic political truth a man had to believe in God; he had to believe that that God is all-knowing and all-powerful, that he is a Creator; that man is God's creature and possession; that as a result of this relation to God, man possesses within him a law which is merely the Eternal Law in a finite form; that this natural law is the source of all law, all government, and all rights; and that governments exist merely to administer this Divine Law existing in men.⁶

Liberal protestant thinkers state their beliefs in a more congenial manner, perhaps, but the basic position is essentially the same. For, as one of them remarks:

If moral optimism be true, there must be a God. There must be a dependable Power great enough and favorable enough to man to make it possible for man to produce progressively the moral values he must recognize as unconditionally imperative, and to conserve such absolutely valid values beyond what man can do, and indeed in spite of anything that can happen in the law-abiding

course of natural events. . . . The moral optimist . . . takes his stand on the sufficiency of God, and the sufficiency of man—with God.⁷

In spite of differences, the Catholic and the Protestant agree in holding that both on individual and social morality man cannot know what is really good without God, that he cannot achieve what is good without God, and that man has dignity only because he is God's creature.

Here are two opposing varieties of philosophy bearing on human problems and, specifically, the meaning of democracy. The fundamental issue between them is clear, in spite of variations and oppositions that flourish within each major tendency. If labels help, the first type of philosophy is an empiricism; the second is supernaturalism. For all their differences it is important to notice that these two philosophies have one assumption in common: it is that the function of knowledge is simply to describe things as they are independently of the act of knowing.

The empiricists and the supernaturalists disagree as to *what* it is that knowledge describes. And they disagree as to the nature of the knowing process. But they agree on two things: First, that description, whatever it is, is something essentially different from evaluation. Second, that description is a means of copying or reproducing or mirroring without altering in any fundamental way the thing to be described. The theory of description involved here is analogous to the way we frequently speak of photography. The camera, we say, records things "as they really are," unaffected by the mechanism of the camera or the processes of exposure, development and printing.

From this starting point, the supernaturalists seek mainly to describe what is, in one way or another, beyond finite experience. They arrive at the conclusion that moral standards are an inherent part of supernatural reality. A democratic society must, therefore, be built on standards which are not themselves democratically determined because they eternally transcend that society, and indeed all human existence. From the same starting

point the other philosophers, the empiricists, seek to describe what is in some sense experienced, whether such things are called "sense data," "phenomena," "neutral existences," or something else. They fail to find moral values in their examination of the universe at large. Their failure leads most of them to declare that there can be no knowledge about morals, except as moral customs and habits are sociologically and psychologically described. Democracy as a moral ideal, then, is something to be described as any other ideal would be described. As an *ideal* it is found to be no more meaningful or rational than any other. Those empiricists who have attempted to start from this position, yet go beyond it, have encountered great difficulties.

To the extent that the problem of a philosophical basis for democracy is set by these competing philosophies, it is heightened by the fact that an increasingly large number of people can no longer accept wholeheartedly a morality founded on supernatural sanctions, and yet they feel that the other choice given them offers no direction for their lives. The whole situation is rooted deep in the past.

The tap root is Plato. Neither the problems he defined nor the solutions he proposed originated with him. But he formulated them so brilliantly and incisively that they have provided much of the nourishment and determined much of the growth of western philosophy. That is not to say that the growth has necessarily been healthy, or that a beautiful flower may not conceal poisonous seeds or roots.

Plato witnessed the disintegration of traditional Greek religion and morality; and at the same time he witnessed the persecution of Socrates who had challenged both these traditions and those men who had nothing better to offer, by seeking a valid basis for belief. He witnessed the decline and defeat and the renewed decline of Athens. He witnessed corruption. He saw commerce flourish and men despair.

He thought on these things and sought the basis for the good life. How could men know what is good? Indeed, how can men

know anything, since there is no belief which cannot be doubted? In thinking upon these things he inherited the influences of Heraclitus and his theory of change patterned by the laws of change, of Parmenides and his denial of change, of Pythagoras and his mathematics and otherworldliness, and of Socrates and his ethical quest.

So far as the present inquiry is concerned, what Plato did was for the first time to state clearly a set of assumptions and their implications. Almost all subsequent philosophies in the West have taken at least the assumptions for granted, however much they may have disagreed in other respects. These assumptions—or perhaps more accurately, an assumption and its corollaries—I believe to be essentially as follows:

1. True knowledge must be beyond any possible doubt. It must, therefore, be unchanging and eternal, or in other words, absolutely certain. Anything less would not be knowledge but only some level of opinion.

2. Such knowledge cannot be had of the world we find about us. Since this world changes according to time, place, and perspective, no statement about it, even if it rests on extremely accurate observation, can be indubitable. Consequently, true knowledge must be about another world, one which is itself eternal and unchanging. That other world is Reality, the way things really are in themselves, as compared with the way they appear to us in experience.

3. Knowledge is had when we are able to have ideas that correspond to Reality “as it really is.” Such ideas represent, reproduce, copy, mirror or restate Reality without changing it. For, again, if changes were introduced into Reality, Knowledge—which is to say, indubitable ideas—would be impossible.

From these three points important conclusions follow, as Plato frankly and clearly indicates in the *Republic*. If the nature of reality makes any difference to our lives—and it would be strange if it did not—we should know it; and we should mold our individual and social activities to the truth. Yet by the very nature of Reality, inaccessible as it is, only a few can know it. For the

bulk of the population thinks it has knowledge and knows how to live because it is familiar with the ways of the world, while that very conviction is clear evidence that it does not have true knowledge. Indeed, the obstinacy of men and women in persisting with the problems and solutions of the everyday world is evidence that they are lacking the ability necessary to acquire knowledge for themselves. Would people who had the ability to recognize Truth continue to reject it or ignore it when it was presented to them? For Plato—who had presented the Truth—the answer was as unmistakable as Truth itself. It is therefore the duty of those who do have knowledge to tell the others how they should live their lives.

With St. Paul the Platonic element became alloyed into the solidifying Christian doctrine. An unusual metal was produced, which was forged into doctrinal tools and weapons hard enough and sharp enough to contribute toward building a church structure on the one hand, and toward fighting enemies on the other.

In St. Augustine doctrinal intransigence came to be connected clearly and intimately with the sense of personal guilt. For if God is infinite, infinite reality and infinite knowledge of reality, man as finite is literally nothing as compared with God. Man cannot so much as begin to get knowledge without God's aid, and this he has rejected. Men, by their very nature, without God's support, persist in trying to solve their problems by their own efforts, which is in essence the rejection of God. Therefore, there is no possible salvation unless individual men cease completely to depend upon their own efforts and without reservation turn themselves over to the Supreme Being.

The tools and weapons of doctrine continued to aid the building and the fighting. The church structure grew and was defended, and in time the Augustinian intensity was moderated. But the foundations had been set. The intellectual and social structure of the church found support in the social structure of feudalism. For centuries whatever social and intellectual movement there was took place within a relatively fixed framework.

Cracks in the frame were caused by discoveries of original

Greek texts. By distinguishing between rational and revealed knowledge, St. Thomas produced two buttresses where there had been only one before. If the rationality of Aristotle produced ideas that seemed as true as the revelation of the Bible, the conflict between them was only apparent. Aristotle's reason applied only to the natural world, whereas faith and revelation dealt with the supernatural reality. Instead of conflicting, these two methods of knowing were harmonious, and indeed mutually supported each other while supporting the Church.

The support was not enough. In place of the cracks, real gaps appeared. They were created by the growing power of experimental science, which opened visions of new alternatives in thought and action. Men's lives came to be radically changed by the stimulus of science in exploration and industry and business: new customs and beliefs were introduced from strange lands; technological inventions and business institutions spread both knowledge and means of living to sections of the populace that had been untouched before. But science also introduced an infinite universe governed by laws of mechanics, and at the time it was this last, rather than the former, effect of science that was felt to undermine religion and morals.

The thinkers who followed upon the Middle Ages and the beginnings of the Age of Science retained the same point of emphasis: the revolutionary thing about science was its theoretical description of the world. However much later philosophers rejected the specific medieval metaphysics, with its finite, qualitative universe based on Aristotelian or Platonic essences, they retained the assumption that knowledge is descriptive. Most of them retained more than that, for both the idealistic and the materialistic movements continued to explain the world in terms of essence—mind or matter—although greatly simplified over the complex Aristotelian scheme. In time the English empirical tradition became skeptical of any such hidden essence and rejected that mode of explanation—but it still retained description, in the established sense, as the function of explanation.

A large part of the following pages of this book deals with contemporary representatives of these various historical trends. The discussion begins with an extremely influential but amor-phously related group of philosophers whom I have called traditional empiricists, a term which may not be acceptable to them. The popularity of this movement, especially among intellectuals, has created reactions in religious circles. Perhaps the most dramatic of these has been the rise of Neo-Thomism, which, as the name suggests, seeks to make the medieval philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas compatible with modern physics and palatable to the modern taste; and in the same way it seeks to show the traditions of the Roman Catholic Church to be compatible with democracy. There are also defenders of Protestantism who oppose both the dogmatism of Catholicism and the skepticism of traditional empiricism. The examination of Protestant thinkers will be focused primarily upon those who seek to explain the universe in terms of a basic mental essence. From this theory of the nature of the world they find it possible to derive general principles of individual and social morality which, they declare, are basic to democratic procedures.

While these various theoretical attitudes towards the results of science were growing and clashing, science itself continued to develop a general method for the handling of problems, and to produce tremendous consequences in increasing numbers of lives through ever greater technological invention and the mass-production of goods. These factors have been involved in tendencies that are diverse, frequently conflicting and sometimes catastrophic. In any restricted sense of the word, certainly, science has been a willing tool of the most varied and even repulsive purposes. Its technological results in particular have been neutral to human or anti-human intent. Mass-production has indeed produced more goods, but so much of them of such a quality as to make the word "goods" meaningless where not obviously ironic.

Let us not forget these and other difficulties and dangers. But let us also remember that technology and mass-production have made necessities of life and other significant goods available to

great areas of the western world, and potentially available to the whole world. Above all, let us realize that science has developed experimental procedures and techniques to the point where it has become more accurate to characterize it as a way of arriving at conclusions than as any set of conclusions.

Instrumentalism grew out of these tendencies of science. It is opposed both to *traditional* empiricism and to supernaturalism, for it rejects the conception of knowledge as the description of reality embodied in a set of conclusions. Knowledge, instead, gets its fundamental meaning and importance as the activity of knowing—it is a naturalistic, guiding function, a method, enabling men to live satisfactorily *and* to determine what satisfactory living would be. According to the claim of the instrumentalists, widespread democracy is now genuinely possible for the first time, for now at last men are in a position to use scientific method to control technology for human aims and to make available to all the materials and tools out of which it may be possible to construct a human community. Democracy will succeed in proportion as ordinary men cooperate in shaping the purposes and conditions of their own individual lives. Democracy, here, is an old name for new ways of acting.

Is any choice possible between these conflicting philosophies of democracy? Actually we make such decisions constantly. But usually, in all of us, we decide by temperament, habit, or custom. Sometimes we include representatives of all three types of philosophy in our thinking, swinging from one to another. Can we decide otherwise? Is there a philosophy which is not only appealing, say, in the meaning it gives to democracy, but which is also true as a philosophy? I think there is. Perhaps I should give offense if I did not immediately add that I am not alone in making such a statement, but that most of those who make it would disagree with me concerning its object.

The crucial theoretical question, in my opinion, is whether or not knowledge is to be defined in terms of that theory of description according to which, it will be remembered, a description is a copy of something as it is supposed to be apart from any

human purposes or procedures by which the copy may be obtained. Frankly, I do not see how this definition of knowledge can be accepted as tenable. It is seldom examined by those who assert it. And this is part of the difficulty encountered in efforts to discuss it. The assumption is so completely taken for granted that any other possibility is dismissed as inconceivable. But before this question is examined let me state, without argument, what I consider to be the implications of that assumption. To the extent that it determines human action, in a logical fashion, it leads either to a social order based on might, in one form or another, or at best to a conservative order—that is, one based on the faith that it has an inherent movement toward its goal, without rational control or guidance of its activities.

But if that assumption is dropped, both scientific method and morality may appear in new light. Both may be closer to daily living than we had thought; and they may also be potentially closer to each other. There is at least the hope that men can work together in creating a society in which change can be democratically directed and controlled.

Traditional Empiricism—I

Traditional empiricism is a good place to start. I say this, not because it came first historically, for it did not, but because it clearly sets our theoretical problem. Is there any criterion in terms of which valid moral decisions can be made? Can that criterion itself be validated? What do the answers to these questions indicate concerning the meaning and validity of democracy?

The problem did not originate with theory. It grew out of an infinite variety of human perplexities. As I write, large numbers of citizens, convinced of the virtues of truthfulness and of abiding by the law, are cheating on their income tax returns. Still greater numbers, perhaps, taught to love one another, are beating their children or beating out their competitors in business. Sure of the necessity of thrift, we live in debt both as individuals and as political states. These examples, and many, many others, are extremely familiar. They are personal problems with far-reaching repercussions. But let me pose one more example of obvious concern for democratic societies. I refer to a problem which everyone has felt, probably many times, when he is convinced of the rightness of his endeavor but feels that endeavor threatened by the scrutiny and activity of others. Should he submit his aspirations to their examination, perhaps even accepting their modifications or rejections? Or should he hold his righteousness to him, girding himself about with power and secrecy, in the effort to force the acceptance of his heart's desire?

Different traditional empiricists approach such problems in different ways. E. B. McGilvary is convinced that it is might that makes right. R. B. Perry and T. V. Smith attempt, each in his own way, to escape that conclusion; in the process, each strives

explicitly to formulate a philosophy of democracy. Those philosophers who were once known as Logical Positivists or Logical Empiricists, but who now sometimes prefer to be known as Philosophic Analysts, usually insist that their job is that of clarification, and that such problems lie beyond their scope or cannot adequately be dealt with at all.

The philosophic ancestors of today's empiricism accepted the Platonic assumptions, discussed earlier, expressing a quest for certainty through description of Reality. Those assumptions were initially formulated in reference to an essentially unchanging universe of eternal qualities and values. But while the early empiricists could not accept the conception of such a universe, they still retained the assumptions which had been used to justify it and attempted to apply them to experience. The result is not only an important stage in the history of philosophy but one of today's pressing problems.

Traditional empiricism is in general the theory that the aim of knowledge is to describe the data of experience. Ethical knowledge, accordingly, seeks to describe whatever moral beliefs may be held at any time, without asserting that those beliefs or any other ought to be held. Moral obligations, on the other hand, are not descriptions, for they are concerned with what should be done, not with what actually has been done or may be done. They are ideal projections of the habits of some individual or the customs of some locality, instead of descriptions of those habits or customs. Knowledge may be had of human values in the sense that they may be described but not in the sense that they may be rationally evaluated.

One of the best formulations of this theory has been given by E. B. McGilvary.¹ Traditional empiricists largely agree with him that an object or an action is good only when it is in some way related to human desires. Nothing, he continues, is good unless it is desirable, and nothing is desirable that is not desired—with the exception of those things that come to be desired when additional information is had about them. Conversely everything

desired is to that extent good, and there is no way of telling in advance when knowledge will create desire and when it will not.

McGilvary does not deny that deeds may *appear* to be done out of felt obligation rather than desire. He simply argues that they are to be understood in terms of desire. The feeling of duty may arise when a desire has become so habitual that it has taken on the quality of obligation. But the sense of duty is most likely to come from the tremendous psychological weight of social customs, which were ultimately produced by desires. Once customs are established, they are maintained so long as they meet the needs and desires of that society. When it does happen that a member of society questions its commands, there are two things he can do: he may break with some of the traditions or with the society itself, in which case he falls back on his own individual desires; or he may consciously adopt the customs as his own desires. In either case, the degree to which there is self-consciousness indicates the extent to which the individual is independent of felt obligations as such.

Morality—which is that aspect of life involved in such issues—is classified as an art. Art is defined by McGilvary as “facile correct performance . . . , skill in the production, or skilled activity directed to the production, of some object other than knowledge.”² Morality, therefore, includes the ability to fulfill desires, and presumably an individual is more moral in proportion as he is adept at satisfying his desires. But an individual lives in a community and as long as he merely follows one custom or another his conduct is not moral. He is doing what he is told instead of being really skillful. The art that is morality can arise only when there is a conflict of alternatives where a choice has to be made involving the individual’s ingenuity in choosing a goal and pursuing it.

Moral conduct (therefore) is the voluntary action of a self-conscious person, in so far as that action is amenable to a standard of obligation imposed on him by social influences or by a comprehensive plan of life that draws its materials from society.³

Morality and ethics are not the same. Whereas morality is a type of conduct, ethics is the theoretical study of that conduct. Ethics is a science, and "all science . . . is theoretical; it is a matter of *seeing*, not of doing. . . ." Science is rational explanation, which "is merely ascertainment of actual uniformities of connection between phenomena. . . ." The ethical scientist looks for the objects of morality and the relations between them, and in so doing he also finds natural laws which are no different in kind from laws in any other field. Ethics "sets the objects before us and discloses the means by which they can be secured; but unless, when means and ends are thus set up before us, our affections and desires rise up and set the machinery of will to work, there can be no imperative issued." But the issuance of imperatives is the abandonment of science for morality. If anyone finds prescriptions or exhortations in any *truly* scientific writings, he must realize that they are actually "disguised statements of fact. The true scientist, as scientist, does not advise or exhort. . . . He does not lay down any rules of any sort for the guidance of anybody. He merely says: 'This is the way things are.'"⁴

Usually the theory of knowledge as description and the distinction between knowing and valuing are not defended. They have always been taken to be true and most authors apparently find it inconceivable that they should be questioned.

One philosopher who is not content to take the assumptions for granted is Ralph Barton Perry. He is as anxious as McGilvary to make a science out of ethics and also to insure the compatibility of ethics with recent developments in the other sciences. His desire is to see man "in that objective and dynamic aspect in which he is homogeneous both with his biological antecedents and with his encircling physical environment."⁵ In the outcome of his analysis, however, man is not so dynamic, and, at least in moral behavior, he is more subjective than objective.

To begin with, Perry agrees with McGilvary that valuation and knowing are "specifically different." Although he admits

they may always be entangled in each other in the human organism, yet as he analyzes them they are two distinct functions. The division between the two is demonstrated to his satisfaction by the fact that belief in the existence of an object implies nothing whatsoever as to the quality or extent of its value; and conversely, conviction of an object's value implies nothing about its existence or belief in its existence.

What supports Perry in this type of approach is his theory of reality: for if reality is essentially independent of the human organism, and if it can be known at all, knowledge presumably occurs by some process which seizes upon reality as it is by itself, in such a way that evaluation is logically irrelevant to the knowing activity. The important thing about reality, therefore, is that both "its existence and essential nature" are independent of the knowing organism. Reality neither depends on experience for its existence, nor is changed in any way by experience and knowing. The physical and sensory aspects of things, which are usually described as primary and secondary qualities, exist in the objects themselves. But the values attributed to things are no part of real objects; they exist only as a response by the person to the object.

When it occurs, knowing is an external relation "superadded" to a reality without affecting it. Knowing takes place in reality, but as a shadow—a shadowy shadow that does not even cool or darken what it falls upon. The changes in theories about the world—for example, the change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics—indicate man's ignorance and his attempts to overcome it, yet they reveal no changes in nature itself. The facts are the same before and after changes in theories. They remain the same no matter how we look at them.

Since reality is thus unaffected by knowledge, the job of knowing is to describe that which it comes upon. Perry is convinced that a knowing mind is essentially some sort of a recording device, but he is also convinced that it is a *biological* recording device which may be described in the same sense as the rest

of the world. Mind is not, therefore, an unknown, mysterious mirror, reflecting nature without the use either of glass or of mercury.

On the contrary, knowledge is found in biological expectation. Knowing occurs, in any of its forms, when a biological organism is prepared for an orderly series of events at the end of which its object occurs. At its simplest, what takes place is that the event at the end of the series, where the expectation is fulfilled, is predicated on the object or event that introduced the expectation. If the expectation actually is fulfilled, then truth has been arrived at; if not, then the result is error. For example, one may expect certain results from an official pronouncement. If the actual results are the same as those which were expected, the anticipatory judgment is true; if not, it is false. Or, more simply, an object may be judged a certain weight or color, and the judgment will be tested in a similar manner.

When a judgment is fulfilled, its object is no longer ideal but is "in some sense united" with the knowing activity. The act of knowing and its object are then not two separate events but two aspects of the same event; they have the same "ontological status" or "variety of being." When a successful intuition of this sort takes place, the result is immediate and certain—and is a reality.

But Perry grants that knowledge itself is never certain even though it aims at certainty. Both the object which initiated judgment and that which completed it may be found as pure sensation, which is immediate and certain. But such occurrences, by themselves, do not constitute knowledge proper, however essential they may be to it. True knowledge is found in judgment, which ties together the events of expectation and fulfillment. There is always an interval of time between anticipation and verification. And, while each event may be "known" with certainty, the temporal gap between the events makes certainty in judgment logically impossible. By the time the judgment has been concluded, its earlier aspects lie in past time, and at best knowledge of the past is never certain.

The aim of knowledge, once again, is to describe reality itself

by connecting one real event with another. That aim is essentially passive, as is indicated by the key word "expectation." The occurrence of expectation makes a difference as to what portion of reality happens to become known, but it makes no difference to reality itself. Also, it is at best doubtful that expectation has any rational grounds for choosing one aspect of reality or another. Perry sometimes speaks of knowing as a biological problem-solving activity, but he thinks of the "problems" as taking place only within the organism. For all his emphasis on biological activity, he seems to consider it a necessary accompaniment, rather than a basic characteristic, of knowing. Biological activity is logically accidental to knowledge, although it is psychologically unavoidable.

Knowing can logically exist and function independently of evaluation, but genuinely human values cannot be without some sort of act of knowing, even though the two functions remain distinct. In Perry's theory, value is "any object of any interest," where interest refers to the many attitudes of liking and disliking which the human organism is found to have. It includes all the tendencies of "instinct, desire, feeling, will and all their family of states, acts and attitudes" which make valuable the objects toward which they are directed. So far, the description is as true of all other animals as of men. The thing that distinguishes human interest is the existence of foresight or expectation in the interest. Hence, human values are dependent upon knowing: valuing "is in fact a double act, a combination of emotion and judgment in which each preserves its own nature intact."⁶

Perry calls the emotional aspect of interest a "governing propensity." It is the dominant desire which sets the general quality and direction of the organism as a whole. By itself the desire can do little or nothing, so it relies on knowledge to state conditions in which the desire may be fulfilled. When the descriptive activity is done, the initial desire chooses that particular judgment which seems most likely to lead to success.

Values are obviously subjective on this theory, both because physical reality is neutral to values, and because of the separation

between knowledge and interest. But subjectivity of values does not imply that they cannot be known. They are like any other biological fact. Whether known or not, they are exactly what they are: "love, hope and fear, like mountains, are independent of the acts of perception or judgment whereby they are known."⁷ As facts of human existence, they may be the subject of psychological or sociological description.

This would seem pretty much to settle the question. Values can be known to the extent that they can be described. In the case of a labor dispute, for example, social scientists could describe past conflicts and their consequences. They could analyze and describe the present conflict and its anticipated consequences. But no more, presumably. As scientists they could not take part in the dispute or pass judgment on the aims or purposes of its participants.

But I should make it clear before going further that Perry insists that more can be done. He is a moralist deeply disturbed over the state of the world's interests. He goes on to attempt the formulation of an objective standard, by which subjective values may be judged. And he draws from that standard an elaborated philosophy of democracy.

The examination of those questions must come later. Meanwhile it is advisable to explore some of the ramifications of traditional empiricism. I am not seeking to exhaust its varieties but to consider those developments which have been influential in molding the meanings of democracy, intentionally or not, and which clarify the outlines and bases of those meanings.

This brings me to the Logical Empiricists. In their desire for clarification they have refined and extended the analysis of the logical foundations of traditional empiricism. But Positivism is a movement; it is not static. It is true that some Positivists work over the old ideas, drawing a new distinction here and adding a new term there. Yet others have a new sense even of the older problems; and there are indications that new directions may be opening up within the movement.

Those who are familiar with Positivist ethical theory may be surprised at the account given by Phillipp Frank, in the first chapter of his *Modern Science and Its Philosophy*, of the moral fervor of the Vienna Circle in their desires to attack traditional metaphysics and to improve the condition of man. But perhaps we should be surprised only that they returned, in effect, to the eighteenth century for their weapons and tools. The weapons were almost immediately accepted and adopted by the enemy.⁸ And the tools were almost immediately declared by many Positivists to be ineffective. Nevertheless the moral concern has continued with some of them, however embarrassing it may be to admit, in moments of reflection, that one's own moral activities have no more rational basis than those one opposes so intensely.

As a philosophy, Logical Empiricism has been primarily concerned with linguistic analysis. This is proposed not merely as a therapeutic measure, but also as the necessary logical Foundation of Knowledge. If we are to have knowledge, a language must refer beyond itself. If a linguistic statement is true it must somehow correspond to existing conditions. But a statement must be meaningful before its truth, or falsity, can be determined; for if it is not meaningful to begin with, any attempted verification would be a waste of effort. A statement is meaningful, then, if it is capable of being true or false, capable of corresponding to some existing conditions, capable of corresponding to fact.

This is what the Logical Empiricists call cognitive or factual meaning. They do not deny the existence of other types of meaning, but insist that such meanings be carefully distinguished from any genuine attempt to arrive at truth or falsehood. An assertion about the world is declared to be factually meaningful only if it can be shown capable of verification. As judged by this criterion of verification, an assertion is meaningful when it is possible to tell what observations would "be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood."⁹ This does not mean that the Positivists identify meaning with those statements which have been verified or with those whose verification is now possible. The criterion justifies as meaningful even those beliefs which are only *theo-*

retically verifiable—such as the belief, to take Ayer's example, that there are mountains on the other side of the moon. Even those statements are considered meaningful which are not capable of direct verification, such as those about the past, but which may be logically connected with other statements which are capable of direct verification.

In other words, a belief is declared cognitively meaningless if it can be retained no matter what evidence turns up. For example, peace and prosperity on earth might be used as proof of the existence of gods, while those conditions exist. During warfare and poverty, those conditions might be considered punishment and be used as proof of the same gods. It would then begin to look as though the existence of such gods would be taken as proved no matter what happened—in which case belief in their existence would be factually meaningless. Such a belief is impervious to evidence because it implies none by which it may be tested.

For various reasons which I cannot go into here, verification is defined in terms of empirical observations. Therefore application of the criterion of verifiability means that all propositions describing the world or speculating about its nature are either empirical or meaningless. The most effective means of empirical verification is science, which is consequently the arbiter of all empirically meaningful questions. All empirical propositions, whether they are general laws or statements recording observations, are at least potentially scientific hypotheses.

All of this is another way of saying that science is knowledge at its best. But more than that is implied, since Logical Positivism embodies a specific philosophy of science. Science is based on description, and description means for them what it was found to mean for McGilvary and Perry. Although some formulations of the theory have changed since he wrote, it may be well to refer to Moritz Schlick, one of the founders of the "Vienna Circle." "Every idea," he says, "presupposes a perception to which it is related as a copy or secondary experience." Science groups the ideas in descriptive laws for the sake of explanation. For "to

explain means to refer back to laws. . . ." and "the natural law is not a *prescription* as to how something should behave, but a *description* of how something does in fact behave."¹⁰

Two beliefs are indicated here. One, which has gone by the name of phenomenism, is that knowledge refers to psychological sense-data. Reality is considered to be such that all that can be known are the impressions it makes on us. Ayer insists that Positivism is not logically dependent on any psychological theory—especially "an atomistic psychology, such as Mach and Hume adopted." His protestations are belied by his own efforts which simply replace Berkeley's word "idea" . . . by the neutral word 'sense-content' . . ." or by the word "sensation."¹¹ Yet other writers have made more radical efforts to avoid phenomenism.

The other belief involved in Schlick's remarks is briefly stated and dealt with by Arthur Pap, in his *Elements of Philosophical Analysis*:

The view . . . that laws are descriptive summaries of observations cannot stand in the face of (a) the generality and predictive content of laws, (b) their ideal or *contrary-to-fact* character. Obviously, it is observations that lead to the formulation of a law and that supply the evidence for the law; but it does not follow that the law describes what has been observed.¹²

The conclusion arrived at is, in traditional language, that science not only describes but also explains. It explains by developing general theories from which observable evidence may be deduced. As Herbert Feigl puts it in his essay on "Logical Empiricism," science formulates "empirical laws, or on higher levels, theoretical postulates" from which "specific descriptive conclusions" may be deduced.¹³ The general laws are the explanation of the descriptive conclusions, which, in their turn, are the verification of the general laws. Therefore, while the Positivists do not now hold that all knowledge is description, they do continue to maintain that all knowledge rests on description.

This raises another problem. It is psychologically impossible to describe and only to describe anything, in terms of the theory

of description at issue. Generalizations and predictions involve non-descriptive factors; and even descriptions involve non-descriptive decisions as to what is to be described, what is relevant and significant, and how the description is to be made. Emotional factors are involved. So are factors which may be called evaluative or normative, and which are at least not obviously reducible to factors which are only emotional. All this is widely recognized today. And recent Positivists do not claim that description proceeds apart from other psychological processes, or that it may not be causally dependent on them. What they do assert is that description, or "descriptive meaning," is logically distinct from those other processes. The position seems to come to this: Whatever knowledge *is*, it is essentially descriptive, and description is logically independent of emotion and also, even if it is not reducible to emotion, of evaluation.

The main outlines of the Positivistic theory of knowledge are plain. All genuine knowledge is empirical, and science is the most effective method for arriving at empirical truths. What does this make of philosophy? Historically, philosophy has not been interested solely in the nature of knowledge but has also considered itself the prime discoverer of truths making up the body of knowledge. If philosophy attempts to set itself up in competition with science—that is, if it attempts to establish beliefs not in conformity with the criterion of verifiability—then it is dealing with meaningless statements. Such beliefs are not to be taken seriously, not because they are false but because they have no cognitive meaning. Philosophy desires to make contributions of its own at the same time that it cannot compete with science and does not want to be relegated to metaphysical nonsense. The remaining possibility, logical analysts say, is for it to take on the function of logical analysis.

Philosophy in this sense would be deductive logic. And logic has nothing to do with empirical questions, in that it gives no information about the world we live in, and its meaning is not derived in accordance with the criterion of verifiability. Yet it is not metaphysical nonsense. Logic consists of purely verbal defi-

nitions, making our usage of words formally explicit. Its meaning is tested solely by the standards of consistency. As analytic, logic does not convey any new meaning but draws out the implications already contained in the propositions in question. It is true that logical analysis *seems* to arrive at new conclusions, but actually it does not. All it can do is to reveal through clarification what our linguistic conventions happen to be.

When philosophy adapts itself in this way, by becoming philosophical analysis, the competition between philosophy and science is removed. The techniques and subject matters of philosophy and science are entirely different, as Ayer argues, so that a statement from one could not "conceivably contradict" a statement from the other; for science has all empirical propositions to itself, and philosophy "is independent of any empirical assumptions." Philosophy can find a job for itself by becoming "the logic of science."

The main task of philosophy, then, is to apply its methods of formal, linguistic analysis to scientific languages. One of the expected results is the realization of the unity of science, the recognition of which has been hindered, according to Ayer, by "the unnecessary multiplicity of current scientific terminologies." As Feigl puts it: "The possibility of a reconstruction of all factual sciences on the basis of a common set of root terms . . . enables us to speak of the reducibility of all sciences to a common, unitary, interscientific language."¹⁴

There is also a further use of philosophy. By means of the criterion of verifiability it can expose metaphysical beliefs retained by the various sciences; it can criticize scientific hypotheses according to the criterion of consistency; and it can reveal the specific criteria that are actually used in the sciences to determine truth or falsity. Beyond this it can act in general to clarify our obscure and confused ideas. But philosophy can go no further. After showing the structure of a language, determining its consistency, and making explicit the criteria contained in it—after that its job is finished. Any attempt at establishing the actual validity of scientific or common sense results can take place only

in experience, but philosophy is a purely linguistic and a priori activity, and can have nothing else to do with actual, non-verbal, problems. Verbal hygiene is the important thing. Philosophers will mold the vessels of language into wash-basins. But it will be up to others to see if they hold water. And the reasons why people get their hands dirty, and their success at cleaning them—those, too, will have to be questions for others.

We have gone a long way from a discussion of democracy. Or have we? It is true that the Logical Empiricists have no body of writing dealing with the meaning of democracy or with the problems of a democratic society. The reason for this is itself important for those questions.

The Logical Empiricists are primarily interested in the two types of meaning which I have just mentioned. They are: (1) cognitive meaning, which has to do with verifiable theories and the matters of fact by which they are tested; and (2) analytic meaning which is involved in such things as logical implications of a concept within a system of formally consistent symbols.

Democracy may be treated either way. If the aim is the acquisition of factual knowledge concerning democracy, the inquirer would be interested in such questions as the ways in which the term democracy had been used or may come to be used, the characteristics of societies that have been, or may come to be, called democratic, and so on. For instance, one might describe the ways in which the term democracy was used by the Greeks, Romans, Medieval Europeans, Renaissance Europeans, 18th century Europeans and Americans, contemporaries all over the world, and the ways in which it might yet come to be used. One might describe the characteristics of those societies of similar times and places that may have been called democratic, and the possible characteristics of future societies designated by that name. One might attempt to chart the changes that have occurred in usages of the term democracy and other terms associated with it, or in actually existing societies bearing that name. One might attempt to formulate theories to account for such changes, which

might also indicate future tendencies. All these things and others could be attempted in a cognitively meaningful manner. As for logical analysis, it would examine the consistency of usages of the term democracy in the past and present and attempt to elaborate possible usages of that term in relation to other symbols.

But for better or worse most people's interests in democracy are of a different sort. They are interested in questions of better and worse. Is democracy a better form of government or type of society than rival types? Are our present concepts of democracy good enough? Such questions obviously raise the question of value. How is one thing to be judged better or worse than another? How do questions of moral standards fit into the positivistic analysis of meaning?

Schlick puts the issue bluntly. "So long," he says, "as the philosopher is concerned with his purely theoretical questions, he must forget that he has a human interest as well as a cognitive interest in the object of his investigation." One either takes ethics to be a purely theoretical, descriptive science or one changes "from a philosopher into a moralist, from an investigator into a preacher."¹⁵ One understands good, *or* one attempts to create it; one cannot do both. Morals are not just concerned with what is desired, or with the actual or possible consequences of desire, but with what is felt to be desirable. They are not concerned, in traditional language, with what is or with what may be, but with what ought to be. According to this analysis, moralists make statements which are neither cognitive nor analytic, and which are therefore of a different type of meaning. The dominant Positivistic theory seems to be that those statements are expressions of emotive meaning.

A. J. Ayer, who states this theory in its most extreme form argues that moral expressions are not equivalent to any sort of descriptive concepts, whether of psychology or of sociology. From this he draws the conclusion that what appear to be moral statements are not really statements at all, for they are "simply expressions of emotion." They are literally nonsense. While other Positivists consider this an over-simplified theory, the position

remains essentially the same. C. L. Stevenson, for one, grants that there are many different kinds of meaning, that there are moral statements, and that they may involve complicated combinations of meanings. He nevertheless asserts that there is a difference in kind between descriptive meaning and emotive meaning which establishes the divergence between knowledge and evaluation. Descriptive meaning is concerned with belief. Emotive meaning, however complicated it may be, is essentially an attempt to influence attitudes.

What is the basis of the fixed distinction between description and evaluation? At least on the face of it, for reasons which I touched on earlier, it is a difficult distinction to maintain. This holds true in spite of the fact that the logical separation of the two factors traditionally has been taken for granted. I have also mentioned the fact that the Positivists no longer make the distinction in the customary simplified manner. Some would even be willing to grant that no act of knowing can take place apart from other psychological factors, among which would be those factors they call emotive. Stevenson goes so far as to say that "No inquiry . . . can divorce itself from the evaluative considerations that directly concern and guide the process of inquiry itself. . . ." ¹⁶

The initial argument, then, for the separation between description and evaluation, is that the inter-relation of the two factors is psychological rather than logical. Knowledge may be causally dependent on evaluation, but logically it is independent, and is necessarily so. To argue otherwise is to commit the genetic fallacy. This fallacy occurs when one seeks to explain events or ideas by reducing them to their origins. One of the first principles of rational procedure is that the validity of a conclusion does not rest on the particular motivations which may have led to it. Such motivations may be relevant to the examination of certain beliefs but they may also be irrelevant or misleading. Valid theories may be arrived at for the most disreputable reasons, and respectable motivations may lead to highly invalid conclusions. Similarly, the Positivists argue, description cannot be re-

duced to the psychological conditions that are associated with it.

But this begs the question. Surely any attempt to reduce description to its psychological causes and accompaniments would commit the genetic fallacy. But the question concerns the logical characteristics of description, or of knowledge generally if it cannot be reduced to description. Can evaluation logically be excluded from the knowing process? If, as Stevenson says, evaluation guides "the process of inquiry itself," does the validity of the results of inquiry have no bearing on its direction, and does the direction have no bearing on the results of the inquiry? Are they logically unrelated?

The plausibility of the separation of knowledge from evaluation comes from a tacit assumption. The logical significance of evaluation is denied, and yet it is constantly taken for granted. Ayer, for instance, defines science mainly in terms of predictive hypotheses. These hypotheses are said to help us "control our environment." At the same time, all the indications are that he—and the other Positivists in their own ways—considers men's desires and activities of control as external to scientific hypotheses: the one is related to the other by accident, that is to say, without control. There would be no reason, on this theory, to assume that the scientific hypotheses were not haphazardly trivial.

Either it is tacitly assumed that science and human desires and evaluations exercise mutual direction and control over each other, or there is no reason to assume that science—or life for that matter—has direction. In the first instance both factors would presumably be aspects of one dynamic method. In the second there would be no reason to assume the existence of control over the relevance of scientific hypotheses or to assume that science would assist life. This is not a question of absoluteness of direction. By direction, here, I mean rational direction, direction that is not arbitrary.

A similar point must be made regarding the relations between science and philosophy. Either it is tacitly assumed that formal, philosophical analysis and the empirical hypotheses of science mutually direct each other, or there is no reason for believing

there is any relevant relation between the two functions. If the former is true, the division between philosophy and science is not so sharp as has been claimed. Philosophical analysis is then not so formal as described, and science is not so independent of logic. If the latter is true, there is no reason to believe that philosophy is more than accidentally relevant to any human activity. And in any case there would be no criterion for relevance.

The marked tendency of Positivism is to emphasize the separateness and passivity of the functions under analysis. Nor is this at all surprising since Positivists do classify their theory as a philosophical analysis, which would presumably, therefore, not be considered true or false by reference to experience. Quite naturally, then, the theory has the formal and passive quality of abstract analysis. Yet it is not merely an elaborated series of formal definitions or of analytic deductions. The Positivists present a theory of knowledge and value and of the nature of experience which they claim to be true.

This brings us again to the question of knowledge and evaluation. At best the Positivistic argument, that they are psychologically rather than logically inter-related, begs the question. But I think there are other reasons, besides those I have mentioned, why the distinction is retained.

One of these is a fear of any interference with objectivity. As the argument usually has it, knowledge as description simply tells us what the facts are; it does not evaluate them. And that remains the substance of the argument, even if it is made with the subtleties of logical analysis, and not in the usual, naive manner. In both the sophisticated and the naive forms the distinction between description and evaluation is involved in a parallel distinction between objectivity and subjectivity.

Whatever else objectivity means, it refers to the existence of evidences which may not be dealt with lightly, which may not be eliminated or altered by whim, whose existence and nature do not depend on the particular wishes and desires of any individual or group of individuals. If this has any significance it means further that when there are conflicts of beliefs, those con-

flicts may be resolved through reference to the evidences. No doubt, there is general agreement on such a definition of objectivity, but there is obviously disagreement on where and how it may be found.

Positivists point out that the two areas in which objectivity has been well-established and agreed upon are in formal logic and mathematics on the one hand, and in the natural sciences on the other. These are identified as deductive and inductive reasoning. In the one there is a logical relation between premises and conclusion such that, once certain premises are granted, a certain conclusion follows. In the other there is a logical relation between observations and ideas such that the validity of certain ideas is determined by the nature of the evidence. Once the evidence is examined, the conclusion is demonstrably established and cannot be changed unless the evidence changes, assuming that human beings desire to examine the evidence and to be guided by it.

But, Positivists say, the case is different with moral issues. These are of a different sort. Moral issues are fundamentally unexaminable, for moral standards are based on human preferences and desires—and are *therefore* not rational. A dispute may be resolved, harmony may replace conflict, but the resulting situation will be no more rational than if resolution and harmony had never occurred. The situation will not be based on knowledge in the one case any more than in the other. Of course, knowledge does have *some* effects on values. Positivists do not deny this. What they assert is that these effects are not rationally determined. They do not follow logically from the knowledge, but are only psychologically caused. The relation between values and knowledge is called psychological or factual rather than logical, which is another way of saying that values or moral standards have no rational connection with evidences or formal analysis. Values are responses that happen to occur and any other responses might equally well have happened. Therefore, when people happen to agree on the values they hold, that agreement is logically accidental. It resulted from peculiar psychological conditions rather than from any rationally established basis for the agreement. And

when people happen to disagree, that, too, is logically accidental, and cannot be rationally affected by any amount of knowledge, even though the people may happen to change their minds as a result of acquiring more knowledge.

Much the same is said of those evaluative issues which are involved throughout the sciences. As Stevenson argues:

There are certain evaluative issues that are integral to the very process of organizing knowledge. Interests in knowledge may be opposed, leading theorists to disagree about what is *worth* speaking of, or what distinctions are *important*, or what schemes of classification are *suitable*. These issues are not always factual ones in disguise, concerned with what sort of organization will suit a stipulated purpose; for there may be disagreement about the purpose to be served. They may be genuine evaluative issues, requiring the use of methods like those we have examined in ethics.

He goes on to raise the possibility that serious evaluative controversies might arise in science. But he is convinced there is no great danger, because: "The evaluative aspects of science involve only interests in knowledge, and these constitute a limited range of attitudes in which opposition is relatively infrequent. They tend to converge on certain aspects of knowledge, since they come to be re-inforced, and take on a similar direction, even when other desires are opposed." Even if this does not happen, varying interests may come to be tolerated or even welcomed. He concludes:

There is accordingly reason to hope, though there can be no full certainty, that the evaluative issues of science will not grow more serious than they now are, but will progressively grow less serious. One may hope as much, of course, even for *moral* problems; but there, where a broader range of attitudes is in question, the hope cannot be so confident.

But the issue is not whether or not evaluations in science have a more "limited range of attitudes" than moral questions. The problem is whether or not they are different in kind. If they are not, the question of extent of range is irrelevant, and there is no more rational basis for agreement in science than in morals. Nor

is there any more reason to anticipate agreement.¹⁷

The Positivist argument is still not enough to prove the mutual independence of knowledge and evaluation. The history of the sciences—and even of logic—reveals deep disagreements. While there is still disagreement, there is at least general agreement on the methods for dealing with the problems involved and the new problems that will arise. In those areas, standards of objectivity and methods for realizing them are well developed. It is possible—and I should say likely—that similar results may be achieved in morals, given the desires to do so.

By all indications, the Positivists do not consider this possible. Apparently the reason for the lack of objectivity in morality is not that it has not been striven for, but that values are by nature subjective. Subjectivity refers to an inaccessibility, an isolation, of values. They are then not affected by what goes on about them.

Knowledge is held to be objective because beliefs, ideas, theories may be checked in terms of the evidence. A meaningful idea is one that makes an ascertainable difference, and it makes a difference because it implies consequences which in turn affect the idea which brought them forth. The validity of a meaningful idea may be determined because the idea may be turned loose in the world to suffer the consequences, unforeseen consequences as well as those which were anticipated, to be tested and judged sound or wanting. If it made no difference to the world, the world could make no difference to it—and it could not be valid, or objective, or even meaningful.

What of values or ideals? Do the goals, purposes and standards of men make no difference to behavior and to the world of which behavior is a part? Do they have no effects upon the other events with which they seem to be involved? What of Galileo's standards of intellectual honesty and Mussolini's contrary standards? Did they take place in the void? If they make a difference, if they have consequences, presumably those consequences are capable of being examined. And presumably those examined consequences would make a difference to the values, which would in turn lead to future consequences. Although I cannot go into

detail here, it is not evident that there is an essential difference between the situation with ideals and the situation with ideas, in regard to objectivity, and eventually validity. Unless—and here we return to Positivism—unless values are denied to be a part of the ordinary world of events. In that case values are subjective, essentially isolated, both logically and psychologically.

There is another aspect to this problem. If “interests in knowledge” are indeed “integral” to science, as Stevenson has declared, would not the validity of science both depend on and determine the validity of those interests? Would they not, in fact, be both logically and psychologically inextricable? To broaden the question: Does it make any difference whether or not one seeks truth and is interested in validity? The Positivistic reply is that it depends on what one is interested in, or what end one desires. As Daniel J. Bronstein says it:

The answer can only be in terms of what we hope to accomplish by using any of these methods. Do we want comfortable beliefs? Do we want beliefs that will stack up well with those of our social set? Do we want a method that will make it unnecessary for us ever to change our minds? Then one of the other methods would be preferable to the method of science. Or do we want a method which is most likely to lead to beliefs that are true? People tend to choose that method which they think can best accomplish the end they desire.

He adds a footnote: “Of course, none of these methods can tell what end to desire.”¹⁸ Well, then, does it make any difference what end is desired? Is it a matter of indifference whether one desires truth or not? Unless I am seriously mistaken, this is classified as a moral question, and therefore not answerable.

This has strange implications for knowledge. Even if the question is declared unanswerable an answer is still given by implication. If there is no reason why one should desire truth, then it does make no difference whether or not one desires knowledge, or prefers truth to error. Presumably the existence of knowledge, or the quest for it, makes no difference. This implies that knowledge is either trivial or subjective, or both. And, if it is subjective,

the question must be raised as to how there can be any objectivity at all.

Part of the difficulty, in attempting to deal with this whole problem, is that evaluation is usually identified with morality and morality is identified with a clinging to fixed standards, traditional or personal. If this series of identifications is valid, then evaluations are essentially isolated somehow, because there can be no examination of evidence under such circumstances. But surely evaluation as uncritical acceptance constitutes a contradiction in terms. Whatever else may be said about morality considered as rigid acceptance of pre-established values, it is certainly not evaluative. And unless morality is defined in those terms, it is at least possible that it is capable of critical examination in such a way that knowledge becomes an integral—not simply a logically accidental—part of morality. It may be, indeed, that moral evaluation (or any other kind) is not possible apart from rational, objective procedures.

The difficulty with morality may not be that it is necessarily subjective or concerned with fixed standards, but that it is still assumed to be such. Before the emergence of science, knowledge in general was conceived in terms of immutable truths. The Logical Empiricists reject this conception. But it may be, as many believe, that morality is in the same situation.

The question is not whether all people agree on the same values, or whether they will in fact come to agree. The question is not even whether all moral conflicts may come to be settled. The question is whether or not values may be validly evaluated and judged. Is there any criterion and method by which this may be done? If there is, and if it is applied to moral disagreements and conflicts, that does not mean they will automatically be settled. While a valid criterion leads to particular agreements, validity would not depend on agreement as such—regarding either conclusions or method—here any more than in the established sciences.

The Positivistic analysis has not shown that there is not such a criterion. And the suspicion remains that the plausibility—or

even the possibility—of that theory rests on the tacit assumption that there is.

Without attempting to settle that question here, let us return to the general position of traditional empiricism in order to see what its implications are for morality. Positivism is the most exhaustive contemporary effort to explore the theoretical foundations of traditional empiricism. The most incisive statement of its consequences is given by E. B. McGilvary.

While not all Positivists would agree with his definition of good in terms of desires, the disagreement is not crucial to his argument and clearly most empiricists are sympathetic to his fundamental ethical theory. But so far the ethical problem has been set rather than settled. If good is defined in terms of desires or interests operating at any given time, there are still conflicts of desires struggling for realization, both within and between individuals. The objects of desires are not sent to us post-paid and for the asking. They are always strictly cash-on-delivery, and there is never enough cash for all of them; and often we have sacrificed to meet the price only to find that someone better fixed has got the goods first.

When we find a number of incompatible desires, are they equally good? If so, what happens when all of them cannot be realized? If only some of the competing desires are really good, how can we go about deciding the question?

In attempting to settle conflicts between desires, McGilvary insists that we can at least attempt to learn what the desires are. Although science cannot declare any belief or action obligatory, it can clear away confusion about what desires are actually operative. It can also determine the ends of these desires and the means to their attainment. It might discover that the existing morality does not actually satisfy desires. In doing all this it may reveal more agreement than was previously thought to exist. Besides describing "various ways of behaving observable among men," science may also elaborate various "conceivable" desires and ends. "It might be able to describe an end which, if realized, would

include the realization of all, or of a large number of . . . historical ends." But it remains true that "a science could not as a science prescribe this inclusive end." Finally, science might learn that there really is, after all, "a common chief desire in all men" and hence also a "common chief end."

It is *possible* for this to be the case, but "historically there has been no such thing," even if it has been approximated in certain stable societies.¹⁹ McGilvary therefore rejects this last possibility. The second he apparently considers unlikely. The first clears away confusion and tells us what we really want, but without either of the other two possibilities it does nothing to alleviate ultimate conflicts of desires.

What then? McGilvary's own conviction is that "moral conflicts are actual warfare. . . ." Moral warfare is found no less in moral suasion than in battles between armies. For "the weapons of moral warfare are not all carnal. . . . Every virile moral judgment is itself . . . a weapon." Praise and blame, glory and material reward—all such reputedly peaceful devices are arms in the moral battle. The fact of relativity in morals has been deprived of recognition by the fear that it "would prove the death of morality"; and also by the fear that ideals are not able to win by human efforts alone, so that people feel there is no use trying unless the conclusion is foregone. But the actual consequence of relativity is very different. If an ideal *is* an ideal, it is a glowing vision that is yearned for; and competition, instead of weakening the ideal, gives it an added life and vigor, and gives the believer firmer conviction. When we have ideals, they are *our* ideals and we should fight for them. Any other attitude is false modesty or cowardice. "All we need," says McGilvary, "is *not* to know the end is unattainable, and to believe that there is a chance for success."²⁰ All the conviction one needs in the certainty of his ideal will come after he has pledged himself to it. The moral commandment is: Pledge yourself to your ideal and fight for it with all the weapons you have at your command.

Hence the conclusion: All moral conflicts are solved by the method of might, in one form or another. It is the same method

that has been used throughout history. Might has always made right and will continue to do so. But McGilvary does not claim that this fact means that rightness is settled immediately upon the use of force. Time must elapse. After the battle is won conditions become settled and the various sentiments adjust to the new situation. Even the defeated opposition may come in time to hold the same ideals as the victors. Or it may happen that the ideals of those who were apparently defeated may eventually dominate, because of elusive psychological or cultural forces, in which case they will be the victors after all.

Where the Moslems triumphed, Islam became the creed; where Christians won, Christianity set the pattern of beliefs—until later conquerors arrived. Where conditions appear to belie McGilvary's claim—where, that is, we deny the rightness of a particular settled standard—he insists it is only that we have inherited another set of standards that have been established by fighting. Most Americans, for example, reject dictatorships for techniques of arbitration. But arbitration cannot be settled by its own means; it has been created as a standard by an earlier use of force.

Whatever its special techniques may be, the essence of might is the effort of one individual (or group of individuals) to impose his beliefs on another individual (or group of individuals). McGilvary shows convincingly, if it is not already evident, that might has been the dominant method, throughout history, which has been used in attempts to settle moral problems. But it does not follow from that that might has been the only method, or that it must be. The heart of his argument is not historical but logical: Might is not only the method which has been used but there is no other which may be—where the conflicts are genuine and crucial.

One more qualification should be added. It does not follow from the logical argument, even if it is valid, that might solved the problem even where it produced agreement. I am not attempting to argue that a solution was not produced because the standards agreed on did not remain unchanged. That would not

meet the issue. I am asserting that many, if not all, problems remain even where the exercise of might has produced agreement on moral ideals. The defeat and virtual extermination of the Albigenses, for example, may have solved the *Albigensian* heresy. But the occurrence of heresy, its causes, remained, and indeed before long heresies began to flourish as never before, until the Church itself was broken from its former power. M. C. Otto has pointed out, regarding one of McGilvary's own examples, that while the Civil War produced eventual agreement on the evils of slavery, the problems of which slavery was a partial expression have remained, sometimes in intensified forms.²¹

To take one further example: People in this country are almost unanimously agreed on the virtue of thrift and the evil of debt. And the national debt continues to mount. It is not enough to point out, in reply, that other standards may be held as well as those, and in conflict with them. That is part of the problem, even if not the whole of it. For men do not only hold ideals which are in conflict with other people's ideals. Individual men are also in conflict with themselves. What is to be done then, especially when the conflicts are important and crucial? If the moral standards involved are incompatible, as they frequently are today, then there are two possibilities implied by this theory, and only two that I can see. One would be for one phase of the self to impose itself, by might, on other phases of the self. Psychological case histories are full of such efforts. The other would be to make a decision by some other form of chance, logically speaking. It would be by chance because it could not be based on knowledge, even if it were made in reference to knowledge. In either case there would be no reason to assume that the underlying problem did not remain. Unless—and here we return to the fundamental assumption of Logical Empiricism—unless we assume that the individual were isolated from the world. The philosophical term for that isolation is subjectivity. That assumption must be made at least about the moral aspects of life—assuming further that they can be strictly separated from the others—in order to arrive at the conclusions we have seen. Those

conclusions, once again, are that fundamental moral problems can be dealt with only by chance or by might.

Is this all that can be said, finally? Perhaps. If so, is it what we *should* believe? Perhaps. Or is it a matter of indifference? But let us not get entangled in this paradox—or dilemma—just now. If that is all that is to be said, there are traditional empiricists who do not think so, and we should see what some of them have to say.

Traditional Empiricism — II

The reaction to the doctrine that might makes right is so generally one of revulsion that it is belaboring the obvious to make a point of it. Yet it has to be mentioned, if only to suggest that a revulsion of feeling does not constitute a refutation. This should be obvious but is not. Those who are loudest in denouncing the theory that might makes right are sometimes among the most adept in using the techniques of might. Even their protestations may be, however unconsciously, weapons in the warfare of moral ideals. There are also many instances where men have come to accept, or even to acclaim, what had previously been viewed with repugnance. McGilvary's theory may be true, and it may come to be accepted.

Many empiricists who agree with the premises of his argument nevertheless reject his conclusions. One of these is Ralph Barton Perry, who has made the most intense, persistent and exhaustive efforts that I am aware of to avoid the apparent consequences of traditional empiricism. He has attempted this both in his explorations into the nature of value and in his explicit formulations of a philosophy of democracy.

But there are difficulties in working with Perry. One can easily understand his conviction that other empiricists have reduced, or even eliminated, the possibility of a moral and social philosophy which is both rational and significant for human perplexities. Yet, while respecting Perry's moral concern and intellectual ability, one may still have serious doubts that he has succeeded in avoiding the conclusions which are characteristic of the empirical tradition.

The main problem centers upon the relationship between Perry's initial assumptions and his social philosophy. From his *General Theory of Value* to the recent *Realms of Value* the assumptions—regarding, for example, the logical separation of knowledge from evaluation—seem to remain the same. During those years, however, and especially since the outbreak of World War II, Perry has been increasingly preoccupied with specific social problems. His social philosophy has become increasingly relevant, realistic and, I believe, valid. But I am equally convinced that the same process which enhances the worth of his conclusions also tends to divorce them from his premises.

The problem is common-place in the history of philosophy. A thinker inherits assumptions. The course of experience has, at the same time, brought him up against conditions which must be accounted for in a different fashion. As a rule the philosopher is unable to reject either the assumptions or the events that confront him, incompatible though they may be. His problem, then, becomes that of reconciling incompatibles. So it is, I think, with Perry. And so it is that, in his effort to harmonize his original assumptions with his later conclusions in social philosophy, without surrendering either, some of the issues become blurred.

But Perry is emphatic in declaring his departure from his fellow empiricists. If morality is left where McGilvary as well as most of the Positivists leave it, he implies, men will have only two alternatives to choose from. One choice is totalitarianism, which rejects rational knowledge and seeks its own ends by making men alike and by appealing to their tribal impulses. The other choice is "modern liberalism":

The canker at the heart of modern liberalism is the suspicion that its hallowed morality is only one prejudice among others. Liberals have learned from what they take to be authoritative scientific sources, that all moralities are matters of arbitrary preferences, relative to the taste of particular individuals or groups. Granted this general relativity, the moral will of the liberal is paralysed.

As long as the liberal takes his skepticism literally, "he is condemned to become the impartial and impotent spectator of a war of superstitions."

Perry finds an alternative to totalitarianism and liberalism in what he calls the tradition of civilized mankind, especially as it is found in American democracy. He grants that this tradition suffers from both internal and external dangers, but finds compensation in an essential agreement, among Americans, concerning the basic issues:

There is, happily, no question of improvising a creed on the spur of the moment, but only one of recovering a creed that is already there. . . .

The underlying ethical premise of American democracy is the simple doctrine . . . that there are meanings of the terms 'duty,' 'right,' 'wrong,' 'good,' 'evil,' 'virtue,' and their derivatives, which are universal; so that the judgments in which they are employed are binding on all men.

Although the immediate reaction to these statements may be that Perry either has fallen back on supernatural sanctions or has abandoned his reliance on description, he denies that either is the case.

He does not avoid the difficulty, however, when he continues:

In the eighteenth century, when American democracy was born, this doctrine was expressed in terms of 'reason' and 'conscience.'

. . .

The moral truth discoverable by reason and conscience was in substance as follows. Good and evil, in their broad, generic senses, mean happiness and unhappiness, while in their specifically moral senses they mean harmony and conflict.

And a statement made four years later, in *Puritanism and Democracy*, if anything increases the difficulty:

The fundamental faith in democracy is the belief that sound institutions are founded on truth; that truth is accessible to all men through the cultivation and exercise of their higher faculties; that the truth will in the end unite men rather than divide them;

and that to this end men should be permitted freely to think, profess, discuss and persuade.¹

What does he here mean by truth? There is no reason to believe that he has abandoned his earlier position that morality and truth (valuing and knowing), in the ordinary sense, are "specifically different." And yet he constantly insists that the basic issues of democracy are moral.

Although Perry speaks of "moral truths" as being in "correspondence with the nature of things through enlightenment," there is still every reason to believe that he does not intend to identify morality with a description of reality, nor to equate morality with a description of agreements already achieved by human beings. What then? In speaking of moral truths he must be referring primarily to judgments made in accord with the "standard of inclusiveness." William James sketched the outlines of that standard in "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life." Perry extended the theory and refined it in such books as the *General Theory of Value, Puritanism and Democracy*, and *Realms of Value*.

The problem, in terms of the interest theory of value, is to find some way of locating those interests or desires which are better than others, and to show its significance for democracy. Perry argues that this is to be done by obtaining a "harmonious integration" of conflicting desires, and that this is possible without resorting to force.

The criterion which is proposed as peace-maker in the warfare of moral ideals bears the name, Inclusiveness. In general, the principle of inclusiveness is applicable in those instances in which interests "overlap"—in which, that is, interests are tied together, either because different desires seek out the same object or because similar desires are interested in different objects. In these instances, which include conflicts, there is a relation of whole and part—a whole of overlapping interests related to those particular interests that go together to make up the whole—and since a

whole is greater than any of its parts, there is also more value to the whole than to any of its parts.

Overlappings of interests, in general, and also conflicting interests, specifically, may occur within one individual or among several individuals. The existence of a conflict means that what is good to one interest is evil to the others. So far, there is no way of deciding which of the interests is better since, as they stand, each has its own standard which applies only to itself, excluding the others. It sometimes happens, however, that a new object is hit upon. If the new object is effective, it is not just a compromise which curtails part of each interest; instead it constitutes a new object of interest in which the old desires are fulfilled. Let us say the situation involves two desires and is handled by whatever group or person has the conflict, without aid from the outside:

In this case no factor operates save the two interests themselves, each in turn taking account of the other, and both contributing dynamically to the outcome. The plan or course of action so generated may be said to embrace both interests, because both have gone into the making of it. They have, furthermore, gone into it without any residuum, so that both interests may be said to be wholly satisfied.

That which occurs is comparable to chemical synthesis or to a resultant of forces.²

In all such efforts, two different things go to make up a third thing, which is the whole including only the original elements. The original elements are transformed into something apparently different from what they were at first; but they really are the same since, when the whole is analyzed, it is found to contain nothing but the original constituents. In this way both originally conflicting interests can operate to their full capacity and still be harmonious.

Under the circumstances, the "satisfaction of both interests would be better than the defeat of either," which leads to the conclusion "that a harmonious personality or society is better than a conflicting personality or society." It is true that the belief

is valid only when "judged by . . . the standard of inclusiveness hypothetically applied," yet it alone makes genuine moral judgments possible. The principle of inclusiveness "is relative neither to interests nor to objects," nor to further standards. It "makes possible the comparison of the objects of one interest with the objects of another without the introduction of a third interest, and is therefore the only standard by which all interests may be brought into one system" and in that way be commensurable by other standards.³ Therefore, if any standard at all is applicable, it is inclusiveness.

It is this standard that makes it possible to speak of "moral truths." A moral judgment is "objective and verifiable" when made in terms of it, even though the validity of the judgment depends on the acceptance of the standard. But this is not the end of the matter. Perry insists that this criterion is in fact generally accepted and is therefore generally applicable to that extent. It "has been most widely in vogue in Western Europe, pagan or Christian" and "it is the standard most likely to be assumed as the standard of final appraisal among those who inherit the European tradition"; it is the basis of our "social arts and institutions"; and it is "commonly presupposed in moral discussion as the principle by which differences of moral opinion can be resolved."⁴

But Perry is not interested simply in recording the fact, as he considers it, that overlapping interests in an object make that object better than when only an isolated interest is directed toward it; or the fact, however he arrived at it, that most people (in the Western World) believe in the standard of inclusiveness. He does not assert that it is the only standard, nor does he look the other way when fundamental conflicts appear before him. He is alive to pressing and tragic moral problems. And he wants to do something about them. So he claims that when the standard of inclusiveness is "hypothetically applied" it is the only standard by which a greatest good can be comprehensively defined or placed above *all other* values. The greatest good will be the object of an all-inclusive and harmonious system of interests.

This is "the moral good." It "has been defined as harmonious happiness, or as that organization of interests in which each enjoys the non-interference and support of the others, whether within the personal life or the life of society." The moral emphasis, however, "is on the 'harmony' rather than on the 'happiness.'" It is not the job of morality to define concretely the nature of happiness, nor to legislate the particular ways of attaining it. Morality endeavors, rather, to make it possible for the individual to work his own way toward happiness, and it does so by eliminating those conflicts which interfere with the pursuit of happiness. The emphasis is indeed on harmony, but not for its own sake. It is important morally because it opens the way to the personal achievement of happiness.⁵

There is little chance for the attainment of harmonious happiness without the development of benevolence. In benevolence one takes the interests of another person as his own—as parents may at least try to help their children find their own happiness, even though it may be different from the parents' own anticipations and hopes.

Ultimately benevolence must apply to all men because one person cannot subordinate the interest of any other person to his own. One individual may—and often should—subordinate one of his own desires to another which he considers more important; but the dominant or ultimate interests of each individual are independent of other individuals—and consequently are unchanged by the attitudes others have toward them. A conflict of interests may cause one party to reject or ignore the desires of the opposition, yet those desires are not themselves subordinate just because they have been rejected; they remain whatever they happen to be. Perry is convinced that most people would repudiate a situation in which all persons but one lived in perfect happiness, on the condition that the one person lived in torment. Nor does he consider it to be merely a contemporary historical sentiment: people would reject the possible solution because the tormented individual would retain his torment no matter what the rest tried to think about him.

This or any other moral problem may be solved, Perry's argument continues, when the various interested parties have the same attitude—"universal love," which is equally interested in all interests involved in the controversy. To use the extreme case, the man in torment would like to give up some of his suffering, and the others would be willing to give up some of their happiness in order to include the outsider. The happiness would be less perfect, yet the outcome would be better because it includes more people. "It is evident," Perry says, "that a situation in which both the one and the millions are happy *would be* better." For just as fulfillment of all conflicting interests is better than their defeat, so the achievement of all conflicting interests is better than the success of some and the defeat of others. For, by hypothesis, the satisfaction of interests is good.

But Perry does not ignore the obstacles to harmonious happiness. Interests—even benevolent interests—conflict. When that happens the conflict may be resolved by the method of "reflective agreement." This method begins with the individual's inner conflicts. As he reflects upon his interests which have been diverse and at odds with each other, he relates them to one another, and they become integrated and more or less harmonious. But sooner or later he will find himself—as a person representing all of his interests as they are now organized—in conflict with others. Reflective agreement may begin to function again, this time on a social level. To the extent that there is benevolence there will be a desire to agree. There will be a mutual acknowledgment of claims, an emphasis on areas in which there is already agreement, and perhaps the formulation of a plan for cooperation by which all interests may be fulfilled. The procedure throughout will be one of discussion and persuasion. Any other method will be an "invasion of privacy." And if each of the participants is benevolent they may find themselves a step closer to harmonious happiness.⁶

The highest good, as Perry would have it, is obviously an ideal rather than a fact. Yet he insists that it is realizable. Some men have occasionally touched it. At the same time it may never

exist; but whether it is achieved or not it is still the best, the highest good.

From this point of view an adequate philosophy of democracy depends upon the several points just considered: morality, inclusiveness, harmonious happiness, benevolence, and reflective agreement. Democracy is not, therefore, confined to any limited group of institutions which may be called "political." It is a comprehensive form of social organization. It is, indeed, the special application of morality:

In its fundamental meaning [Perry says] a democracy is a society of persons who so manage their relations and their affairs as to escape the evils of isolation, frustration, and violence, and achieve the goods of living innocently and fruitfully together. It is a harmony of wills by which to achieve the maximum fulfillment if the interests of all concerned. So defined the democratic society is the ideal society, and in proportion as the ideal is achieved a society merits the name of 'democracy.'⁷

Democracy, like morality, assumes that no individual's interests may be excluded from consideration. All men have access to truth. While individual capacities vary, they do not do so on a hereditary basis. It is always possible, moreover, that any individual's claim may be true. And besides, each individual has "a unique experience through which some truth is accessible to him alone."

Since "an individual's good is to be found in his own interests as he feels them, . . . to do good to any man means to serve that man's felt interests. . . ." This implies that each individual should be allowed to participate in political affairs, for "the best guarantee that any given individual's interests will not be neglected is to give that individual both the voice and the power with which to obtain a respectful hearing."⁸

If the matter were left here, Perry would have done no more than to have ratified the existing conflicts. He would have asserted, in effect, that each person's desires were automatically desirable; and since the existing conflicts result from the existing

desires, we would be no better off than before. But Perry adds that human beings are educable. If they are given opportunities for education and participation in political affairs they will, to that extent, become increasingly capable both of achieving what they want and of regulating their wants.

The conclusion derived from this is that democracy rests essentially upon unanimity rather than upon majority. All men's interests must be considered and "every mature and normal individual" is rational. Since truth "is the same for *all* men," universal reason must, ideally, result in unanimity, which thereby becomes a norm, "a standard of criticism," of political activity.

The ideal of unanimity is also implied, he continues, by the democratic principle of consent. To say that democracy rests on the consent of the governed is to say that it must really represent *all* of the interests it claims to speak for, and that it does not do so unless each of those interests actually gives its consent.

Here is a source of meaning for the slogan of equality. In *Puritanism and Democracy* equalitarianism is given primarily as a "sentiment of fellow-feeling." A similar idea is found in the *Realms of Value* as "the emphasis on the common nature and the common lot of mankind." But in the more recent work Perry goes on to interpret equality as the principle of equal consent. As such it "culminates in the feeling of participation," the "sense of participation and companionship in a joint effort to provide for the several and different interests of all men."

Perry's conception of freedom has changed in much the same sort of way. In *Puritanism and Democracy*, again, freedom is for the most part defined in traditional terms as the ability of the individual to do what he wants. So stated there is an obvious difficulty. Wants conflict and freedom is here little more than a name for such conflict. Perry was aware of this but his argument became cumbersome in the effort to deal with it. Apparently for this reason freedom is defined in *Realms of Value* as "doing what one *chooses*." And this is a matter of *personal* choice. It

implies reflection, that is, a capacity to select from several acts which are represented in advance by ideas. It implies calculation,

that is, judgments of the results of possible acts; and it implies a weighing not only of alternative means but alternative ends. It then appears, furthermore, that the degree of freedom depends on the range of alternatives—the number and variety of possibilities open to choice; and this, in turn, not only upon their existing but upon their being known.

Freedom is still, in this formulation of it, essentially an individual possession, and personal choices remain a source of conflict. But the shift, slight as it may at first appear to be, has consequences for social harmony and potentialities for the social implementation of freedom. And although Perry somewhat negatively gives the democratic principle as “the maximum freedom of each which is consistent with a similar freedom for all,” he also suggests that there may be an “interplay of freedoms” which “creates the zest and exhilaration of democratic social relations.”⁹

And yet there are those who are not interested in democracy, equality and freedom. They must be dealt with accordingly. This does not mean that they must be dealt with harshly in every case. Regarding some it is sufficient to point out that political liberty demands a distinction to be made between thought and action. Freedom of thought does not imply that one can act on whatever he is thinking. But not everyone accepts this distinction and the other limitations of freedom. Democracy must be able to defend itself against those who are opposed to democracy and who seek to act on their ideas. There is a danger, Perry repeatedly remarks, in being so “scrupulous” about ideals of freedom that it becomes impossible to defend them. A person may be so anxious to defend freedom in principle that he will lose it in actuality, by disregarding the consequences of unrestrained liberty. When democracy conflicts with those who seek to destroy it, believers in democracy must use force: they “must in hours of trial even be willing to conduct themselves in a manner profoundly opposed to their ideals. But they do not thereby renounce their ideals. . . . They must keep their souls undefiled while soiling their hands. If they employ violence rather than persuasion, they must do so without gladness but from the conviction of its tragic necessity.”¹⁰

Perry's approach to value in general, and to democracy specifically, has many appealing qualities. The chief of these, perhaps, is that he is rare among contemporary writers in that he possesses *both* a deep moral concern and a keen regard for examinable evidence. Most writers are motivated by one or the other. There is seldom an equal regard for both. As for his philosophy of democracy, I must confess to a partisan response. It will be noted that the meanings he gives to freedom and equality are similar to the interpretations of those ideals which are presented in the last chapter of this book.

Yet there are two general questions which must be raised. Democracy is the best form of social organization, Perry says, because it is the social extension of morality. Morality starts with conflicting interests and pursues the goal of harmonious interests. Does he actually provide an adequate standard and method for the resolution of those conflicts? Is democracy as he conceives it actually the consequence of that standard and that method?

Just what is the nature of Perry's claim regarding his standard?

It is no disproof [he says] of the present doctrine of harmonious happiness to point out that men are not harmoniously happy, or are inharmoniously unhappy. All that needs to be proved is that there is a prolonged and widespread attempt to be harmoniously happy; that men are capable of such an attempt; that they can and do take steps in the direction of harmonious happiness; and that they can and do measure their steps by the standard of harmonious happiness. The fundamental claim for the present view is that it describes a peculiarly widespread, fundamental and persistent human pursuit for which 'moral' is the most appropriate name.¹¹

Now the ideal of harmonious happiness, as we have seen, rests on the principle of inclusiveness. Any whole contains more value—simply in terms of "moreness"—than any of its parts. But if the various interests conflict so as to eliminate each other there will be less value. The proposed solution lies, then, in enabling each interest to be fulfilled so that the maximum of value can be main-

tained or achieved. This can only be done by harmonizing the diverse and conflicting interests.

Stated in this way the ideal of happiness becomes superfluous. The goal is to harmonize all interests *whatever* they may be. And besides, even if most men are interested in happiness, it is so vague and so variously interpreted that people try to trip each other up in its pursuit.

Thus, as Perry says, the emphasis must be upon harmony, which is to be understood as the organization of all interests so that each may be fulfilled, or the pursuit of each in such a way that all may be attained. But there are more problems here than even Perry, with his lively awareness of the limitations of his principle, seems to be aware of. One of them is that, granting agreement on the general idea of harmony, there remain disagreements as to its specific nature.

If a fictional example may be used, Huxley's *Brave New World* presents a society of harmonious happiness. True, Bernard Marx, Helmholtz Watson and the Savage excluded themselves and were excluded. Most of us, probably including Perry, admire the three protagonists rather than the Brave New World. Yet in that framework *they* were the menace to *that* harmonious society. Meanwhile, in this actual world of ours, we find it necessary to eliminate Hitlers, Mussolinis and others as obstacles to the present potentialities for harmony. The two situations, we say, are different. But the question is: harmony for harmony, exclusion for exclusion, how can we decide, on Perry's theory, which is superior?

If a more "realistic" example is preferred, let us take a recent newspaper account of conditions in the Belgian Congo. The situation there is reported to be harmonious as compared with that in British, French, and Dutch colonies. The "natives" are well-treated, but, as is sometimes said in this country, "they are kept in their place."

In fact [the reporter says] there is no politics. Neither the whites nor the natives vote.

Natives get elemental education to equip them for the jobs

they can do here. They are not, as in some British and French colonies, sent to European universities for higher education and exposure to political ideas, the agitation of which might disrupt colonial rule. Natives who leave and acquire such political sophistication are barred re-entry to the Congo.

This, the reporter comments, "is what Americans call reactionary."¹² But why, on the principle of harmonious happiness, should we object?

Perry's reply might be that the real test of harmonious happiness is to be found in reflective agreement. Such agreement takes place with regard, say, to social policy in proportion as a decision is the expression of the agreement of all persons, each of whom speaks on behalf of an integration of all his own interests. Reflective agreement, he says, is akin to the process of collective bargaining with a genuine interchange. The two examples, on the other hand, represent the use of agreement achieved by propagandistic devices. But in "non-reflective propaganda men are united with one another by being divided from themselves. . . . Agreement obtained by methods thus deliberately contrived to inhibit reflection does violence to personal integrity."¹³

It seems likely that Perry underestimates the extent to which interests may be unified without any special concern for reflection. He may assume that people *ought* to be interested in reflection, whether they are or not. But why should anyone be interested in reflection? If there is no such interest, does not that end the matter? Or, if we assume that people do have an interest in reflection, what are they to reflect upon? Usually Perry seems to say that one reflects upon his interests and their inter-relationships. If so, is not this essentially a subjective matter? And if it is subjective, one would conclude, presumably, that any form of harmony or agreement among desires, however arrived at, would be equally valid. Reflection, then, is irrelevant.

The issue of subjectivity is crucial for Perry's theory. If his theory of value is essentially subjectivistic, then most of his arguments and conclusions are irrelevant. Sometimes he appears to

say that interests are, at least, not just subjective, and that reflection must be concerned with objective conditions. Interests have objects and objects can be known. Such knowledge provides a way of judging interests by what he calls the standard of enlightenment. Yet the way he puts it, I think, ultimately confirms the suspicion that interests are subjective. For enlightenment consists in the possession of true knowledge *about* value—the nature of a particular interest, the nature of its object, and the consequences and relevant conditions. But let it be remembered that Perry, like the other traditional empiricists, maintains the logical separation of knowing from valuing. And like the other empiricists, Perry asserts that, while interests may be modified by knowing about their conditions and consequences, such changes are not logically related to the enlightenment. He asserts that evil interests, for example, may be just as enlightened as good interests. As we have seen, this is the essence of subjectivity in value: namely, that changes in value, as a psychological fact, take place in a way that is logically irrelevant to changes in man's objective world or to changes in his knowledge of that world. Presumably, then, one need reflect on no more than his subjective interests themselves—if, indeed, it is necessary to do even that.

There may be another way, however, in which Perry claims objectivity for value, and specifically moral value. "Moral knowledge," he says, "possesses the same general characteristics, and is subject to the same discipline, as all knowledge." It differs only in regard to its subject-matter. Any judgment is made relative to some standard, but the relativity is vicious only if it is not recognized. There are, to be sure, various moral standards. Yet harmonious happiness is qualified to be *the* moral standard, because

It satisfies the requirement of cognitive universality and objectivity; that is, it is the same for all knowers who address themselves to the subject. Since the norm of harmonious happiness acknowledges all interests, its affirmation is free from the so-called 'personal equation.' . . . It is impartial. It says, in effect, that since it is interest as such which generates good, and a harmonious relation of in-

terests which constitutes moral good, to him who makes the judgment *his* interest is just one among the rest.¹⁴

Earlier in the discussion we encountered certain difficulties with the standard of harmonious happiness. In the effort to avoid them it seemed advisable to turn to reflective agreement, not just as the method by which harmonious happiness is applied, but as the way by which its meaning might be specified and its validity established. Now, however, we find ourselves thrown back on the ideal of harmonious happiness with its attendant difficulties.

In the first place many standards are "universal and objective," in Perry's sense, if they are formulated vaguely enough. They are "the same for all knowers" in the sense that they do not mean much concretely to any of them. It is this way with self-realization, enlightened self-interest, hedonism, altruism, duty—and also with harmonious happiness. When the standard is made concrete the situation changes. It is then highly dubious, as we have seen, that it means the same for all.

In the second place, therefore, if harmonious happiness is regarded as a universal standard because it seeks the fulfillment of all interests, we must remember that interests do actually conflict. How is harmonious happiness by itself to fulfill the interests of the persons who are opposed to the principle to begin with?

Third, although it is true, as Perry says, that the interests of the person doing the judging are among the rest, they remain *his* interests. Instead of regarding them as *just* among the rest he may seek the domination of his own interests through a manipulated harmony. Perry is opposed to this, to be sure, but as yet there does not seem to be a valid basis for his opposition.

One other point needs to be made, about objectivity or subjectivity as the case may be. Perry says that "moral knowledge" differs from other forms of knowledge only in subject-matter. But the difference may be a fundamental one. Given his theory of knowledge as the description or record of things as they are, he concludes that knowledge and reality are essentially the same. And this is presumably the ultimate basis of his theory of objectivity.

But surely he means something very different when he writes of *moral* knowledge. His basic argument throughout is that since good is the fulfillment of interest, the greatest good is the fulfillment of all interests. If this is a moral truth, with what sort of a reality is it identical? He explicitly denies that it is a metaphysical principle. He does not claim that all men have heretofore found more inclusive ideals better than the less inclusive, or that they do now, or that they will. And besides such a claim would, if valid, be an example of a sociological or psychological truth, rather than a moral truth. If it is asserted that the principle of harmonious happiness is, strictly speaking, the logical consequence of the very meaning of value, the conclusion seems to be both doubtful in its own right and seriously irrelevant to the realities of human conflict. When the principle leaves the heavenly calm of formal logic for the rough and tumble of daily affairs, it finds not only that there are those who are not interested in it, but also that many who claim to accept it disagree as to what they are accepting.

In contrast to these possibilities, Perry may argue that, however it is derived, the principle is the only one that makes comparative judgments possible. But this, too, is at best dubious—for reasons which we have examined—and leads to the mazes of subjectivity instead of to an identity with reality. We are left with the alternative that Perry's moral principle is one that he considers the best, not because it is true, but because he is most positively interested in it. The conclusion appears to be inescapable that, in this theory, value is subjective; and that, when moral goods conflict, there is no rationally valid standard by which they may be judged.

What has been said about Perry's theory of value vitally concerns his philosophy of democracy. He argues that the meaning and validity of democracy are to be derived from the nature of morality, which in turn rests upon moral knowledge. But if the claims regarding moral knowledge are unfounded, that affects the nature of morality, and also modifies the conception of democ-

racy—in its very meaning as well as in its validity. These changes may be seen as they affect the key ideals of consent, freedom and equality.

As Perry expounds the idea, consent means the principle of resolving social problems by unanimous agreement, arrived at reflectively and without any form of coercion or manipulation. But social problems are essentially moral. A moral problem occurs when interests conflict and is to be solved by bringing those interests into harmony. A social problem and its solution are to be found in the extension of the same process. Granting this position, with the implied subjectivity of value, it is irrelevant how the harmony is reached, as long as each individual accepts it as satisfying his interests. So far as I can see, Perry's insistence on "reflection," "integrity," and so on, is beside the point. If interests are subjective, "propagandistic" or manipulated harmony would be as harmonious as any other, and therefore as good as any other. Consent would not, then, imply any specific form of social organization. Or, to put it differently, if democracy were still defined in terms of consent it would cease to have any distinctive meaning.

The meaning of freedom likewise changes. The connection between freedom and "enlightenment," which is implicit in Perry's reference to freedom in terms of the "range of alternatives," is without foundation in the rest of the philosophy. For he writes of democracy as the social organization of morality, and of freedom as a main democratic slogan. But he also denies any rational connection between goodness and enlightenment.

Indeed there seems to be no reason why freedom should not be defined—as in one of its traditional formulations as the ability to do whatever it is one wants to do. This leads, naturally, to serious problems. So stated, freedoms themselves conflict, without any criterion, here, for the resolution of that conflict. Or it may be said that what each person really wants is harmonious happiness. Freedom is then the possession of that state, in whatever way it may be achieved or imposed. In neither case does freedom cast any light on the meaning of democracy or provide any help

for the solution of human problems.

The ideal of equality is in much the same situation, although there may not be such a clear or drastic shift in meaning. It would be as reasonable a definition of equality as any, in this framework, to say that each interest is as good as any other interest. A formula of that sort could be interpreted to mean that an interest in harmony had as much right to exist as an interest in conflict. But it would also mean that an interest in conflict was as legitimate as an interest in harmony. Given such a situation the equal and opposing interests might as well fight it out. And we are no better off than before.

It may be objected that, in this discussion of consent, freedom and equality, the worst possible alternatives have been chosen. That may be. The point is simply that no valid basis has been provided for any better choice.

Perry presents a philosophy of democracy that is in many respects coherent, rational and non-coercive. He recognizes that the empirical tradition has led to a subjective morality, which in turn has often contributed to widespread moral enervation or to reliance on might. With persistence, imagination and good will he has worked to avoid such outcomes. And he has counselled us well, at least in recent years, against reliance on drift. And yet the evidence indicates that he begins with the assumptions of traditional empiricism and that, having done so, he cannot avoid the consequences.

Once fact and value are not just distinguished but separated they cannot be brought together again. The front end and the back end of a horse are not the same. But if one insists that the only way to distinguish them is to chop the horse in two, he will no longer have a horse. It is the same with fact and value in the process of knowing. And the consequences of such a philosophical amputation are more tragic for human affairs than the death of a horse.

For, as we have seen, it is the separation of fact and value that leads to moral subjectivity. When this position is taken there is no rational basis on which conflicting ideals can be judged and

the problem solved. There is still, even in Perry's approach, no escape from the logical consequences of conservatism or might. He denies that there is an inherent drift toward an inevitable goal in human affairs, and he is fervently opposed to the use of coercion, whether physical or psychological. But he has provided no valid alternative.

There is a *feeling* of rationality that comes from Perry's description of the method of reflective agreement in terms of discussion and persuasion in search of an all-inclusive ideal. But Perry has no answer to McGilvary's assertion that once morality ceases to be descriptive it becomes might in some form or other—no matter how gentle the aims and methods seem to be. Moral arguments are rationally irrelevant, and can only make their appeal to a person's non-rational side. A non-rational appeal even in the name of morality, is itself an effort to push someone into a belief he does not now have or desire to have—which is a defining characteristic of might. Because this is an argument to which Perry has no apparent answer, he is, logically, forced into a reliance on might whenever genuine moral conflicts arise.

There has been talk in recent years about such abstractions as the Economic Man and the National Man. Little or nothing has been said about the Ethical Man. The abstraction of the Ethical Man is based on the assumption that it is possible to live the good life independently of regard for economic and other social problems. It is time to point out, if it is not already obvious, that the assumption is involved in the ideas being examined. Even though McGilvary, Perry and others take for granted that men are affected by social events they also take for granted a moral subjectivity which renders man's social existence of no real account in determining the good life. Moritz Schlick's ethical theory is a good example of the application of the assumption. He shows more concern than McGilvary for the possibilities of a happy, friendly individual life, and less than Perry for the problems for democracy connected with such a life.

In his *Problems of Ethics*, Schlick develops a sophisticated,

contemporary form of hedonism. A truly moral problem arises, he says, when there are certain "inner checks" to the activity of an individual. There are several "imaginative pictures of the results of the different activities" that might take place, and these ideas compete against each other for attention. A choice is actually made when one of the alternative ends-in-view is experienced to have a more pleasant "feeling-tone" than the others. Apparently the concept of pleasure refers to no more than the quality of feeling about any idea that causes it thus to be chosen in preference to other ideas. But the important thing is that good is defined in terms of the pleasant idea, not in terms of the consequences of the idea which may be pleasant.

The problem does not end here. Indeed it is heightened by the fact that a pleasant end-in-view may not lead to pleasant consequences. Is this discrepancy between "motive-value" and "realization-value" to be taken as ultimate, or does it lead to further developments? If it is final, man is doomed to frequent and unpredictable disappointment. His habits will be unstable and his survival impulses will be defeated.

As a matter of fact, Schlick says, the pleasure or pain encountered when one of the alternatives is acted upon functions as a check and guide for future ends-in-view. If a pleasant idea leads repeatedly to painful consequences, the feeling of pleasure shifts from it to another idea. ". . . There is a tendency toward the assimilation of that discrepancy" between motive and realization, which "is in the long run insurmountable." Stability comes to be found in these desires which are actually "directed toward truly pleasant ends."

At the same time that this tendency operates to make the individual happier, society makes moral demands on him. The sense of obligation, and the *moral* good, arises from what *society* believes to be for its own welfare. And it often happens that moral obligation and individual happiness do not coincide—which poses another problem: is it possible that "the idea of the things which appear useful to society can also be pleasant for the individual agent himself?" In short, "does virtue lead to

happiness?"¹⁵

Schlick proceeds to answer by remarking, first, that we necessarily refer to individuals in speaking of the welfare, pleasure or happiness of society. Such feelings can exist only for individuals. Society has the greatest "capacity for happiness" when that capacity is possessed by the people who make it up. Second, he says that men find most joy in their "social impulses." The altruist has many sources of pleasure whereas the egoist has only one; both because his own impulses will have many outlets and because he will be sought out by similar impulses in his neighbors. Third, it is very difficult to over-indulge in kindness. It belongs to the "higher" group of impulses," which, instead of producing unfortunate effects, makes the organism ever more capable and adaptable. The organism becomes more sensitive and "susceptible to new joys." Kindness makes the course of life more stable and more likely to survive.

Virtue and happiness are not completely reconciled by this analysis, but Schlick is convinced that they begin to move in the same direction. The most effective basis of happiness has been found in the social impulses, whose main tendency is toward altruism; and altruism is precisely what morality—that is, what *most* members of society praise or blame—seeks to inculcate. The various demands society imposes on the individual are aimed to make him more considerate of others. The "same dispositions," Schlick concludes, "which lead to the greatest possibilities of pleasure are identical with those from which, for the most part, virtuous conduct springs," which "means that virtue and happiness have the same causes, that they must go hand in hand." Society can strengthen these connections by various means. Through "moral suggestion"—praise, blame and other types of suggestion—society can create feelings of pleasure and pain, and in that way reinforce the social impulses, create new ends or destroy old ends. It also, of course, reinforces suggestion with punishment and reward.

Virtue still does not guarantee a happy life, nor is it ever likely to make happiness an inevitable end for each individual;

yet moral demands move in the direction of a much closer relation between the two. Just as the feeling of an end-in-view and its actual consequences tend to grow into a stable adjustment, so does the *belief* in what is best for the general welfare adjust to what is *actually* for general welfare. When this stage is reached, the good will be done "willingly." Until then "long periods of the development of civilization must pass, during which strong feelings of pain are necessary for the motivation of good behavior, so that it results only from the 'compulsion' of duty and conscience. . . ." "Good" here means that which actually does give both the individual and society the "capacity for happiness"; and although it appears to involve renunciation it really leads to a greater fulfillment of desires. Therefore, "one can perhaps conceive all civilization as the colossal process of this subjection of egoism, as the powerful means which ultimately serve to bring about a harmony among the inclinations of all persons."¹⁶

Schlick's theory, in its consequences for democracy, encounters the recurrent dilemma. On the one hand, although Schlick strives to show the need for kindness, the establishment of right at any given time depends on might. On the other hand, if one chooses to abide by Schlick's own hopes, the possibilities they hold for present-day societies are so passive and conservative as to fall short of their needs.

In terms of McGilvary's analysis, Schlick's standards of morality are based on might. Morality comes into existence when society believes various actions to be helpful or harmful to its welfare. It is obligatory because the beliefs are expressed in sanctions of pleasure and pain—whether by customary approval and disapproval or by forceful legal action. These social influences are functions of might because they seek to impose certain patterns of behavior upon individuals irrespective of the ideas and ideals those individuals may have. Those patterns cannot be rationally established, since that is impossible by hypothesis. Instead they aim to push desires into conformity with some pre-existent code. To be sure, the code would be gentle enough if it were molded

by Schlick's hands, but the hands of amiable philosophers are among those least frequently found molding the shape of things. Even as he wrote, in 1930, there were signs of the newer totalitarian methods of securing agreement to preconceived ends. The menace of dictatorship does not arise solely from the fact that there are brutal and ambitious Mussolinis and Hitlers and Stalins in the world. Such men have indeed used carnal force in establishing their programs. But we miss a major source of their effective power if we leave the matter there. Such men have also fulfilled the needs and wants of distressed peoples—needs and wants that democracies have often not satisfied sufficiently by peaceful means. Those programs were more satisfying to the "social impulses" of individuals in the respective countries and regions than the democratic standards with which they had contact. And within the limits of national boundaries—beyond which Schlick has no right to go, since there are still no vital and widely accepted international standards—within these limits there has been at least as much "altruism" under fascist and communist as under democratic guidance. The conclusion must be that Schlick's philosophy not only depends on might, but also has no criterion besides purely personal preference for deciding between totalitarian might and any other.

Let us try a different approach; for there are other types of conflict besides those between the happiness of individuals and the demands of society—although Schlick is less aware of them. It is not hard to remember that individuals conflict with individuals and societies with societies. In so far as Schlick recognizes friction on the personal level, he seems to feel it will disappear under the strength of social principles and moral demands. Friction on the social level hardly seems to exist for him. If references to it exist between the lines, he apparently assumes the difficulties will be taken care of by the "colossal process" of civilization. Yet both types of antagonisms are inescapable facts, and they are hardly disappearing. Personal fights might theoretically be taken care of by society—although this in itself involves reference to a more general pattern of coercion. When it

comes to societies there is no civilization over and above nations which can be appealed to as a higher force. Open warfare remains the ultimate method.

This theory provides no other way of resolving personal or social conflicts than a higher force, or warfare—except for an assumption on which Schlick often relies. His problems were those of an individual who wanted to be at peace with society, who desired to live quietly and affectionately with his fellow men, and who had a deep distrust of might. He appears to have assumed—in spite of some denials—that everything would turn out for the best in the end, that social tendencies would move inevitably toward the realization of human desires. Technically stated, the assumption is that the discrepancy between motive-feeling and realization-feeling would disappear, that society's beliefs about what is good for it would in time be justified, and that both of these tendencies would eventually come to work harmoniously together.

No convincing evidence is given for the assumption. What there is of evidence has to do with the "assimilation" of motive-feeling and realization feeling to each other. To a certain extent it is obvious enough that motive-feelings change when they lead to frustration. There is no evidence that the change leads inevitably to success. The argument is especially weak in the absence of any method for controlling motives to make them increasingly adequate. And Schlick is far from advocating any such method. He expresses his assumption most clearly when he says:

Of course the processes whereby the general welfare becomes a pleasant goal are complicated; and one must not, above all, attribute too great a role to rational *insight*. For even if men thought much more and more accurately than they usually do about the consequences of action, such considerations would have but little influence in the realm of feelings. And these processes take place chiefly in this realm, in the absence of subtle thinking. But here we can appeal to a general principle which has otherwise proved to be valid in psychology and biology, namely, that the result of organic, unconscious or instinctive processes is the same

as would have resulted from a rational calculation. This principle is closely connected with that general 'purposiveness' of the organic world which is usually called 'teleology.'¹⁷

Any sophisticated conservatism has a similar assumption behind it. In its broad political form it takes shape in the belief that the institutions and procedures already in existence are adequate to problems without radical change either in form or direction, that events already have their direction anyway, and that it is either useless or harmful to tamper with them. The direction of history may be assured by the gentle hand of God, or by something inherent in human nature, or by the very process of Evolution itself. G. H. Sabine, speaking of Edmund Burke, for instance, remarks that he had

an appreciation of the complexity of the social system and of the massiveness of its customary arrangements, a respect for the wisdom of established institutions, especially religion and property. a strong sense of continuity in its historical changes and belief in the relative impotence of the individual will and reason to deflect it from its course, and a keen moral satisfaction in the loyalty that attaches its members to their stations in its varying ranks.

Therefore,

as every man should have his place in the stable and continuing order of his nation, so every nation has its place in a world-wide civilization unfolding in accord with 'a divine tactic.'¹⁸

The conservative has on his side the fact that few proposed changes are plausible—to say nothing of being workable—at any given time. There is also the fact that attempts to change institutions and beliefs suddenly, activities that are most usually called "radical," tend to gravitate back to the starting point, or worse. And there is another fact that carries a great deal of weight with many contemporaries, both liberal and conservative. Democracy in the United States, for example, has no self-conscious, established direction. Historically its method has, at first glance, been a process whereby a number of partisan interests, each one of

which seemed to preclude the others, came together, each to secure its own ends. And yet out of the opposition of interests, the confusion, bungling, backsliding and compromising, conditions have emerged which appear to be increasingly favorable to the average citizen.

These reasons make up a seemingly plausible argument against the reformer or radical. It is dangerous to keep the eye too near existing evils. Of course conditions are bad; that is admitted. No sensible person wants the present problems to remain, and he will do everything he can to get rid of them. But by focusing too closely upon them the observer is not able to consider the historical context. He also is not able to see that he represents only one of several interests in the situation; there are other desires to be considered besides his own. The remedy is not to ignore the other interests, but to let them come together in such a way that a compromise may be reached. Such a procedure will not satisfy any of the interested parties entirely but it will satisfy all of them enough so that social activity may go on. This, it is argued, is the way democracy has operated in the past and must remain its method in the future.

A case for this position is made by T. V. Smith. He seeks to reject both conservatism and radicalism, "both the static and the violent way," and to formulate a program of dynamic action that will remain democratic. Compromise is his solution. Otherwise, he says, change can be directed only by coercion.

As a matter of fact, compromise is unavoidable anyway. It is a law of life that men must compromise to think or act, because:

There are billions of things which may be felt, millions that may be thought, thousands that may be said, hundreds that may be done, dozens alone of which may perhaps be done collectively..

...

The foundations of its necessity are laid in our very frame. Life is an equilibrium of energies, few of which can trespass upon others without causing illness and none of which can monopolize the field of the organic without causing death. . . .

As physically we exist by constant redress of disparate urges,

so the mind lives upon prowess preserved against the prevailing of its separate elements.

And there are diverse interests in the social sphere as well as in the individual. In order to live together in any way at all, there must be some compromise, and in order to get anything done there must be more of it. ". . . Men either compromise or get compromised."¹⁹ With a different emphasis this is as true of dictatorship as it is of democracy. Compromise therefore means any curtailment of interest or desire, either partly or wholly, so that action may continue.

In the typical situation, each individual has a private realm of "conscience" which is the sphere containing his moral principles and ideals. It is the expression of his desires and the projection of the perfect world he would like to see. Because of the nature of conscience, the individual to whom it belongs desires changes in the existing situation, but his desires of conscience conflict with other consciences. In most cases each of the involved parties is equally moral and good, equally principled and honest. Even economic conflicts become conflicts of principle. If the situation develops without compromise, what happens is that several of the equally good and conscientious men are defeated. They are destroyed, either physically or financially or by losing "face" and "self-respect."

In this state of affairs each person wants to make everyone also moral. But there is no agreement as to the nature of morality. Conscientious people then proceed to bungle political instrumentalities and to hinder action. "The fact," Smith says, "that one thinks something right does not make it right in politics, not even if he thinks it very hard and feels it very deeply. If something is to be done cooperatively, nobody can insist upon what he thinks right." This argument may be summed up in a law of "social life":

To demand the maximum of ideality—the highest demands of the private conscience—as the rule of collective action is to suffer the minimum of ideality; for, since other consciences will not agree

with the highest vision of any conscience, this vision can be put into action only by coercion, which in turn outrages all other values and mutilates its own by the form of implementation.²⁰

Peaceful compromise is better than violence because other people will gang up on the violent and prevent them from getting their ends.

Refusal to compromise peacefully is not democratic, whatever else may be said about it. A moral ideal may be "superior" in that it deals with something having "a superior claim upon legislators," something basic to democracy, such as education. But in a democracy, "each counts for one and nobody for more than one," so that superiority of a moral claim in no way makes it final. Any claim must be examined in the light of other demands. Whoever thinks otherwise "becomes by that very fact an apologist for a covert form of dictatorship. There is a little Hitler hidden in the bosom of every conscientious man as well as in the heart of the unconscientious. . . ."

Since compromise is necessary, Smith urges us to make it a constructive principle for betterment. This can be done, he says, both in public and in private spheres, for whenever a number of people can live together peacefully, new values are born out of their society. Even where the dirty work of compromise is delegated to professional technicians, as it should be, it is possible to make a creative advance. By making politics "king of all that's in dispute," it is possible to have public peace and private freedom.

Growth is the principle of American democracy; it, rather than perfection, is desired. Compromise allows growth in the individual, in the sense that his conscience grows mellowed, enabling him to understand his fellows and even to take on some of their values. Compromise is "the very principle of growth, whereby conscience passes continually from approximate fanaticism toward a roomy worldly wisdom." It is growth, too, in the social sphere, since it makes possible continuous, dynamic adjustment to social problems. Where individuals or groups are willing to be peaceful, "compromise . . . is not doomed to point down

and down to death through acceptance of the intolerable; it can point up and up toward infinite progress through mutual accommodation."²¹

But the individual not only does but should leave compromise to the politician. There are additional reasons besides the fact that the politician is trained to a job which the amateur would only spoil. The very nature of moral demand is something to be fulfilled, so that one should compromise only when it is necessary. By oneself there is no need to compromise, and for this reason men should be allowed all the privacy possible. "Whoever, indeed, goes about hunting up chances to sacrifice his interests is a masochist, and whoever hungers to sacrifice his principles, if such a specimen exists, is a pervert." Therefore "men wisely compromise when they are deadlocked, since there is no other way out that involves so little sacrifice." Moreover it is only by holding fast to one's convictions that the politician knows what he is dealing with. "To weaken the claim" is not only to "injure conscience"; it also deprives the politicians of stable knowledge of the forces they are working with. "It is their business to find a middle course between two sincere and tangible positions. To locate the middle they must reckon from stationary banks."

The constructive aspect of compromise may be considered under a second law: "To settle collectively . . . for the minimum ideality is to facilitate the realization of the maximum." Having agreed upon the minimum, violence dies down and each person can enjoy his own conscience. The excellence of the Bill of Rights is that it "guarantees freedom of private conscience from compromise. . . ." The individual is free to believe anything he wants and to seek any perfection he needs. It is in itself a good thing that men can throw their conscientious weights around and flex their moral muscles. But they may do so, without compromise, only so long as they do not bruise their fellow athletes or the bystanders.

Freedom of conscience also aids social progress. If men have mellowed as a result of past compromises, their moral vision becomes more relevant to society. The peace following compro-

mise "permits each conscience to go back to its groups of like-minded people and there work out its highest promptings directly for the subsequent indirect improvement of the body politic." It is possible for differences between individuals actually to make it easier to solve the conflicts arising from those differences that are unavoidable anyway. "... The summit of growth" is "marked by positive embracement of variety as the greatest good." For "there is a law of compensation which holds that those who lose their unity through freedom shall find it, and those who find their sociality through coercion shall lose it."²²

With this general theory as a starting point, there are three defenses Smith may make against the charge of conservatism. The first is the "principle of growth" as one of the bases of democracy. This principle, he would say, is an explicit rejection of the status quo. Progress is one of the limits to compromise, for when compromise leads only to more compromises and sacrifices, it should be rejected. It is necessary to keep moving towards a growth in human ability and welfare.

Second, the least conservative aspect of Smith's theory is his insistence on "operative equality" in democracy. Equality is not a fact but an ideal which must be striven for as concretely as possible. Its concrete application requires the further ideal of "sharing," for sharing means that, if men are considered equal and able to determine their own fate, they must know what sort of thing they are doing. They must know what their aims are and why they are working as they do. Equality implies, for example, the application of the principle of sharing to industry and religion—"a reorganization that might not stop short of the radical. . . ."

Third, Smith insists that effective democracy must make use of "judicious social experimentation," since without it amelioration of conditions will be prevented by ignorance. Instead of letting laws be applied in a hit and miss fashion, there shall be an "adequate way of evaluating the results of legislative activity" and of pooling the "best ideas."²³ To that end public administration must be improved and given a chance to experiment—

which implies a need for coherently directed control of social forces, instead of trusting wholly to luck, or compromise.

"Growth" may or may not be a conservative concept. If it is a hypothesis that development is automatically assured, then it is conservative, since it removes the need for intense and persistent human watchfulness, control and direction of events. This would not be the case if it were a goal pursued by experimentation and sharing as methods of direction and control. But compromise rather than experimentation is the core of Smith's theory, and it is the key to the problem at hand.

While Smith maintains that democracy, even as compromise, must make use of science, the relation between the two is more accidental than integral. Science is a method for the discovery of truth. Compromise is not. It has to do with the "regions of the spirit," and is a method dealing with goodness or morality in the social sphere. The normative factors in politics are so important that they overshadow all facts, and "no social science furnishes or can furnish facts to resolve" them. This plus the fact that the social sciences themselves are necessarily but loose sciences convinces the "experienced legislator" that "there is not now and never will be enough knowledge available to give a certain basis of rationality to collective action."²⁴ For these reasons, Smith's proposal for the use of experimentation in public administration would be less at variance with conservatism than it appeared: no matter how scientific administration could be—and it could not be very highly scientific—compromise and not science would have to be the directive force.

Can compromise be a "dynamically" directive and regulative factor when it is formulated in conjunction with "operative equality" and "democratic sharing?" The difficulty here is that Smith tries to stand on both sides of an issue which he has made into a chasm. Moral questions, he has said, can only be decided by compromise. And compromise is the basis of democracy. He has also said that democracy implies equality and that equality implies sharing of knowledge and purposes. But compromise and equality (of sharing) are not the same and are frequently in con-

flict. The chasm is wide and not even verbal stilts can maintain a sound footing on both sides at once. Smith proposes equality and sharing as moral aims, and he attempts to justify them. If they are rationally justified, then they do not rest on compromise and he has abandoned his basic premise. If not, then the aims of equality and sharing would either have to be held "conscientiously," without rational grounds, or their meaning, justification and application would rest on compromise.

How, for example, would equality and sharing be applied to economic affairs? Most industrialists do not want to grant their employees operative equality in the sharing of aims and methods. Yet, a dispute over such a question, as Smith would usually have it, can be settled democratically only by an appeal to compromise, not to coercion. The result of such a compromise could very easily be something less than equality in sharing, as Smith speaks of it. Avoidance of this result would require, logically, that equality and sharing would be defined in terms of compromise. Smith's "radical" application of operative equality is either derived from a source independent of compromise, or it will be considerably modified by his method. The one possibility would mark him as a "conscientious" rather than a political man; the other indicates that equality in sharing would not be the radical departure he apparently desires.

Exactly what Smith means by compromise is not too clear. Presumably he means by it pretty much what it has meant in everyday language: a procedure arising out of a conflict between a number of interest-groups, in which the problem is considered solved when each group gives up something of its original claims; each may surrender an equal part or some more and some less. He describes it as "a course of common action tolerable for all rather than miserable for most"; it is a "middle course," he says; men of good will must be prepared to meet others "somewhere near halfway"; and we must settle for "the minimum ideality."²⁵

It is difficult to see how this plan escapes conservatism. As matters stand, there is no reason to assume that the method can solve a social problem by a readjustment of the existing claims

of interest-groups or pressure-groups. Social problems do not come into existence only upon the occurrence of disagreement and conflict, and they are not to be solved, therefore, simply by reaching agreement. Granting even that no group would have to give up a disproportionate amount of its claim, problems usually have their settings in an environment larger and more complex than any group or set of groups. And even where the groups are unusually representative, there is no reason to assume that their claims, separately or together, are adequately directed to the source of trouble. The dynamic quality of such a method is hard to locate.

If belief in the validity of compromise is not justified, it nevertheless remains tempting. What evidence there is for it serves as a warning against too much reliance on speed, against too much distrust of existing democratic procedures, and finally against the exclusive virtue of any one set of moral beliefs. But however plausible compromise may be, its inherent weaknesses should be recognized. If growth is believed to result automatically from compromise, it is a conservative principle because it relieves men of the burden of directing and controlling their own activities. If, in other words, progress is assumed, we should not worry about the direction of movement as long as we keep on compromising. If growth is not assumed to be inevitable, the situation is not significantly changed. Compromise by itself still cannot give any assurance that the problem will be nearer solution after its use than before. It does not give control over social events. Consequently, compromise is a form of drift—or at best provides no way of distinguishing drift from any other type of social change.

It is dangerous to trust compromise. Smith recognizes that a limit must be set to it when it leads to further sacrifices. But the difficulty goes much deeper. The whole method is essentially negative. It is assumed there will be progress as people give up part of their desires, although the method itself indicates the need for continued sacrifices at least as much as it indicates anything else.

Interest-groups and pressure-groups, in the political scene, may be defended as a check on legislators and administrators and as a source of needed information. Yet such activities and the compromises involved in them must be judged by some other method than compromise. Indeed, reliance on compromise has frequently led to an intensification of the problem it was supposed to settle. An example may be found in the 1951 "Amendments to Defense Production Act of 1950." The Amendments include the Butler-Hope and Capehart amendments, which were later described as compromises by Senator Robertson in his majority report of the Committee on Banking and Currency. As summarized by the *New York Times*, those two amendments establish the following policy:

Rollbacks should be restricted; for example, no farm product may be rolled back farther than beef already has been. [Beef prices had already exceeded 150 per cent of parity.] Ceilings [for non-agricultural goods] should take account of all cost increases, including advertising and sales expenses; they must be based upon the highest prices received in January-June, 1950, plus all cost increases since [until July 26, 1951]. Wholesalers and retailers must be allowed their 'customary percentage margins.'²⁶

Thus a law presumably designed to combat inflation virtually guaranteed it.

The law in question had many other implications, of which at least one should be noted. Apparently one of the factors entering into the complex compromises, of which the Defense Production Act and its amendments were the result, was the widespread conviction that governmental activity is by nature evil and therefore something to be closely restricted even when it is deemed necessary. But since compromises tend to be vague, if not confused and contradictory, there seems to have been some expansion of such agencies as the OPS and WSB in the effort to interpret what the law meant or might have to mean. And for the same reason—to judge by reports found in the public press and given privately—bureaucracy burgeoned in the impotence and confusion of the administering bodies.²⁷

This is an old story in public administration. A variation upon it may be found in the history of the regulation of radio communication. Commercial broadcasting is an activity which is limited most notably by the great amount of equipment and expenditure which is necessary and by the physical limitations of the wave-lengths which, in A.M. broadcasting, permits only 900 to 1000 stations. By the early 1920's there was recognition of a need for some sort of control. A series of compromises resulted. The first complex of compromises came so close to chaos that a new effort had to be made with the Radio Act of 1927 which established the Federal Radio Commission. But that act was not so much an effort to deal with the various evidences bearing on the issue as it was an effort to satisfy congressmen and their constituents, radio companies and others. The commission sought its way out of a confusion of compromises by compromising in the direction of the most powerful interests, especially advertisers. When the Federal Radio Commission was absorbed into the Federal Communications Commission, the main tendencies persisted, though with modification. Chaos has been avoided, to be sure, but at great cost to the listening public. Chaos is not the only symptom of trouble, and I suspect that we tend to minimize some of the far-reaching problems of radio communication because the radio, like Mussolini's trains, operates on schedule. In addition, the new potentialities of F.M. radio have not been effectively utilized, and the persistence of old compromises seems to have produced new ills in television.²⁸

Another type of problem emerged with the exploitation of natural gas and oil. Where oil or gas fields extended beyond property lines, it was possible for the driller who tapped the field first to draw off all or most of the mineral, even though his property covered only a small part of the field. The main tendency of the courts seems to have been to handle the problem by a series of compromises between conflicting interests, including the judicial interest in precedent. The problem was a novel one—without precedent, one would say. Yet there *had to be* a precedent. Precedent was found by turning to Common Law. Oil and gas, said

the courts, were analogous to foxes, birds and fish, and could be captured by the person on whose property they trespassed. Draining an oil or gas field constituted such a capture even if the field extended under property lines. But at the same time that the courts argued, for certain purposes, that oil and gas were "wandering minerals," and, therefore, not possessed by ownership of the land, they also declared, for purposes of real estate taxation, that they were analogous to timber and so "a part of the realty."

Even while the courts sought to maintain the principle that gas and oil are like wild beasts, it was found necessary to modify it or on occasion to ignore it altogether. Compromise was not adequate. The conditions which brought the original difficulty into existence forced reconsiderations of the law; and those conditions were only in part made up of conflicting interests. One may be sure that the adequacy or inadequacy of the new regulations depends not alone on the existing interests and possible compromises between them, but also and especially on the ability of those regulations to deal with the fundamental problem.²⁹

It should not be surprising that compromise may increase the trouble it seeks to avoid. In Smith's theory the privacy, and even the fanaticism, of the individual conscience is something to be enjoyed and encouraged—by that individual himself. The fanaticism is supposed to remain in the limbo of privacy. But that sort of privacy does not like its own privacy; it seeks to make the private good into the public morality. Otherwise it would not be fanatical. How can compromise prevent fanaticism, public or private? How can it avoid being a tool of fanaticisms? An industrialist may believe others to be less moral than he in proportion to their lack of wealth. A laborer may believe unions can do no harm. Is such a conflict likely to be dealt with by compromise, or by might? If men are encouraged not to "pull their punches" until they are "in deadlock," are they not more likely to hit below the belt than to conciliate when they are deadlocked? Conciliation may involve less sacrifice for all. But why should a conscientious man worry about the sacrifices of others as long as he can avoid sacrifice? He is the one who is right. And Smith states repeat-

edly that the conscientious man should not gratuitously surrender his ideals.

It follows that Smith's theory leads as readily to the use of might as to compromise. Or: to might in the form of compromise. Totalitarians of all brands do not shun compromise but use it for their special purposes. They come with fantastic demands on the calculated hope that those will be scaled down to what they want at that time. If it is objected that that is not true compromise, the objection begs the question. Not only do the procedures in question have the general characteristics attributed to compromise, but the very method of compromise is such as to encourage each party to seek special advantage over the others. The objection rests on certain assumed standards which have no foundation in this theory. If it is argued, for instance, that it is illegitimate to use techniques of compromise to obtain what one wanted in the first place, because such acts do not exhibit good will or because they make conditions worse—that argument implies that compromise is not the arbiter of moral conflicts. Compromise must then be evaluated by some different criterion of judgment. If it is said that we must oppose such extravagant demands by similar strong counter-demands, the issue clearly becomes one of might versus might.

In the end it seems necessary to conclude from Smith's theory that compromise is a variety of might. Each person is, and should be, convinced that he is right. Since he cannot rationally validate his ideals, he seeks by any means available to get others to accept them. But the others, who have been similarly engaged, resist his efforts. When he is unable to get them to accept his ideals, he gives up as much as he has to, in order to keep what he can, until he can get more. No one is expected to compromise until different techniques fail. But, whatever technique is used, the point is to get one's ideals accepted by others, no matter what their preferences may be. While the specific means may vary, the general way of dealing with human beings remains basically the same.

Smith, like the other men I have examined so far who attempt

to shun force as the basis of morality, can avoid that conclusion only by a gratuitous assumption, namely, the conservative conviction of the inevitability of progress. But even if we say that compromise rests on a conservative basis instead of on might, there is another objection to it. Democracies have been extremely lucky in the past, at least in England and the United States. Too often our activities have been marked by drift rather than by a clearly envisioned unity of purpose, or by determination to attack crucial issues. Perhaps we have had a sense of what we are after. But it is dangerous to assume that a vague sense is adequate to our predicament. The world has been devastated by two terrifying wars in twenty-five years, we are now engaged in limited warfare and the preparations for preventing future wars are sickeningly inadequate. What evidence there is surely indicates that the world has reached a stage where it must take its own fate in its hands. The first World War sowed the seed of peace which was bred of compromise and might. The second was the fruit of it, and we seem to be continuing the strain. But if that quarter of a century has taught us anything at all, it is that the world can scarcely stand another compromise peace. And it will not do to argue that the use of compromise within a country would be different. A compromise prosperity followed by depression is also dangerous and could be disastrous.

It is *possible* that the conservative is right. Our future *may* be assured. In that case drift would be successful. But we cannot safely assume it. To assume it is to surrender the possibilities of men's control over their destinies before those possibilities have been tried.

It is time to bring this phase of the argument to a close and to survey what has gone before.

With all their diversities the various empiricists whom I have called traditional have in common a general theory of knowledge and morality. Knowledge is defined as descriptive. Reality is usually considered to be devoid of value. Morality, as the expression of men's desires, is therefore subject-matter for knowledge

only when the scientist chooses to describe the interests and desires of men. Morality can set certain problems for knowledge, so that knowledge can make clear what morality wants and the means of attaining it; but morality gives no information about truth and knowledge gives none about what ought to be considered good. The result is either a conservative philosophy or a philosophy of might—or both, for might itself is usually on the side of the status quo.

Conservatism is not an adequate philosophy of democracy because it does not even face the problems of survival which democracy has to deal with. If the belief in the separation of knowing and valuing is correct, then a morality of might is the most logical implication of it; it is least encumbered with dubious assumptions.

If this theory is true, we must recognize the fact and adjust our lives to it. But we must also recognize that wide acceptance of the philosophy of might would hardly lead to a lessening of conflicts. It is logically possible, as McGilvary insists, for might in its broadest sense to lead to any kind of moral belief, even the gentlest and most conciliatory. The likelihood remains that a widespread conviction that there is no rational difference between fundamental moral beliefs will not encourage conciliation of opposing desires. Such a philosophy is not likely to lead to democracy or to preserve its existence. For this and other reasons it is not the sort of philosophy that becomes widely accepted in the first place.

This fact will not surprise many of those who are convinced that might makes right. The thing to do, they would say, is to furnish the rest of the people with myths to believe in—democratic myths or some other. These men may be correct. But if so we are only deceiving ourselves to talk seriously about a philosophy of democracy. Democracy could then be no different in any significant respect from the various recognized authoritarian patterns of living. If those men are wrong, as I am convinced they are, there is no need to pay them more homage.

Neo-Thomism—I

Traditional empiricism has gained intellectual strength over the years as the main philosophical opposition to traditional Christian theology and morality. For centuries it has undermined the authority of established religions. Recently it has even denied the dignity of meaning to the doctrines on which such authority has rested. Yet there has been a resurgence in the intellectual respectability of supernaturalistic religion. And the empiricist theory of science has been heavily relied upon by many leaders of that resurgence.

They have welcomed, affirmed and repeated that theory of science, even though they may not always have examined it. One of its conclusions has become a slogan: science can tell us how to achieve our aims but it cannot give us our aims. And those who repeat the slogan quickly add that a science without aim and without control is on the way to destroying our civilization. Not only do they point to the destructiveness of many of the uses of technology; they also maintain that science in general makes people negligent of values. The guidance men require, so the argument continues, simply cannot be derived, ultimately, from any *human* sources. The very finiteness of human beings, especially as it is intensified by bondage to the natural world, makes them too limited, too various, and too erratic to secure, by their own efforts, the proper direction for their lives.

If science is neutral in regard to values and *human* efforts are basically incompetent, what then? We are told that we must get our values from another source, and that the source of values for the western world has been the Greek-Hebrew-Christian Tradition. Some writers have been content with a solution of this sort.

An increasingly influential group continues the argument. What we need, they say, is not only a tradition, but a tradition having a unified authority, for the Greek-Hebrew-Christian Tradition in general is too vague and contains too many conflicting elements. They conclude: the only truly unified authoritative source of values is the Catholic Church.

Of the numerous philosophies of Roman Catholicism expounded throughout its history, the most influential today is the one formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas. His philosophy became virtually official with an encyclical by Pope Leo XIII in 1879. *A Catholic Dictionary* refers to it as "the classical and practical scientific exposition of theology and summary of Christian philosophy." And Pope Pius XI has said: "The following canon of the Church's code should be held as a sacred command: In the study of rational philosophy and theology and in the instruction of students the professor should follow entirely the method, doctrine, and principles of the Angelic Doctor, and hold them religiously."¹

In recent years the movement of Neo-Thomism has interpreted and extended Thomas' philosophy to reconcile it with some of the developments since the 13th Century, especially modern science. If Neo-Thomists are not the only Catholic philosophers, they are the best known intellectual defenders of the Church; and their philosophy of democracy has had increasing influence outside of the Church.

They follow the lead of the Church in maintaining that no nation can be properly democratic unless it adheres to the basic Truths of Catholicism. There can be no democracy, they say, without recognition of human dignity and human dignity is impossible unless men are recognized to be essentially supernatural creatures, of which the Church has given the only true account. Democracy demands the recognition of humanity, but men are not truly human no matter how much happiness and material comfort they may have, if they do not partake of eternal things. If their supernatural aspect is ignored, and to that extent rendered ineffective, men are at best dogs barking at the moon,

and at worst they are dogs tearing at each other's flesh.

The truths of Catholicism do not make for a philosophy of democracy *because* they are democratic, but because they are true. And since Catholicism is true, the argument goes, it is basic to all humane governments, though limited to none. Man must choose between being ruled by God or by men; that is to say, between freedom and totalitarianism. Etienne Gilson puts it clearly in his *Medieval Universalism*:

. . . as soon as men refuse to be ruled directly by God they condemn themselves to be ruled directly by man; and if they decline to receive from God the leading principles of their moral and social conduct, they are bound to accept them from the king, or from the state or from their race, or from their own social class. In all cases, there will be a state-decreed philosophical, moral, historical, and even scientific, truth, just as tyrannical in its pretensions, and much more effective in its oppressions of individual conscience than any state religion may have ever been in the past.

Against the encroachments of the totalitarian state in its various forms, our only conceivable protection, humanly speaking at least, is in a powerful revival of the medieval feeling for the universal character of truth.²

If these declarations *are* true, it is most important to know them. By following their lead we would make important changes in our social institutions and in our private lives. It is, in fact, important to know that they are believed to be true, whether they are true or not. According to recent estimates there are twenty-six million Roman Catholics in the United States, or about eighteen per cent of the total population. It is not known how many of these are nominal members, or even people who in their own opinion have left the Church. Even if, as Paul Blanshard reckons, only "about half of the Catholic people in the United States give some kind of support to the Church," it still remains the largest single religious group in the country.³ The Church is also highly organized and aggressive in pursuit of its aims. It is a powerful social force.

Religion does not, cannot and should not exist in isolation.

A religion which attempted to have no general consequences would cease to be effective even as a religion. The question is not whether it has such effects, but what they are and how they are attained.

The Roman Catholic Church, in its various ramifications, has become one of the major pressure groups in the United States. Its influence may be felt through censorship, boycotts and political influences. There is evidence, as reported by George P. West in *The New Republic* for March 1, 1943, that Catholic policy in the United States has changed from "appeasement and conciliation" to a "policy of organized assertion and aggression, based on realization of what a powerful organized minority could accomplish as demonstrated by the Anti-Saloon League and the American Legion."⁴

There cannot be adequate understanding of the significance and force of Neo-Thomist social theories without some knowledge of their theological and metaphysical doctrines, which are emphatically said to be the root of any satisfactory human activity. Gilson insists that the roots of Neo-Thomism are to be found in "rationalism, realism, personalism." This trinity is the basis of a liveable unification of life. Unification can be achieved only if there is an independent, universal reality whose existence is acknowledged.

Human minds by themselves, Gilson argues, vary as the individual varies, and as long as minds merely express themselves they waver in belief and contradict one another. Once it is realized that there is a reality transcending individuals—one which may not be changed by them—then all men necessarily agree, in so far as they know that reality. Truth is clear "water flowing from fountains, architectural and above ground," in Santayana's phrase; water from a source beyond the sewage of human living, water which can revivify and unify men weakened and made antagonistic by a cosmic thirst. But in Protestant philosophy, as Santayana observes, the water is "drawn painfully in bucketfuls from the subjective well, muddied, and half spilt over."⁵ These

other philosophies, lacking truth according to the Catholics, can only draw water which has been contaminated by the poison of individuality.

Realism is also the guarantor of our liberties, both individual and social, Gilson insists, for "mental liberty consists in a complete liberation from our personal prejudices and in our complete submission to reality." Therefore, reason is the highest unifying force in the natural world: "What is rationally true is universally true, for the only thing that lies behind truth is reality itself, which is the same for all."⁶ This holds true even for faith. For, though faith may be said to supersede reason, it does so by going beyond it to the supernatural reaches of the same eternal and unchanging reality. True faith and true reason, then, are not opposed. They are unified, complementary aspects of the one, universal truth.

Each of us, on this theory, is a person when he is rational. When he is not rational he is just an individual organism. Men develop their highest personalities, as rational beings, in intellectual knowledge of a universal nature; and without this knowledge, leading to liberty, unity and personality, men are but a herd of individuals subject to tyranny.

Above all, then, reality must be eternal, universal and unchanging. Once it has been accurately described, that description must hold for all people at all times, and even if no one exists at all. Obviously the ordinary world of experience does not conform to this requirement. Yet, since it is absurd to say that the objects of experience do not exist, it must be that the various objects which do exist are not equally real.

We know, the Neo-Thomists continue, that God exists in himself and is the cause of all things, since Aristotle and Thomas proved the necessity of a First Cause. God must therefore be absolute actuality, reality, and perfection.⁷ He is the upper limit toward which all things strive. The lower limit is pure potentiality or pure "matter," which is not an existent thing at all, but the potentiality out of which things may be formed. The actual formation and existence of objects demands a specific nature,

principle, form or essence, which furnishes the characteristics that individual things have. These essences are arranged hierarchically in the degree to which they have perfection.

The individual things found in experience are the combination of essence and potentiality. Essence is that which gives the individual specific characteristics, makes it one of a species. It is also that toward which the individual strives in order to realize those characteristics as perfectly as possible. As the formative principle, the essence is found in each individual of a species, and in each instance it manages to remain identical with itself without existing in a realm apart. Matter or potentiality, on the other hand, is the negative principle which prevents the object from being perfectly realized in its essential nature. It is that which makes each thing different from every other in the species, and which makes them all subject to change and decay. In short, matter is the basis of individuality.

Each dog, let us say, has certain essential characteristics of caninity as an inherent part of its nature. Its growth indicates its desire to perfect its attainment of those qualities; and at the same time it will be prevented from ever realizing itself into its essence by the physical conditions of birth, growth, and death. If the ability to chase cats were one of the dog's essential, rather than accidental, characteristics, each dog would necessarily strive for perfection in cat-chasing, while it would also be retarded by slowness, size, weakness of senses, and what not.

But, for all the disorganizing influences of matter, the universe does possess an order and type of existence which is not subject to natural corruption, because the essences of natural things exist eternally and immutably in the thought of God. The hierarchy of nature, on this view, ranges from inanimate objects through plants and animals to man. Man is above the rest of nature, not merely as animals are above plants, but also because it is his essence to have a soul which partakes of the divine. Man belongs both to the natural and to the supernatural world. It is for this reason, according to Neo-Thomism, that a man is more than an individual organism which is a member of the human

species. He is also a human person—a rational metaphysical entity which is a unique and ultimately inseparable union of soul and body.

Angels, which are above men in the hierarchy, are purely spiritual and supernatural. Each angel is at once a whole species and a person—that is, each angel is a species exhausted with one member. It has no matter and yet is not completely actual, for, being a species, it is limited in existence, retaining still a non-physical type of potentiality.

God, once again, is absolute perfection, infinite being on whom all things depend for their existence and who is caused by nothing outside of himself.

Two general Catholic principles have emerged. One of them involves the difference between matter and spirit, potentiality and actuality, individuality and personality. It establishes fundamental differences within the universe; between the lower and the higher aspects of a man; between one type of man and another, the one who is not spiritual and the one who is; between one type of society and another, the non-Christian and the Christian; and, finally, between any temporal society and the Church. The other is the principle of hierarchy, which charts the order of the universe and, in Maritain's phrase, "the degrees of knowledge," and which expresses the structure of historical feudal society and of the present Church. Both of these principles outline the nature of Neo-Thomist democracy. Let us turn first to the hierarchy of knowledge.

The most respected and influential Catholic social philosopher is undoubtedly Jacques Maritain. His *Scholasticism and Politics* gives a statement of the bases of Neo-Thomist social theory and practice; and he gives an elaborate, even rococo, formulation of the hierarchy of knowledge in *The Degrees of Knowledge* and *Science and Wisdom*. But the convolutions of detail do not hide the main outlines: truth is that which conforms to Catholic doctrine, or at least does not go contrary to it, and it rests ultimately on the authority of the Church.

Any knowledge that is worthy of the name must be known with certainty. This follows from the very nature of reality, which is immutable and eternal. Knowledge must, therefore, be able to reflect reality in such a way as to constitute universal and eternal truth.

The so-called knowledge of every-day life, on the other hand, has to do with sensible, material objects. The world of sense-experience is a realm of change and contingency, and cannot be dealt with in absolute fashion. True knowledge is impossible here.

And yet, although ordinary experience does not itself yield knowledge, it does contain an intuition of something beneath the surface. There is a "primordial" intuition of reality. Originally this intuition is a dim sense of the basic nature of things. As it is grasped and developed, it becomes the source of all knowledge other than that which is direct experience of the supernatural. One must go first to experience even to achieve knowledge which otherwise is purely rational. Beginning with the primordial intuition it is then progressively possible to abstract the more real from the less real. By eliminating the changing, the unessential, the contingent, one moves toward the essential. But how is one to achieve certainty? It is not possible, Maritain argues, as long as the knower and his object remain separate. They must somehow be united.

In Thomism matter is the principle of change, separateness, individuality, and, therefore, an object can be known only to the extent that it is immaterial. "To know does not consist in doing something, nor in receiving something," nor in making something, for those are all characteristics of matter. "It is a form of existence . . . : it is an active, immaterial super-existence. . . ." What happens is that the knower becomes that which is known while remaining himself. The process is one in which both are disengaged from their "natural existence" into another form of being. It takes place by means of "the whole world of intrapsychic immaterial forms which in the soul are like deputies of the object and which the ancients called similitudes or species."

Because the process is "a more or less pure and profound assimilating of oneself to the object, a conformation to what rightly is," certainty is possible.⁸

Through knowledge a person increases his existence: he is not only what he was; he is that plus the new object whose essential nature he has acquired. The acquisition of knowledge is literally a process of realization, since one includes within himself more of intelligible reality than before. It is this enlargement of existence through knowledge that explains why God's complete knowledge is equated with complete existence.

The Jacob's-ladder of knowledge rises out of the "metaphysical dream" of ordinary experience.⁹ Above sensory experience there are the sciences, which Maritain subdivides into empirical science, physico-mathematical science and mathematics. Next in turn is philosophy, which is made up of philosophy of nature and metaphysics. Still higher is theology in which faith and reason are combined in "virtually revealed" knowledge of God. Then comes faith by itself which has "formally revealed" knowledge of God. After this faith combines with "mystical wisdom in an experience of God." Above all is the Beatific Vision in which God is "seen in his essence."

Let us begin with metaphysics, not because it comes first but because of its strategic location. It is said to be the way in which fundamental reality may be known rationally, even by secular reason. As such it is the foundation of those types of knowledge having to do with the natural world, and at the same time it is a starting point for higher wisdom. It is theoretically possible for any human being, as a rational creature, to come to know the truths of metaphysics by reason alone. He would do so by abstracting the essential nature of things from the multifarious experience of them, as, to use Maritain's example, one may abstract the beauty of a painting from the brush strokes that make up the physical painting, after which the beauty of all beautiful paintings could be seen to be essentially the same. Metaphysics gives knowledge of essences, of angels, and of God as the necessary

Being on whom all else depends. It makes it possible to "see" fundamental natural reality from the "inside."

As Maritain puts it, metaphysics develops "the aspirations of the intellect as intellect." It "is in its essence a purely natural wisdom. It is in terms of natural and rational evidences that this wisdom is entirely developed. . . . Its formal object is being according to its proper mystery,—being as being, as Aristotle said."¹⁰

By way of amplification, if not of clarification, two general types of metaphysical knowledge must be pointed out: univocal and analogic. Univocal knowledge concerns things which are essentially the same in spite of what may appear to be great variation. Human nature, for example, is known to be eternally the same, regardless of differences between individuals and in spite of what most biologists consider to be evidence for the origin of species.

Analogic knowledge concerns objects which are genuinely multiple although there is also unity. Atoms, men, and angels all have being, and to that extent, Maritain says, there is unity. But each has a different kind of being from the others. Knowledge of angels, then, can be had neither through the senses nor univocally, but analogically. This is especially true of God. He is so different from all other forms of being as to be "trans-intelligible." He cannot be known rationally as He is, in His essence. And yet it is God's nature to create and to affect all things. Therefore, His existence can be known through other things, even though His essence differs "totally and absolutely" from theirs. For example, God can be known as the First Cause of all things.¹¹

Metaphysics is predominately analogic knowledge, and is infallible because of the nature of being. No matter where we start, being is intellectually inescapable, it is "the first object which our mind attains to." Because it is the first object, being cannot be something simply constructed by the mind; nor can it "be enclosed in any construction," which would introduce possibilities of error. Once being is reached, the rest follows. The laws of thought, for instance, may be derived from it: "being is not not-

being, all being is what is. . . .”

All this is possible because “the intellect sees” in its way just as the senses see in theirs. Although metaphysics depends on sense initially, “it is precisely the activity of the intellect which disengages from this experience and brings to the fire of immaterial visibility in act, the objects which sense cannot decipher in things, and which the intellect sees. This is the mystery of abstractive intuition.”

The difficulty is that not everyone recognizes this fact. There are philosophers who ignore it. Some even deny it. “And if we ask why,” Maritain concludes, “we shall be bound finally to admit that it is because there are philosophers who see, and philosophers who do not see.”¹² And that’s that.

This raises the question of the relation of metaphysics to other forms of knowledge. Metaphysics is said to be about the natural world. For that reason it is, and should be, autonomous of theology. It has its own problems and should work on them in its own way.

But metaphysics is below theology in value. The theologian may use it “for his own purposes,” in which case “it is then a means for theology and integrated into it.” Such integration is confined, it is true, to the “ministerial function” of philosophy. Yet metaphysics is, irrespective of that, necessarily “attracted” to theology as “an order of superior intellectuality,” and gets assistance from it in the form of objective knowledge beyond its own reach.¹³

What this comes to is Maritain’s claim that metaphysics is autonomous while at the same time he denies its independence. Indeed, he says, a crisis developed in Western thought when philosophers “demanded absolute independence” for metaphysics. The distinction between autonomy and independence may be seen in another way. Metaphysics is independent of the “empirical sciences,” for the pure nature of things is what it is independently of matter and the sciences concerned with it. Metaphysics “dominates them and it is free from their control.” In relation to the higher wisdom, on the other hand, the autonomy

of metaphysics means that it is "subordinate" without being "subalternated."¹⁴ All of this is another way of saying that metaphysics is free to follow its own lead as long as *that* lead follows the lead of theology, and as long as its conclusions do not go counter to those of theology.

"Philosophy of nature" is midway between metaphysics and science. It is "subordinate" to metaphysics, and yet is necessary to it as a source of "material" information. It is a connecting link between the higher philosophy and the sciences below itself, and serves to "transmit rules" from the higher to the lower knowledge. As must all knowledge, philosophy of nature starts from sensory experiences, but it must stop short of metaphysics, for it has to do with "corporeal being" instead of pure being.

In a sense philosophy of nature shares the same world with science, the changing natural world. It "has as its object, in all things of corporeal being, mobile being as such, and the ontological principles which give the reason for its mutability." It is dependent on the data furnished by science, while independent of science in its origin and in the solution of its problems. Because of its dependence on scientific data, philosophy of nature is "essentially subject to change." And yet it cannot change "radically" or "substantially"—or, presumably, essentially. The substance must remain the same, though the details may be modified. Furthermore, no scientific fact or theory could "nullify a philosophical assertion," since the two types of knowledge are different. ". . . To imagine," Maritain says, "that philosophical doctrines need to be radically transformed to fit in with scientific revolutions is as absurd as to suggest that our souls are vitally affected and altered by a variation in the elements of our dietary."

Science seeks to go "from the visible to the visible," while philosophy goes "from the visible to the invisible." When science deals with matter, space, time or quantity, it can only study "the laws of phenomena, linking one observation to another." But philosophy seeks to know what in the very nature of corporeal being those things are. In the classic phrase, it seeks not only to describe but to explain. Although philosophy, like science, begins

and ends in experience, its procedures differ from those of science. It searches for essences and is deductive in so far as it reaches them. For this reason philosophy of nature has a basis of "metaphysical intelligibility": It can grasp in "things" the intelligibility which is invested in what is sensible, "and can do so with certainty." It is a true "speculative wisdom" but of the lowest sort.¹⁵

From the point of view of Thomistic philosophy the empirical sciences are trapped by their own commitment to experience. The individual objects which make up that world are both unique and contingent, and so there can be no knowledge of the "individual as such." Science can have certainty at all only to the extent that it can avoid contingency and deal with necessities. Therefore physics is the best of the empirical sciences, in spite of the fact that it does not have the deductive and certain perfection of mathematics, which is abstracted both from being and from phenomena. Physics is highly certain because it is able to achieve a "mathematization of the sensible." But, Maritain insists, its rigid mathematical deductions are verified only by measurements, not by "real causes." Physics remains a science of phenomena. It is not in search of being, like metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. It is knowledge involving only "the possibilities of observation and measurement, by the performance of physical operations. . . ."¹⁶

Physics therefore has the same general limitation as the other empirical sciences, even though it is the highest of them. All the sciences are limited to observable experience. That is their nature, just as it is the nature of a fish to be limited to water. Within the realm of experience it is the aim of the sciences to describe the regularities that occur. But, as the positivists assert, scientists can only describe; they cannot, as scientists, evaluate or attempt to move outside their realm. Indeed, Maritain welcomes the positivistic theory of science, even though he refers to positivism as a reaction against metaphysics so extreme as to be "retrograde, and indeed pre-Copernican." He is convinced that its assumptions concerning science are basically accurate and that they also leave

the field of religion open to faith. He points out that a number of positivists have been sympathetic to religion.¹⁷

One of the positivistic contributions, Maritain continues, is that it passes on science's discovery that science "is *not* a philosophy." It deals with phenomena alone and cannot try to go beyond, in the manner of philosophy. But error begins even with this contribution. The positivists have tried to rid science of the ontological weight of its language—that is, what Maritain considers the inherent reference of the language to ultimate reality. This, he says, cannot be done. The sciences necessarily presuppose Reality.

Here is a dilemma. Sciences are limited to the sensory, yet they cannot be wholly sensory and develop genuine knowledge. Since it is impossible to deal with individual, natural objects as such, sciences must make use of some sort of universal principles. Scientists assume that nature is sufficiently uniform that, on the basis of certain observations, it is possible to predict future occurrences. Many positivists take the position that the principle of induction and its assumption of the uniformity of nature are simply presupposed. They do so on the grounds that the uniformity of nature could only be demonstrated by induction, which itself rests on the assumption of uniformity. Since induction is the basis of all knowledge of fact, they conclude, it must simply be presupposed—without a metaphysical basis, but also without other forms of justification.

Maritain replies, in effect, that it is strange that that on which all knowledge is said to be based should itself have no basis. There is no rational basis for knowledge only if one pays no attention to Reality, for Reality is itself rational. The sciences necessarily assume an "ontological x"—some abstract nature or essence without which there would be no reason to assume regularities in phenomena. Unless there are some such essences, there can be no intelligible necessities at all, and no way of trusting the uniformity of nature.

Obviously, in this analysis, the experimental sciences assume many things they cannot prove within their own sphere. They

"require to be completed" and "regulated." This will have to be done by philosophy of nature and, especially, by metaphysics. Mathematics rivals philosophy in certainty and sometimes seeks to usurp its place; but, dealing as it does only with imaginative objects, it cannot do the job. The sciences themselves have "marvelous technical power over nature" but power only "from the point of view of quantity, not that of being." They produce only utility. They seek a reason for things but cannot supply it, whereas metaphysics, in its penetration to being, is a fruition of knowledge. Nevertheless, in spite of the inferiority of scientific knowledge, Maritain insists that the sciences are not dependent on philosophy or metaphysics in "their own intrinsic development."¹⁸

These remarks are limited, however, to the non-biological sciences. Biology and psychology constitute additional problems. In their concern with living things rather than the purely physical, they deal with purposeful behavior. The introduction of purpose brings with it "supra-empirical problems" which can only be solved with the apparatus of philosophy. Maritain denies that these sciences are subordinate to philosophy, but adds that they are continuous with it. They may develop their own "autonomous empiriological vocabulary of ideal, imaginative objects." At the same time they demand a "powerful philosophical discipline" because they have so many more preconceptions than the other sciences. For example, unwary scientists assume the truth of the theory of evolution based on Darwin; but for all its importance, Maritain says, Darwinism is only a "pseudo-explanation" of the "fact" of evolution.¹⁹

Any claim that a lower type of knowledge, such as modern science, is autonomous as regards a higher, such as Thomist metaphysics, does not mean that the inferior knowledge may come to any conclusion it likes. The inferior knowledge may investigate its own proper subject-matter freely only so long as it follows the principles of the higher knowledge and does not contradict its conclusions. This is in accordance with the Catholic principle that one may be free to find the truth but not free to err. Logically it means that no philosophy should be tolerated

that it not Catholic, nor should a science be permitted that contradicts Catholic metaphysics or theology.²⁰

As the sciences are subordinate to philosophy of nature, and both to metaphysics, so all three are dependent on theology. For example:

Considered in its pure *nature* or essence, philosophy, which is specified by an object naturally knowable to reason, depends only on the evidence and criteria of natural reason. But here we are only considering its abstract nature. Taken concretely . . . philosophy is in a certain *state*, is either pre-Christian or Christian or a-Christian, which has a decisive influence on the way in which it exists and develops.

To be valid philosophy must get "objective data" and "subjective reinforcements" from faith and revelation. These last make up theology, and though philosophy is not strictly dependent on it, theology is the source of its "light." Metaphysics can be autonomous only by recognizing its subordination.²¹

Both metaphysics and theology can know God. But if metaphysics can know him only as first cause, theology knows things from God's point of view. It is the "science of revealed mysteries." It

rationally develops in the discursive manner which is of our nature, the truths virtually comprised in the deposit of revelation. Proceeding according to the method and sequences of reason but rooted in faith, from which it receives its principles, the rightful light of theology, drawn from the science of God, is not that of reason alone but of reason illuminated by faith. By this very reason its certitude is in itself higher than that of metaphysics.²²

In this method God is only "virtually" revealed, not directly "seen." Even though theology knows God "as he is known to himself," it is still unable "to lay hold of him." God is "stripped of the veils which belong to our natural knowledge, but left or shown under other veils. . . ." The fact that theological knowledge is still involved with conceptual thought makes it rational

and communicable. But this rationality is not reason in any ordinary sense of the word; it is not even "a simple application of the philosophical method to the matter of revelation; truly a monstrous conception. . . ." Theology is "the elucidation of the substance of revelation by a faith vitally united with reason. . . ." From which it can be seen that "philosophy is rightly the 'servant' of theology, and is fitted to the service of its master."

According to Maritain's interesting terminology theology "is not only an uncircumscriptive analogy: it is a revealed analogy, the proxy or substitute of vision, what we may call a super-analogy." Analogy is the way God reveals himself in ordinary things, reaching our senses in such a way that those objects take on significance infinitely greater than themselves. The Fatherhood of God may be seen through earthly paternity. The generation and procession of the Persons of the Trinity may be seen through temporal creation and activity. These are not just metaphors but ways in which divine truths may be seen even when they are a totally different order of meaning.

Above theology is faith alone. There God is "formally" revealed but still "without seeing, by means of an infallible adhesion given in our obscurity and uncertainty to those things which the very Truth has revealed of itself." It remains necessary humanly to communicate the "testimony of the Primal Truth," which is done through the doctrines of the true Church, that is, the Catholic Church.

God is still better known by means of what Maritain calls "apophatic" knowledge, which means literally, I suppose, knowledge which is detached from the phase of conceptual thought. Apophatic wisdom is a knowledge of "ignorance," it is a "negative theology." He does not mean

a pure and simple ignorance, but . . . an ignorance which knows, in which lies its mystery. . . . And thus by the very fact that in itself the Godhead remains unknown, there is a greater knowledge than ever of God even as he is. . . . It is not that he remains unknown to us, but that he is known by us, is known in himself, as remaining unknown.

Having gone beyond concepts, "it is mystical experience or it is nothing."

Above all these other forms of knowledge is the Beatific Vision, which sees God immediately, but which may be had only after death or to those who are blessed.²³

Since God is that which is most Real, all these types of knowledge fundamentally strive to know Him. This is true to a limited extent even of the empirical sciences, despite their attempts to deny their own inescapable reference to Reality. It is more true of the higher types of knowledge constantly trying to ascend toward God. "Thus there is a double movement in the Christian universe. And the movement by which it mounts upwards to God is only a consequence of the primary movement by which God descends to it." The descending movement is Grace. It is possible to ascend only as God raises us up. In its pure form Grace is mystical contemplation:

Grace supernaturally confers on us the intrinsic power of laying hold of the Pure Act as our object; a new root of spiritual action which gives us as our specific and proper object the divine essence in itself. . . . In this vision the creature becomes the very God himself, not in the order of substance but in that of immaterial union which fashions the intellectual act.²⁴

Knowledge in any ordinary sense of the word, even in the ordinary Thomistic senses, is not necessary for Grace, for apophatic wisdom is inferior only to the Beatific Vision. Through the "affirmation of negation," people "ignorant of metaphysics and theology" may have salvation. God is knowledge, but the prize is not necessarily for the learned. God makes salvation "open to all by cooperation with divine grace according to the individual's knowledge and powers." Grace may, indeed, be granted to men of other religions.

Once Grace is had "supernatural charity" flows from it; and from that the other virtues immediately given by God follow in their turn; and then come the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, for they are not genuine virtues in their natural state, without charity.²⁵

When the heights are reached, wisdom returns again into the world, for theology is such a potent factor that it must enter the world as a cultural force. Having seen God, its human content must become "ministerial." The way is then opened for moral thought and action, and unless morality is well-founded, its commands will be no more than domination of men over men. Therefore, moral theology must come first, as the foundation on which democracy, for instance, must be built. After that comes moral philosophy: "speculatively practical philosophy" and "practically-practical philosophy." Finally, there is prudence, both "infused" and "acquired."

Moral theology, since it is an inseparable part of general theology, sees morality from God's point-of-view. For that reason, moral philosophy should be *thoroughly* subordinated to it. The branches of moral philosophy deal, respectively, with questions of general strategy and with "concrete considerations of particular conditions." But no matter how concrete it becomes, moral philosophy still depends on the truths of the eternal moral law which is based on divine law. It may, therefore, be infallible even where it is relative.

At one time (that is, before the fall of Adam) both aspects of moral philosophy could have been purely natural, but that state has, of course, been lost; and while there is still such a thing as natural ethics, by itself it would lead men astray. This makes it all the more important for moral philosophy both to rely on theology for knowledge of the supernatural and of man and to consider men "from the point of view of the concrete and historical movement that leads them to their end. . . ." At the same time the purity of theological moral knowledge must be maintained apart from philosophical moral knowledge. Moral philosophy is limited to "knowing things from the human point of view." That point of view would degrade theology.

But there is nothing bad, Maritain says, about the subordination of moral philosophy. It simply accepts the conclusions of theology as one "science accepts the conclusions or the results of another science. . . ." For, as he observes elsewhere, moral philos-

ophy "cannot even exist as a science without the illumination it receives from the superior science . . . for instance as optics receives its principles from geometry. . . ." By recognizing its subordination moral philosophy may be a "philosophy in faith" without being formally theological.

Similar considerations are involved with prudence, which does not involve general considerations so much as "the particular regulation of a single act." Acquired prudence is the extension and application of moral philosophy, as infused prudence (directly from God) is the extension and application of moral theology. The function of acquired prudence is to "adjust our action to our temporal ends." But the end of life is not temporal. The here and now is significant only so far as it leads to the then and there, and man cannot adequately live except as he seeks the eternal end. It is the infused virtues that lead to heaven, and they must work with acquired prudence to elevate it and thereby to reconcile what conflict there may be between the two realms.²⁶

In these passages the point of Maritain's argument is dulled as it ricochets among rocky words. But the impact is still there: ethical and social ideas should be regulated by theological beliefs.

We have been surveying the Thomistic account of man's world, and of his ways of knowing it. What then is man, and how shall we be mindful of him?

Maritain calls the Thomistic view of man *True Humanism*. If followed, he says, it "should be a kind of Copernican revolution" which "would make a great change in the relative importance of the elements in the universe of action"—although it "would in no way affect . . . doctrine, not even an iota of it. . . ." True humanism

tends essentially to make man more truly human, and to manifest his original dignity by enabling him to participate in everything which can enrich him in nature and history. . . . It demands that man develop his powers, his creative energies and the life of reason, and at the same time labour to make the forces of the physical world instruments of his freedom.

And yet:

To offer man . . . only what is human is to betray him and to wish him ill; for by the principle part of him which is the mind, man is called to something better than a purely human life.²⁷

Thomism finds two main factors at the root of human nature. One is that "man comes from nothingness and belongs to nothingness," for man is a natural animal, dependent in large measure on his body. The body is material, and matter is nothing of itself but potentiality. In so far as men are subject to bodily desires they express the negation of Reality or God. Matter is the principle of "individuality" in men (and in all nature), "being in one that which excludes from one all that other men are." It is "the narrowness in being," which in its pure form "is a kind of non-being." Men must bear "the burden of nature," that is, "the servitudes and the needs of the body, heredity, ignorance, selfishness, and the savagery of instincts." And as he is actually found man

is an unfortunate material individual, an animal who is born in an infinitely more depraved state than all the other animals. . . . He is destitute and miserable—an indigent person, full of needs.

Man, in so far as he is a material individuality, has but a precarious unity, which wishes only to slip back into multiplicity; for matter as such tends to decompose itself. In so far as we are individuals, each of us is a fragment of a species, a part of this universe, a single dot in the network of forces and influences, cosmic, ethnic, historic, whose laws we obey. We are subject to the determination of the physical world.

But this is not all there is to man. The other factor is that "man comes from God and belongs to God."

. . . Each man is also a person and in so far as he is a person, he is not subject to the stars and atoms; for he subsists entirely with the very subsistence of his spiritual soul, and the latter is in him a principle of creative unity, of independence and of freedom.²⁸

Human beings have two aspects—the material and the spiritual. They are at once natural and supernatural. These are not separate factors, but different parts of one unique substance. Both are necessary if there is to be a “human person.” Yet a man inevitably emphasizes one of those parts of himself. The basis of personality is the spiritual soul, and if that is weakened a man degenerates into an individual.

Men differ because they are individuals, since matter is the principle in things which resists formation into actuality. Men differ, therefore, to the extent that they fall away from reality or personality. At the same time,

all men have the same human nature; hence they all have the same set of capacities to be fulfilled, however much they may differ individually in the degree to which they possess this or that capacity.

The sameness is due to the element of personality. The human person both “bears to God the common resemblance born by other creatures” and “resembles him in a proper and peculiar fashion.”

In resembling God the human person becomes, in that respect, independent. For God is that which is completely independent and that on which all other things depend; so that, for Thomism a man becomes independent to the extent that he recognizes his dependence on God and increases it. In that sense the person is defined

by independence: the person is a reality, which, subsisting spiritually, constitutes a universe by itself and an independent whole (relatively independent), in the great whole of the universe and facing the transcendent Whole, which is God. It is rooted in the spirit, in so far as the latter stands by itself in existence and super-abounds in it.

[Personality is] capable of enveloping itself by intelligence and freedom, and of super-existing in knowledge and free love.²⁹

And what is freedom? There are two kinds: freedom of choice and freedom of “spontaneity,” “independence,” “autonomy,” or “exultation.”

Maritain gives no proof of the existence of freedom of choice since, as he says, "each of us knows by experience the existence of his own freedom." Instead he describes the "will" and its activities. Choices occur in men's search for ends. Men's ultimate end, that which they "necessarily desire," is "absolute happiness." This is "beatitude," the sight of God as he is in himself, and a "limitless good." All things this side of it are "only particular and partial goods," which are not necessarily desired. But though we inescapably desire beatitude, we cannot be fully determined by it until it is directly known. Meanwhile, finite things make up the goods which are sought in life on earth. They are the objects of free will.

The will is "intellective" (or rational or spiritual) appetite, seeking that which is good in itself. The intellect by itself makes a general rule (speculatively practical judgment) concerning human action. No particular act is accomplished by this rule alone. It dictates a general end which remains the same, while there are several particular goods, presumed to lead to that end, from which a choice must be made. The will directs the intellect into the making of a practically-practical judgment. There is then a creative activity of will which chooses from among the particular goods, since they are unable to supply the motive force by themselves. This act of choice is free because it cannot be predicted. Even God cannot foresee it.

At the same time: (1) One can tell "with more or less probability" what another person will do, even though not "with certitude." (2) God "sees" all a person's acts in "His creative eternity," although he can't foresee them. (3) God is the sole "primary cause" of men's good acts. This is necessarily the case, since by themselves men are nothing and can do good only through grace; without it men cannot even begin to save themselves; they can only be "free secondary causes." However, men initiate all their evil acts and are solely responsible for them. Possibly by way of explanation, Maritain says God "solicits . . . but he never compels." Men have freedom of will in grace, although they alone cannot initiate it, and once it has been given

them they cannot reject it. Hence the Mystery of grace.³⁰

The realm of freedom of choice is the extent to which a person can exercise self-determination in this world. Freedom of spontaneity is not freedom of choice, but beyond it and more valuable; it is God-determination. It is the knowledge of reality, that is, God, which comes from grace, and comes fully only in the beatific vision, after death.

It is the freedom of God Himself that the perfect spiritual man enjoys, being independent of all external constraint in so far as he depends only on the divine causality, which is extraneous to nothing.

In so far as this takes place a man has become a genuine person. He is free as a part of the whole of things, its causes are his own and he is not compelled.³¹

Because of his nature, the human person has a dignity not accorded to him by the protestant and naturalistic humanisms. According to Protestantism man is infinitely depraved in the sight of God, a "walking corruption"; according to naturalism he is merely another animal and has "become a monster, dear to himself." True personality makes use of the body since it is an integral part of its nature, and yet is raised above earthly and animal things in its spiritual nature.

All things—animal, vegetable and mineral—desire God. Men desire Him not only because they are creatures, but also because they belong to the spiritual realm. Through knowledge and grace men have a chance, which animals do not have, of becoming more real. The "human capacity for knowing the truth" is "the basis of the human dignity of the person."³²

The personal, rather than the individual, aspect of man is also the sole basis for recognition of human equality. When examined as individuals it is evident that "there is clear inequality between man and man, they being born with varying abilities, characteristics, physical, mental and spiritual capacities and natural gifts." Therefore, any philosophy which denies men's supernatural nature must doom them to inequality. However,

All men are essentially and spiritually equal; no man is preferred before another, or of greater value than another in the sight of God, on account of any advantage or superiority; the salvation of the slave is as important as that of the emperor, of the imprudent man as that of the prudent.³³

To the extent that men have become persons, they have become alike, and equal. Men are also equal and alike as candidates for salvation.

These Thomistic religious principles—of God as Creator, and of man as free and equal under God—are according to Father Wilfrid Parsons, the logical foundation of American democracy, and also its indirect historical source.³⁴

Any valid form of democracy, if we are to take Father Parsons' claim seriously, rests on Thomism—including its doctrines that knowledge requires theology, at least for regulative purposes, and that the true theology is that established by the Catholic Church.

Neo-Thomism — II

Well, then, how is a Neo-Thomist philosophy of democracy constructed on these theoretical foundations? The insistence by Catholic authorities that the doctrines of their Church constitute the sole valid basis for democracy may appear bewildering in the light of the presentation in the preceding chapter of the philosophical reasons for that claim.

There is good ground for bewilderment. The Roman Church itself does not claim to be democratic. Its history is not marked by sympathy for tendencies commonly considered democratic; and the Syllabus of Errors, issued by Pope Pius IX in 1864, specifically condemns many, if not most, ideas identified with democratic movements.

But this is not really the issue at the moment. Any attempt to deal with democracy simply in terms of things "commonly considered democratic" or "usually identified with it" begs the question. Catholic writers are, of course, aware of those factors, historical and doctrinal, which bewilder non-Catholics. The main point is that they have a different philosophy of democracy from that of their critics. Unless this is kept in mind the problem cannot be clearly dealt with. Let us remember that spokesmen for the Church insist that it is the foundation of democracy because it is the true Church possessing true doctrine. The question of its relation to the problems and processes of democracy cannot be examined apart from such claims to the truth. It will be necessary to examine these claims in due time, but the time for it is not yet.

My previous discussion of the Thomistic theory of human nature omitted a crucial portion of it—that man is a social animal.

Without a recognition of this fact and of the proper reason for it, Thomists say, social thinkers can logically hold only anarchistic or totalitarian theories. Man has a "natural instinct" causing "him to live in civil society": "it is divinely ordained that he should lead this life—be it family, social or civil, with his fellow man. . . ." The instinct is based both on the needs and on the perfections of the human person. The fulfillment of needs—both the material needs and the needs for aid and education in virtue—is the negative social function. Positively, society grows out of the spiritual nature of personality and the love one person holds for every other person. Because of his "radical generosity, the human person tends to super-abound in social communications." Although "personality means interiority to oneself," even this leads to a demand for a society of persons:

Because of the very fact that I am a person and that I express myself to myself, I seek to communicate with that which is other and with others, in the order of knowledge and love.¹

For these and other reasons, society is not a merely human instrument but comes from God, who is the only legitimate source of authority. "Society . . . find [sic] its only justification in a law derived from a Creator and therefore binding on all men antecedently to any human will." If this is denied there are only two alternatives: either there is no society at all, or else societies are created by men and ruled only by human authority. The first is impossible, and the second "inevitably leads to some kind of totalitarian tyranny." But Thomism avoids this dilemma. ". . . It establishes upon all an obligation of obeying the authority of the State as something derived ultimately from God."

The ultimate end of man, it will be remembered, is "absolute happiness," which is not obtainable on this earth. Meanwhile there is an earthly life to live, and this involves a temporal end, which is the concern of society. It has two functions. One is to help men reach eternal life, since that remains, as the ultimate end, the highest good and of supreme importance to men wherever they are. Yet the temporal end, although subordinate, *is* an end

and not a mere means. The second aspect of the temporal end is to enable men to get what goods there are in this world.

But society cannot aim for the good of each individual. "The end of society is its common good, the good of the body politic." If social groups were made up of pure persons, there would be no conflict between the good of each person and the common good. As it is each person tends to be a mere individual whose goods are apparent only. To seek individual goods "would dissolve society *as such* for the benefit of its parts. . . ."

The tendency of men is to be evil, especially by themselves.

But social structures . . . are not men though they are human: and so in the very degree to which they are things, not men, they can be purified of certain particular miseries of human life; and like many of the works of men, they are made by man and better than he in their order and in certain aspects.

So the incompleteness of men makes them merely parts of a communal whole. "The political community having, in so far as it is a whole, its own reality, its own unity, and its own life, is by this very fact superior to its parts as such, and demands a hierarchic distribution of its organs. . . ." Besides, the common good is itself "ethically good" and must therefore be sought. Being inferior to the social whole, the individual must be guided by it. Yet communities are also made up of persons. And to the extent that each person is a "spiritual totality, referring to the transcendent Whole," he "surpasses all temporal societies and is superior to them." It is this that prevents society from disregarding its members, and that causes it to be subordinated to the person and to "the eternal destiny of the soul. . . ."

The search for the common good is not the exclusive right of any particular type of state. As Maritain argues:

The Christian religion is not enslaved to any temporal regime. It is compatible with all forms of legitimate government. It is not its business to determine which one of them must be adopted by men *hic et nunc*. . . . Neither does it impose—so long as certain

superior principles are safeguarded—a particular political philosophy.

The Catholic Church is, of course, what is meant by “the Christian Religion.” The Church cannot “specify a political or national ideal.” That “would be contrary to the nature of things, precisely because Catholicism is by nature transcendent.” All temporal governments are imperfect, whereas the Church is flawless. It is a “mystical body” in which the devil “has no part.” It must work in the world without corrupting itself by becoming a part of the world.⁴

There is another reason why the Church condemns no general form of government. Catholicism does not consider a state good because it employs one method or another in performing its functions, but because it is directed to specific ends and employs certain principles which Catholicism declares to be good. A government which aims to develop its policies through the open inquiry by the whole citizenry of the questions at issue, and of the ideas and information bearing on them, is not necessarily considered better, and concerning many things is likely to be regarded as worse, than one which is based on the decisions of an elite. As one Thomist has put it:

. . . all early political philosophers, beginning with St. Thomas Aquinas, held that rule by one, if that one is animated by the principles of justice, can do more good and is more stable than rule by many, for the many are never absolute; they must rule by compromises, and thus inevitably fall short of the perfect good.⁵

Governments arise in the first place because man's instinct for society is frustrated without legitimate rule and law. Civil laws are derived, directly or indirectly, from natural and divine law. Having their source in reason, these laws would be followed voluntarily by men if they lived, like pure persons, according to reason. But they do not. Civil authority is necessary to enforce law. Without it there would be anarchy. “Now,” said Pope Leo XIII, “this social need justifies the existence and creation of new governments, whatever form they take. . . .”

Obedience is a moral obligation to legitimate government, for all authority comes from God. But though God is the only source of "lawful power," in earthly matters he exercises that power through visible rulers, not directly. To disobey any legitimate authority, therefore, is to disobey God. If this were not the case, if power is believed to come from any other source, then one has "despaired of anything like a just order of society." Authority comes either from God or from material force, and belief in the latter can lead only to "the blackest pessimism."⁶

Obedience is a duty, however, only to legitimate authority. But what constitutes legitimacy? There is a Thomistic tradition that Divine authority is not granted directly to a civil ruler, but passes through the community and is expressed by consent to the government in question. Does this imply a preference for democracy, despite what has been said to the contrary? Some Thomists have hinted that it does. But Pope Leo XIII spoke plainly when, with reference to recent democratic developments, he said:

The sovereignty of the people, however, and this without any reference to God, is held to reside in the multitude; doubtless a doctrine exceedingly well calculated to flatter and to inflame many passions, but which lacks all reasonable proof, and all power of insuring public safety and preserving order. Indeed from the prevalence of this teaching, things have come to such a pass that many hold it as an axiom of civil jurisprudence that seditions may be rightfully fostered. For the opinion prevails that princes are nothing more than delegates chosen to carry out the will of the people, so that risk of public disturbances is ever hanging over our heads.⁷

Sovereignty, then, *passes through* the populace, and consent is the manner of passage. But the manner of passage need not require open or explicit approval of the form of government, nor even of the particular ruler. Under some conditions consent may be indicated implicitly, by the absence of objection to an established regime.

But if consent is to be so broadly interpreted, how are we to recognize it when it is given? On what basis, for example, has

the Church condemned Soviet Russia, while "on December 12, 1948, Pius XII gave Franco his public and 'affectionate blessing,' the latest in a long series of such blessings."⁸ If there is a basis for doing so, it is hardly that Spain has established consent, in any ordinary sense of the word, and Russia has not. The point seems to be that legitimacy is not based on consent, as the word is commonly used, but that consent gets its meaning in terms of legitimacy.

A legitimate authority, an authority to which consent may be *properly* given, is one which seeks the common good through conformity to natural and Divine law. Such a government is "just," for it gives "to each one his due" according to rights derived from natural law. These basic rights are:

the right to live, to bodily integrity, to the necessary means of existence; the right of man to tend towards his ultimate goal in the path marked out to him by God; the right of association and the right to possess and use property. . . .

Allegiance to Catholicism is implicit throughout. It is made explicit by Pope Leo XIII in the Encyclical "Immortale Dei":

As a consequence, the State, constituted as it is, is clearly bound to act up to the manifold and weighty duties linking it to God, by the public profession of religion. . . . For men living together in society are under the power of God no less than individuals are, and society, not less than individuals, owes gratitude to God, who gave it being and maintains it. . . . Since, then, no one is allowed to be remiss in the service due to God, and since the chief duty of all men is to cling to religion in both its teaching and practice—not such religion as they may have a preference for, but the religion which God enjoins, and which certain and most clear marks show to be the only one true religion—it is a public crime to act as though there were no God. So, too, it is a sin in the state not to have a care for religion, as a something beyond its scope, or as of no practical benefit; or out of many forms of religion to adopt that one which chimes in with the fancy; for we are bound absolutely to worship God in that way which He has shown to be His will. All who rule, therefore, should hold in honor the holy name of

God, and one of their chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under the credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact any measure that may compromise its safety.

By "religion" and "Church" is, of course, meant Roman Catholicism and the Roman Catholic Church, for Catholicism is the only true religion.⁹

Contemporary Catholic thinkers deny that this doctrine is contrary to the separation of Church and State. One Thomist maintains, indeed, "that it is the heritage of Christianity that we today think of the State as a separate entity, sovereign in its own sphere and separate from the Church." By separation of Church and State he means simply that the two functions should not be unified into one institution. Church and State do not have identical purposes; their respective purposes should be worked out through different institutions.

But as Pope Leo XIII and others have made abundantly clear, this does not mean that the State may go its own way, irrespective of religious beliefs. The same author goes on to say that, in carrying out the separation of State from Church, we have forgotten the "correlative" Christian Doctrine: "This is . . . the supremacy of the spiritual." True political theory recognizes that the State has a sphere which is independent in practical action but not independent of "moral law," "Christian Revelation," or "the Church, whose purpose was to teach the moral law and Revelation in His name." Or, as Pope Leo XIII said it:

The Almighty . . . has appointed the charge of the human race between two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being set over divine, the other over human things. Each in its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits with which it is contained. . . . But inasmuch as each of these two powers has authority over the same subjects . . . God, who foresees all things . . . has marked out the course of each in right correlation to the other.

The Church is superior to the State because it is "super-natural and spiritual," perfect and immutable. Its teachings obviously determine the "right correlation" in question of faith and morals,

where it is infallible. But that is not all. The Catholic State should, among other things, "recognize and sanction the laws of the Church; and it should protect the rights of the Church, and the religious as well as the other rights of the Church's members." Wherever there is not a Catholic State, wherever a large proportion of the population is non-Catholic, the other religious beliefs should be tolerated. But even a non-Catholic State may not permit other religions to carry on immoral practices, nor does the state itself have the right to do things offensive to the true Church.¹⁰ The implication is clear: civil institutions should follow Church policy in any question affecting the Church and its beliefs.

The position is clear, and so are the reasons for it. And so, I daresay, are its further implications. The question of the nature of freedom is crucial. Just what would freedom mean under Catholicism?

Catholic spokesmen answer that true freedom is to be found in Catholicism and nowhere else. Negatively, they deny that the Church has ever sought unity by regimentation. Indeed, says Maritain, "that would be an absolute impossibility." The essence of the Church is its spirituality and possession of transcendent truth. Such elements cannot develop by the coercion of material forces. Positively, freedom is considered most desirable; but, as Pope Leo XIII declared in the encyclical "*Libertas Praestantissimum*":

Human liberty necessarily stands in need of light and strength to direct its actions to good and to restrain them from evil. . . . First of all there must be law; that is, a fixed rule of teaching what is to be done and what is to be left undone.

Freedom is "inconceivable without . . . justice and civic friendship" or "brotherly love"—qualities which are to be found in their true form in obedience to Catholic doctrines. To the extent that men are not persons, this constraint will seem irritating and perhaps even like servitude. By love, however, it is

transformed "into freedom and a free gift." For authority is not opposed to freedom but is the basis of it. A man is free when he obeys anyone who has the right to command, especially if the one in authority seeks the common good. The highest authority is, of course, God, whose commands are "made known to us by the light of reason itself, the church. . . ." ¹¹

Freedom to believe falsehood and to follow it would be a form of slavery. True freedom is freedom to the truth, freedom to know the truth and to act accordingly. The highest Truth is God, and He has established on earth a true Church in order to communicate his Word and Will. The individual is free when he knows God's nature and follows His will. On earth this means allegiance to the Church, as the authority concerning the divine Truth and its Commands.

What follows for religion is obvious. In *A Catholic Dictionary* these words are found:

Freedom of Worship. i. The alleged right of individuals to worship or not, and if they do, to use any form of worship they please. There is no such right. . . . ii. The inalienable right of all men to worship God according to the teachings of the Catholic Church. . . . The State has a duty to foster this true worship, and to prevent . . . the danger of injury to the Church by the propagation of false religions.

According to Pope Leo XIII, in the Encyclical "Immortale Dei":

To hold . . . that there is no difference in matters of religion between forms that are unlike each other, and even contrary to each other, most clearly leads in the end to the rejection of all religion in both theory and practice. And this is the same thing as atheism. . . .

Similarly, Pope Pius IX declared:

that the civil liberty for every form of worship, and the full power given to all of openly and publicly manifesting whatsoever opinions and thoughts, lead to the more ready corruption of the minds and morals of the people, and to the spread of the plague of religious indifference. ¹²

The Church today is not in a position to enforce these claims, at least not directly. "Religious diversity" is a fact, and in many countries power is on the side of diversity. The line becomes modified. *A Catholic Dictionary* says: "the State can tolerate false religions, so long as they do not promulgate open immorality. . . ." Even in what Maritain calls "the New Christendom" different religions will be tolerated—not because they are approved, but in order to safeguard the peace.

Essentially the same argument, regarding freedom of religion, applies to the rest of what Pope Leo XIII refers to as "the so-called 'Liberties' which are so greatly coveted in these days." Although Maritain, for instance, considers "bourgeois free-thought" the "stupidest thing in the world," he finds "the dictatorial or totalitarian method of regulation" of speech and writing to be "detestable." He suggests that in the New Christendom writers and journalists may be able to regulate themselves. Pope Leo XIII, in his Encyclical "*Libertas Praestantissimum*," faces the issue more directly. Freedoms of speech, press, teaching, etc., are not ends in themselves, he says, but means to the common good. For that reason:

Men have a right freely and prudently to propagate throughout the state what things soever are true and honorable, so that as many as possible may possess them; but lying opinions, than which no mental plague is greater, and vices which corrupt the heart and moral life, should be diligently repressed by public authority, lest they insidiously work the ruin of the State.¹³

In order to protect faith and morals, the Papal Index (*Index Librorum Prohibitorum*), and much legislation were instituted. Besides condemning such obviously wicked writers as Montaigne, Voltaire, Hobbes, Hume, Gibbon, Rousseau and Comte, there are others, such as Descartes, Spinoza, Pascal, Kant, Locke, Berkeley, Bentham, Mill, Dumas (both father and son), Flaubert, Stendhal, Maeterlink, Lord Acton, Bergson and Croce. Galileo remained on the Index until 1835.

There are so many offensive books, especially in recent years, that it is impossible to condemn them all by name. Canon law

deals with this difficulty through a number of general categories of prohibitions—for example: books attacking religion and morality, books on religion by non-Catholics (unless it has been determined that they contain nothing contrary to Catholicism), books defending Free-masonry, obscene books (with perhaps some exceptions regarding the classics), works giving knowledge of spurious, abused or withdrawn indulgences, and the printing of sacred images which are contrary to Church teachings. The Church also

forbids all editions of the original text of the Sacred Scriptures, and of old Catholic versions of the same . . . published by non-Catholics. . . .

All translations of the Sacred Scriptures into any language, vernacular or otherwise, made or published by non-Catholics are forbidden, no matter how good or faithful the translation.

. . . Works defending atheism, materialism, skepticism, theosophy, works denying freedom of the will, the existence of Christian revelation, the divinity of Jesus Christ, the inspiration of the Scriptures, are forbidden.

Any work . . . which attacks the moral law made known to us either by nature or by revelation, is forbidden. Thus books against some or all of the Ten Commandments, books defending and promoting divorce, abortion, contraception, suicide and the like are all proscribed by the Church.¹⁴

Many people, Fathers Ryan and Boland observe, do not realize that the Church takes its stand out of concern for their welfare.

Superficial champions of religious liberty will promptly and indignantly denounce the foregoing propositions as the essence of intolerance. They are intolerant, but not therefore unreasonable. Error has not the same rights as truth. Since the profession and practice of error are contrary to human welfare, how can error

have rights? How can the voluntary toleration of error be justified?¹⁵

Catholic teachings about Church and State and Freedom, therefore, are but the fundamental principles of all good government. Far from thinking of them as opposed to democratic procedures, Catholic writers are convinced that true democracy is possible only when developed from these principles.

But it should be remembered that the Church refuses to be committed to democracy. Though God gives political authority to "the community directly," according to Thomism, the community hands that authority on, and in doing so may give consent to monarchy or aristocracy rather than to democracy. All governmental authority arises in this way, even if the apparent source of power is conquest or monarchical succession. While admitting that no type of government is by nature better than another, Maritain suggests that democracy might have certain advantages. It "attests the constancy of the *passage* of sovereignty through the multitude." It also avoids "paternalistic domination of any social class over the mass of the people" by making those who rule the equal of others in temporal labor.¹⁶

Maritain examines the social problems of today by means of what he calls "the concrete logic of the events of history"—a combination of "the internal logic of ideas and doctrines" and the "*human milieu*." Through his logic he concludes that we must somehow get rid of the five centuries of post-medieval culture—even though, due to the irreversibility of history, we cannot return to the middle ages. Those centuries have been a decline from the middle ages. Men forgot that only God could initiate Grace and, in taking it for themselves, cut themselves off from Him. Men became divided. When they tried to struggle back to salvation they only blundered into "anthropocentric humanism" and reliance on science.

"Liberal-Bourgeois" democracy was the tragic political outcome of this fall from Grace. It was tragic because it sought personalism and justice—and failed, necessarily. Its origin was Christian—even that part of it coming from Rousseau was at least

a low form of Christianity—but it rejected the basis of Christian authority when it rejected the Church and its teachings. Without authority, liberal-bourgeois democracy tended to anarchy. That very anarchy led to totalitarianism. If it has done nothing else, totalitarianism has tapped human values, which had been ignored by bourgeois democracy. These changes were not accidental but inherent in the rejection of divine authority. Today, Maritain announces, there are only two alternatives: totalitarianism or Christianity, the devil or God, slaughter or Calvary.¹⁷

Maritain calls his version of the Christian alternative “the New Christendom” or “personalist democracy.” Although it is not utopian, he says, its occurrence is improbable until the existent anti-Christian tendencies have struggled and died. If Christianity is the major premise in the syllogism of the “concrete logic of events,” the proletariat is the minor premise. Because of its “suffering and endurance” under capitalism, it is the “bearer of unused moral reserves which endow it with a mission in regard to the new order of the world. . . .” But “neither a man, nor a nation, nor a class can be saved by men alone,” so that any group, whatever its natural virtue, must ally itself with Christian forces.

The new society will, therefore, attempt to conform to the requirements of good government. It will be a “secular” Christianity which recognizes the autonomy of the state in its sphere. It will get its unity less from explicit agreement on dogma than from an “orientation” in a “practical common task.” All good men, whether Christian or not, may share in the direction as long as they have goodwill and have a more or less good grasp of the Gospels. Christians, however, will take the initiative.¹⁸

The economic and political structure of the new democracy is to be pluralistic, in the sense involved in the principles laid down by Pope Pius XI in the Encyclical “*Quadragesimo Anno*.” Among other things the Pope proclaimed:

It is an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies.

Capitalism will be replaced, says Maritain, by a system in which both the collectivization of property and the maintenance of personal property will be based on "the benefit of the human person." Political and economic action will be by free working of various Christian groups organized so as to represent social functions. The aim is to have a modern version of medieval guilds.

In this way, says Maritain, it is possible to get a "concrete and positive" freedom. Suffrage will be universal, but it is far from clear what Maritain means by universality. Apparently suffrage will be more universal in some respects than in others. The main point seems to be that a person will not be excluded from participation because of a lack of formal education or economic status. There is every reason to believe that the universality of suffrage would not apply to those of significantly varying beliefs. Indeed, Maritain argues, since those who are educated, in the ordinary sense of the word, are as likely to be in error as those who are uneducated, universal suffrage must be based on "right instincts," for which *Christian* education is necessary. The masses will have to be guided by a "political fraternity," having the "vocation of leadership," who will seek the "inauguration of a New Christendom."¹⁹

In all likelihood the New Christendom cannot be realized until the distant future. That, Maritain adds, is one of its advantages. Immediate objectives call for "political action which, even if it seeks to work for a long distant future, is determined with regard to its action and the power of its impetus by an immediate realization which gives it its aim." Christians should act, but with the knowledge that the existent "actual regime of civilization is enclosed in contradictions and irremediable evils." Aims directed to the present are therefore contaminated by the present state of the world. They can only result either in "parleying" (which suffers "from all the fauts of empiricism and opportunism" and the consequent acceptance of present culture) or in some sort of messianism or totalitarianism. On the other hand, by concentrating on the distant future it is possible to let

the present evils use themselves up and to allow a more perfect realization of the ideal.²⁰

Whether the aim is immediate or remote, by what means may it be realized? It is important to remember in this connection that the aim is not just a society organized on a democratic or pluralistic basis. The "material" success of any social system is not necessarily desirable to Catholics, and may be more dangerous than a less successful order, since it makes its citizens self-satisfied and lures them to spiritual death. It might, in other words, make them reject Catholicism. The important thing, therefore, is not the specific organization of men, but the religious principles those men believe in and seek. So the question remains: even if it is true that the social goals of some of the Thomists are democratic, how are they to be attained?

One answer might be that there is no need to worry about the means: God will provide. This possibility is not squarely faced, for better psychological than logical reasons. Maritain evades the issue here, just as he did in reference to men's personal freedom when he asserted that God cannot "foresee" men's actions although he knows them from eternity. Since God is timeless knowledge, it would seem that he knows the course of the world "before" it unfolds. Besides, God presumably has an interest in the success of Catholicism as good and in the defeat of contrary beliefs as evil. It would be natural for Him, as Omnipotent Being, to take steps to assure the realization of good. Maritain himself says, for instance, that "history is governed by God and . . . despite all obstacles, He pursues in it a certain divine design"; and that "there is only one issue to the history of the world" in "the humanism of the Incarnation."²¹ The statements are not essentially altered by the fact that he also says the future is "relatively indeterminate"—where this last seems to mean that the New Christendom could be a Catholic aristocracy instead of a Catholic democracy. If the Catholic God is taken seriously, the Good Society will come according to God's logic of history, and man's efforts will neither hurry it nor delay it, whether they are

free or not. Even if men are free, as Catholicism insists, what practical difference does it make since the outcome will be the same in either case?

On the one hand, if the goal of human activity is assured, and in effect already achieved, by God's infinite and timeless goodness, knowledge, and power, there would seem to be no need for intelligently directed human effort. On the other hand, if there is a need for such effort, it is because the course and outcome of events is not inevitable. And yet Thomists and other Catholics hold both to the inevitability of the "divine design" and to the necessity for vigorous and competent human activity. Practically speaking, then, their attitude is that God may be omnipotent, but they will help him out. God's wrath and love operate on schedule, but it will not hurt to take out insurance. So again, to change the metaphor, what method may be used to make the mighty fortress impregnable? Or, perhaps more accurately, what method may be used to make the impregnable fortress safe?

In the logic of the case, might itself is as good a weapon as any, and may be the best. If the cause itself is absolutely just and the opposition is evil, then take any means to eliminate the opposition—if there is any uncertainty about the outcome. If a heretic is unrepentant, it is better to force him to repent than let him die a sinner. If people read books that are not good for them, then burn the books or remove them from circulation. If "atheistic" governments need aid, then intrigue to see that there is no aid. And if an "immoral" teacher is appointed to a college, and there are no laws to ensure his removal, then remove him anyway. These methods of seeking the common good could be justifiable uses of force under the Thomist theory of authority.

But Maritain rejects such procedures. "Means," he says, are "normally the end itself in the state of becoming," so that "discipline of a military type," should give way to "freedom and friendship." War may be justifiable, but force may not be used "as a means of persuasion or of compliance."²²

The methods Maritain proposes are religious conversion, moral suasion and example. They are to solve the problem of achieving

"spiritual universality." "Practically," he declares, "this problem is solved only by an effusion of sanctity. It exacts an heroic detachment testifying to the primacy of the spirit." The Catholic Church itself will not enter into social affairs but will furnish an inspirational basis for truths and, by "Catholic Action," will try "to create an essentially Christian state of mind." It will enter politics "only when 'politics touches the altar'"; otherwise it would cease to be transcendental.

But if the Church itself does not directly enter politics, secular Catholic groups should be formed—such as the Christian Democratic parties, presumably, which have emerged in Europe. Yet even here "these new political formations . . . presuppose a profound spiritual revolution, they can only come into existence as one expression of the resurrection of religious forces in men's hearts." If such political activities fail, there is still "evangelical" activity, for Christian progress is really achieved through a growth of conscience. If totalitarianism triumphs, there remains the extreme but important method of martyrdom.²³

All these methods derive their validity from the ultimate nature of reality—that is, God. But the fundamental difficulties persist. If God is, as he is declared to be, eternal knowledge and omnipotence, why, indeed, take thought unto the morrow? Behold the lillies of the field. . . . If God needs assistance, why not any form of assistance that preserves His Word and Will? The assertion that force may not be used in conversion, although it is permissible in some wars and a few other instances, is an evasion of the issue. There are a number of difficulties here but only one concerns us right now.

It has been said that man's welfare depends on his acceptance of religion both as the key to his nature and as the door to his salvation. If the question is one of the survival and growth of religion, it must be remembered that religion is identified with Christianity and Christianity is identified with the Catholic Church. What is this Church? Is it a spiritual and eternal entity? Then it is not weakened or destroyed by events on this earth. Or is it a temporal organization with real-estate? Then, if its ex-

istence is essential, it should be defended at all costs. Or is it, as claimed, an eternal spiritual order with temporal manifestations? The difficulty remains. Is it at all important for the temporal manifestations to continue to be manifested? Where the Church is faced with totalitarian oppression, martyrdom may be the only recourse. But that is not the only type of problem which confronts the Church. Where the situation is one in which the power of the Church is not growing, or is weakening, or is simply insecure, what is to be done? What was the Church to do in Italy, under Mussolini or after? (Witness the Lateran Pact and its renewal under the Republic.) What is it to do in Franco's Spain or Salazar's Portugal? Is it to reject political encouragement and help? What is it to do in the "secular State," such as modern United States? It is to withhold pressure, or coercion, and perhaps wither? Or is it to use the forces at hand?

Furthermore, discussion of the issue in terms of forms of obvious coercion, ignores a significant aspect of the question. It does not deal with McGilvary's assertion that what Maritain calls "spiritual weapons of war" are as much might as carnal weapons. McGilvary argues, it will be remembered, that the techniques of conversion and moral suasion are not different in kind from the recognized types of might, but are subtler varieties of the same sort of thing. Thomists insist that their philosophy, with its theory of moral law resting on Divine law, refutes McGilvary and presents the true alternative to empiricism generally. But they must demonstrate their claim. If they cannot do so, and yet retain their position and continue the effort to win others to it, they must fall back on the techniques by which might endeavors to make right. There is then no reason to prefer any of those techniques—from emotional conversion to carnal violence—except as it proves itself superior to the others in obtaining acceptance of Catholic ideals.

And as a matter of fact, to an external observer, the history of the Church seems primarily to be a series of attempts to acquire power and prestige through various techniques of might. It appears to have originated in a most human manner, and to have

maintained itself, oftentimes, by less than human methods. But neither this nor any other objection based on admittedly human ways of getting truth carries weight with the Church's adherents. Neither, for that matter, do objections claiming to be derived from rival super-human sources. The only sources of truth admitted by Catholicism are Catholic sources. But a philosophy whose claim to validity is convincing only to those who already agree with its conclusions is of dubious value. If that philosophy is based on valid methods of knowing, those methods must have the ability to present evidences demonstrating their validity even to those who did not originally agree. The methods for getting truth proposed by Thomism are reason, revelation and faith, and mystical experience.

Reason, whether "inductive" or "deductive," does have the power of getting public agreement. Examination of the empirical or formal evidence is open to public examination by anyone who will perform the necessary operations. Those operations, which may be observed in *their* turn, do require training in the relevant skills as well as willingness to submit to the evidence, but the training itself is open to inspection. By itself, however, reason is not acceptable to the Thomists. Its conclusions are not considered valid by them unless they are compatible with conclusions previously arrived at by faith and revelation. This, as Maritain says, divides philosophers into those who "see" and those who do not "see." Seeing, in this sense, does not depend on the method used in coming to a conclusion, but in commitment to prior conclusions.

It is a notorious fact that faith and revelation, whether taken separately or together, have led to a great many contrary conclusions and types of religion. The Church is aware of this difficulty. The history of religions in general and of Christianity in particular has been full of conflicting claims of faith and conflicting claims to revelation. *The Catholic Encyclopedia* defines "the act of faith as the assent of the intellect to a truth which is beyond its comprehension, but which it accepts under the influence of the will moved by grace. . . ." ²⁴ But this also has been

subject to incompatible claims. So the argument continues: since faith involves the intellect, it is not possible apart from a body of dogma. Valid dogma is that propagated by the Catholic Church. How is this claim established? By revelation. The validity of faith rests on revelation.

What of revelation? The Church distinguishes between two kinds—private and universal. Private revelation occurs when God reveals his truths to some person. There is always the possibility of being mistaken concerning revelations of this type because of their privacy. They should be subjected to a number of tests. They may not, for example, be contrary to faith and morals as established by the Church. Such revelations, says *A Catholic Dictionary*, “should be submitted to the opinion of a prudent priest.”²⁵ The Church does approve some private revelations, but that means only that they *may* be believed, not that one must believe them.

Universal revelation—also called the “deposit of faith”—is that Christian Revelation “given in its entirety to Our Lord and His Apostles.” The Roman Catholic Church has been entrusted with the task of propagating this revealed truth without changing it or adding to it in any way. The councils and the popes, in defining doctrine, do no more than to elucidate that which is already contained “in Scripture or in Apostolic tradition.”²⁶ Private revelation and faith both must be judged in terms of this universal revelation. But why is *this* claim to be believed? Because of faith. Faith depends on revelation, and revelation upon faith. They are not, strictly speaking, two separate methods, but two aspects of one method: faith-and-revelation, as established by the authority of the true Church.

But the problem of conflicting claims to faith and revelation is not eliminated. Conflicts of this sort have constituted much of the history of the Catholic Church. How were they handled? How has the Church gone about demonstrating that the Gospels are revealed, that the enunciation of a Pope on faith and morals is the infallible word of God, or that apparently incompatible stands taken by the infallible Church are not really incompatible? Revelation, even “universal” revelation, necessarily occurs to some

person, and it necessarily occurs privately. However convincing the original experience may have appeared, it cannot be repeated; *that* revelation is gone—and many other revelations conflict with it. The person who had the revelations in question can argue for its acceptance. His arguments may be rational or irrelevant. But they are not revelation.

Ordinarily, arguments for revelation gain whatever plausibility they may have because it is already taken for granted that revelation did take place. The Gospels are held to be revealed on the authority, say, of a Pope's own "divinely assisted" knowledge. (Pronouncements by a Council still have to be confirmed by the Pope.) But the validity of the Pope's knowledge is dependent on the Gospels' authority. And so . . .? And so the question is begged. Revelation cannot demonstrate its own competence as a method of knowing. The claims regarding revelation must be based on some authority whose position becomes unquestionable because of the impossibility of presenting evidence for the occurrence of revelation. And any effort to develop such evidence—for example, by attempting to use science to prove the existence of miracles, and then to use *that* to prove revelation—actually weakens further the case for revelation by abandoning it, in effect, for another method as the test of truth.

Mysticism is equally unreliable as a source of knowledge. There are many varieties of experience claiming to be mystical, and there are various conclusions resulting from similar experiences. Here, as with the other types of alleged knowledge, Maritain is forced to distinguish between true and false mysticism, although both were equally convincing to the persons who had the experiences. So he says it is dangerous to look for genuine mysticism "freed from theological faith." There may be some instances of authentic mystical experiences in other religions, but if there are, they had their origins in grace.²⁷ Again the same argument must be made: the mystical experience itself cannot settle the question, so the effort is made to establish its validity by appealing to conclusions previously arrived at by an entirely different sort of method.

For these reasons, when we are told that the authority of Catholicism does not rest on its temporal existence but on its real nature as an invisible, eternal, perfect and infallible Church—when we hear these words we must remember that the only authority we have for any belief in a supernatural Church comes entirely from a visible, temporal, terrestrial organization. And since this organization has rejected, or at least rigorously subordinated, those ways of knowing whereby the evidence may be publicly examined and tested, in favor of those which do not bring their evidence with them, the dogmas of the Church and the methods on which they are said to be based can only be made authoritative by the use of what is essentially might. That is to say, if the beliefs of the Church cannot be verified by the methods said to be used in acquiring them, their acceptance depends on some type of coercion. Physical force has not been used for many years, but then it is ordinarily the least effective form of might. There are many other kinds, among which are the social pressure of excommunication, rigid censorship, the policy of absolute obedience, or the activities of a highly organized political pressure group, enforced ignorance, teaching by indoctrination, or even the sort of thing that usually goes under the name of persuasion.

In evaluating the Neo-Thomist philosophy of democracy I have not yet dealt directly with a point mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. It concerned the discrepancy between the Catholic conception of democracy and the way that democracy is usually conceived. If there are difficulties in determining with precision the nature of that discrepancy—because of the vagueness, confusion and even conflict in the traditional democratic ideas—at least the general outlines of it are clarified by the Thomistic opposition to all meanings of democracy at variance with their own. Catholic democracy, they say, is superior to other democratic ideals, both because it rests on Truth and also because it is more democratic than they are. Does not this make it futile to object to Thomism on the grounds that it is at odds with

democracy? The objection would certainly have been futile before the examination of the Thomist theory of Truth. But the situation is now changed. That theory relies ultimately on unquestionable—and therefore unexaminable—authority. *Unquestionable* authority is the defining characteristic of authoritarianism.

But there is nothing new about this. Catholic writers clearly deny that democracy must rest on a democratic foundation. To the contrary, democracy is said to be a form of social organization, not a way of arriving at the basic policy of that organization. This may help explain the scorn that many Thomists heap upon "liberal-bourgeois democracy." For that tradition, confused and uncertain as it has been, has moved in the direction of bringing even the most fundamental ideas to all men for investigation. And yet, while Thomists have ridiculed the "liberal-bourgeois" tradition, they have also praised Catholic Christianity as the source and true guardian of its ideals. It is time, then, to compare Catholic principles of democracy with such traditional democratic concepts as equality, separation of church and state, liberty and the right of self-determination.

If it can be said that Christianity has traditionally been interested in equality, it would be in the sense that all men are equal before God. But this could mean any one of several things. In Augustinian terms it could mean that since God is infinite and man is finite, all men alike are as nothing in comparison with God. Or, it could mean that all men have been created by God. This is not much better. Equality of createdness by itself implies nothing about the quality or significance of the things created. God also created mosquitoes and the common cold; and on this argument, by itself, they would have to be equated with man.

The Catholic theory is, presumably, that men are equal before God, in terms of their salvation. This would mean that men are equal to the extent that God is equally interested in saving any of them—to the extent that they are real personalities, alike in knowing God as a result of His Grace. God's nature and principles of salvation are decided on by the authority of one Church,

and propagated by the same means. Even supernatural equality stops—or at least slacks off abruptly—at the boundaries of that Church.

As for social equality—that is something quite different. After remarking that spiritual equality means that “the salvation of the slave is as important as that of the emperor,” *A Catholic Dictionary* adds:

But extrinsically and in the natural order there is clear inequality between man and man, they being born with varying abilities, characteristics, physical, mental and spiritual capacities and natural gifts. Accordingly they have not all an equal claim to rank in the social hierarchy, to assist in the government of the state, to enjoy the advantages of higher education, etc.

And again, under the heading of “Class Distinction”:

The Church recognizes the distinction of various ranks and orders in society, with their special duties and privileges, as a quality proper to humankind arising from the natural inequality of man with man, and that a claim to equal opportunity must be conditioned by equal ability.

Concerning “Woman,” it says:

As individuals, man and woman are morally equals. Socially, man is superior; that God intended this is shown by man’s physical and intellectual equipment.²⁸

Belief in the existence of inherent inequalities of this sort requires the development of a hierarchy, in order to make sure that the inferior recognize their superiors and accept their own inferiority.

Equality has been a particularly elusive democratic concept, yet even as a slogan loosely used it has indicated certain tendencies. Thomas Jefferson, as a major prophet of “liberal-bourgeois democracy,” is an excellent example. His statements directly on the subject of equality were cryptic. But in the light of what he *did* equality became the right of every man to make his own decisions concerning the things affecting him. And this implied free access to information, to variety in ideas, and to material

opportunities. Catholicism, to the contrary, has said in effect that, since men can become equal only through supernatural salvation, on matters concerned with salvation they should be permitted only those opinions and sources of information approved by the Church. This is liberty as enforced by the temporal authority of that Church. The name of democracy has frequently been attached to this meaning of freedom. But if there is anything that distinguishes democracy from other ideas and ways of doing things it is the emergence of a different interpretation of freedom of speech, press and religion.

One difference may be noted in terms of what is implied for the separation of Church and State. In democracies the doctrine of separation has come to mean the belief, in the words of A. E. Murphy, that "sectarian metaphysical and religious beliefs" are not "a required prerequisite for good citizenship in a democracy."²⁹ This obviously goes much further than the Catholic theory of separation, which means only that Church and State are different organizations, performing different specific functions, but having the same basic doctrines.

The concept of self-determination brings us still closer to the crucial issue. The meaning of self-determination depends upon the meaning of the self. In Thomist theory the self is a person, who is essentially supernatural, and who becomes more real in so far as it is absorbed into God, The Ultimate Reality. True self-determination is therefore God-determination. But God is attained through the Church, which is the authority concerning His truths and intentions. Self-determination thereby becomes Church-determination.

This brings me to what is probably the oldest and most persistent meaning of democracy. From Plato to the present it has involved rule by the populace. This is vague. From Plato to the present it has meant various things. As it stands it is compatible with Thomistic theory. In more modern terms, but still vaguely, popular rule would signify the utmost participation in self-government by as many citizens as possible, where the qualifications for citizenship are not based on race, religion or social position.

Vague though it is, this statement says enough to point up the issue with the Neo-Thomists.

Maritain, in his philosophy of democracy, also wants political rule by the citizenry, but the qualifications are narrower. A citizen must either be Catholic or one who has received grace or who at least lives according to the Gospels. The validity of the credentials of non-Catholics is presumably to be determined by the Church. The underlying beliefs, aims and policies of his new society are to be determined by an organization which, at best, is dogmatic, authoritarian and aristocratic, and cannot be called democratic by any stretch of the imagination. Indeed, it makes no claim to the name of democracy, and finds its strength in a single, infallible ruler and the hierarchy under him. If it is possible to call this Thomistic conception democratic, it must at least be further qualified. It is: an authoritarian democracy, limited to Catholics or those approved by the Church, led by an elite. The authority by which this new society comes and perseveres is the authority of might.

But the same may be said, with changes in name, of any other authoritarianism. It may be urged that the "new Christendom" is more humane than other authoritarianisms. Perhaps so—but there is no reason to argue the point. It is an apology born of despair. And besides, it rests on a criterion which has been explicitly rejected by Thomistic philosophers—namely, that the worth of a social philosophy is to be tested in the lives of human beings as they live here and now. The difficulty that Thomism encounters is that in its quest for a truth that ends all search, it must rely upon theories of reality, truth and human nature that make any genuine testing of truth altogether impossible. Whether or not individual Thomists seek domination over others, domination is the logical consequence of their philosophy and religion.

Some Protestant Absolutisms

As science, capitalism, industry, and finally democracy grew out of the Middle Ages, there was a reduction in the direct influence of the Church. Non-theological knowledge seemed more potent than the wisdom of the Church Fathers and the Schoolmen. A fairly universal structure of static society gave way to variously developing societies, which changed with increasing rapidity. In the process a new sense of individuality began to emerge.

Religious institutions, in order to survive, had to adapt themselves to these and other new conditions. The "eternal" Roman Catholic Church "proved" its timeless identity by continuing to make the changes necessary for the survival of its authority. The newer Protestant churches, which tended to reject fixed authority, adapted themselves by forming new sects as the occasion demanded and permitted; or, as in later days, they consciously modified their theologies to meet secular changes. For the last one hundred years or so the dominant efforts within Protestant philosophy to reinterpret traditional beliefs have taken the form of Absolute Idealism. Josiah Royce, the great American metaphysician, and William Ernest Hocking, for example, have endeavored to make of Idealism a philosophy which was democratic and which put the ultimate basis for democracy in a supernatural being.

Royce and Hocking join with Roman Catholic theorists in decrying this-worldly philosophies. But they also declare their opposition to the conception of democracy, most clearly propounded by the Roman Church, which makes it subservient to an established church and its dogmas. The problem is to affirm man's supernatural character and yet to allow him an individual

freedom which is not formulated to bind him to an infallible institution. The solution as it is expressed in different ways by Royce and Hocking is that each individual has an inherent drive, which constitutes his rationality, to know Reality. Liberty and equality may then be based on this core of individual rationality. The present chapter will be concerned mainly with their efforts.

If democracy depends on human rationality, rationality depends on the possibility of acquiring knowledge. But the possibility of knowing the truth about anything, says Royce, depends on the existence of Absolute Truth, which in turn depends on the existence of Absolute Reality. In *The World and the Individual*, Royce bases his proof and description of the Absolute on a *nisus*, an inherent striving and direction, in human thinking. There is a distinction in ideas, he says, between their "internal" and "external" meanings. The internal meaning of an idea is its purpose, which determines the object it is after and the circumstances which will constitute proof; the external meaning is the object to which the purpose is directed. By themselves ideas are not knowledge, and in order to become knowledge they must be involved in a judgment which will bring each internal meaning to completion in its external meaning. Fundamentally every judgment refers to "Reality itself." For the deepest purpose of every idea is to know "the Real" or "Being" as its inevitable object.

The Real is that which we must seek. The quest for knowledge cannot stop short of it. The Real, Royce continues, is any "Individual" object, a unique object which is the complete fulfillment of an idea's purpose, requiring nothing beyond itself. But individual objects cannot be found in finite experience, which can know only objects that are types and incomplete by themselves. True knowledge must, therefore, be found in the experience of infinite being. This much, he argues, is a valid inference from present finite experience. But validity alone—that is, formal validity—is not satisfactory, for by itself it gives no more than "abstract universals." These universals have no content, being purely formal, and must be incomplete in meaning. Genuine Truth, on the other hand, is not separable from Being; it cannot

be merely formal. Therefore, Reality must be an Infinite experience which is at once Truth and Being: The Absolute.¹

Another book, *The Problem of Christianity*, contains a similar proof, but one emphasizing the social character of knowledge. Knowledge in its fullness, Royce says, cannot be wholly explained by direct experience (which is too immediate) nor by our ideas (which are too abstract), nor by a mere synthesis of the two. We have no knowledge of our common world, nor of any object in it, until we have interpreted it to ourselves in the same way as to another person. This three-cornered activity is unavoidably social. Even our knowledge of ourselves results from interpretation in social situations. Science is helpless without the social checks of interpretation, and the same is true of other forms of knowing.

Knowledge depends on interpretive experience, then, which is ultimately social in character. Success in it depends on clarity in interpreting ourselves to ourselves—that is, one of our ideas to another—and in clear mutual interpretation between selves. One can achieve a good deal of success in the former. The ideal would be to have the same success *between* minds. There would then be a "Community of Interpretation." In knowing each mind, the interpreter would know both the uniqueness of that mind and its objects; he would unite many factors into one interpretation. Truth is that interpretation in which each mind would concur if it were the ideal interpreter.

Now, Royce continues, in order for any finite mind to know the truth it must already exist. Otherwise truth would be a matter of subjective preference. This, however, is a self-contradictory position, since it asserts as objectively true that all truth is subjective. Truth exists, then, and so by hypothesis there must be a real interpreter who has reached the goal of complete interpretation. But since this obviously has not been accomplished in the finite world, there must be an Absolute Interpreter, which has through its existence enabled the whole community to reach its goal.

Without the real, infinite Interpreter there could be no truth

at all—and also no reality. “Unless,” Royce says, “both the interpreter and the community are real, there is no real world.” Anyone who denies this must make a counter assertion, which is also an interpretation, and in doing so he cannot help affirming “the principle that the world has an interpreter.” “We all of us believe that there is any real world at all,” Royce insists, “simply because we find ourselves in a situation in which, because of the fragmentary and dissatisfying conflicts, antitheses, and problems of our present ideas, an interpretation of this situation is needed, but is not now known to us. By the ‘real world’ we mean simply the ‘true interpretation’ of this our problematic situation.” Truth (as absolute truth) and Being (as the whole of things) must be the same. That Absolute Interpreter who interprets all to all, who is the solution to our problems, and who is Absolute Reality—that Interpreter is God.²

Reality is God, the absolute interpretation of the universe. In the fullness of the Word, God is the fullness of the World. He is the “ideal community.” As we strive for salvation it is He who guarantees it. Finite minds, with their activities of will and of interpretation, occur in time. They constitute an infinite process, striving against evils and for the goal of truth—that is, complete interpretation. They know and work with finite communities, themselves personalities, all of which together are members and expressions of the “Universal Community.” As the spirit of the universal community, God spans the series of finite individual and social interpretations without Himself being either timeless or an instant of time.

The world is saved, in spite of specific frustrations and defects, because, as an endless whole, it fulfills the divine plan. In the “Divine Interpreter” the latest event is contemporaneous with the earliest. Through the Divine Interpreter the evils of the world are transmuted to fulfill the purpose of the world, and in the process the world is “reconciled to itself and to its own purpose.” Viewed in this way the temporal world as a whole is “an infinitely complex sign” which is “interpreted to an experience which itself includes a synoptic survey of the whole of time.”

This is Salvation.³

What is the basis of these arguments? Royce himself explicitly denies reliance upon purely rational or conceptual thought. Truth that is only formally valid, he says, is no truth at all. It must be confirmed in experience. And such confirmation means, for Royce, the experienced identity of truth and being. Yet he admits that the whole of being cannot be found in finite experience. Indeed, this is given as the reason why there must be an Absolute Mind or Interpreter. But notice: Royce has argued that ideas, to be true, must be confirmed in experience; also that the Truth is such that it cannot be confirmed in any experience that *human* beings can have. The conclusion, surely, is not that Royce has proved the existence of the Absolute, but that his "proof" is itself an abstract, or "merely valid," conception as it stands. The reason for pointing this out is not to refute Royce but to make clear the kind of knowledge with which he is dealing.

Let us, then, be clear about Royce's claims to knowledge: they are based on consistency. Other ways of knowing are rejected as inconsistent. Even the method of formal validity or pure consistency is rejected as self-contradictory. His own *starts* in experience, but in the very nature of his claims it cannot end there. Or, if it does end in experience, it cannot, by hypothesis, be in any experience short of the Absolute's, whose existence it is that the argument is supposed to prove. Experience cannot serve as the test of the argument because no possible verification of it can occur in this life—where the proof is demanded. Royce trusts the method of consistency to lead him from his initial assumptions to the Living Reality uncontaminated by assumptions.

The empiricists found the authority for some of their beliefs in descriptions of ordinary experience. Neo-Thomists found their authority in the Catholic Church's descriptions of the revelations of God. Royce is necessarily content with the authority of logical consistency as being somehow descriptive of infinite experience.

Man, as Royce sees him, is a social being. There is no reason to separate his theory of man from his theory of society, or his individual from his social ethics. Both individuals and communities are personalities or selves, although Royce usually reserves the word self to particular human beings. Both are selves in the negative sense of having thoughts, feelings and actions which separate each from the others (although individuals also have separate bodies, which communities do not have). Positively, both are selves to the extent that they are dominated by a purpose through which the past, in terms of memory, and the future, in terms of hope, are interpreted to the present. As selves, they also include the physical world in themselves as "ideal extensions." In neither case is the self something which is simply experienced. Instead it is an interpreted life: the self becomes more real as its interpretation grows and is clarified. The process may be seen in an individual as it grows from a child to an adult. A community is formed through the extension of the individual self to include other selves in its interpretation; through the communication between those selves; and finally through the inclusion in each individual ideal self of several events identical for all the others.⁴

But even if both the individual and the community are called selves, they are obviously not selves of the same sort. They differ both in specific characteristics and in value. The community does not, of course, have a single "separate and internally well-knit physical organism of its own," though it does have organs and an "organic life." More important from Royce's point of view, communities are "more complex . . . more potent and enduring than are the individuals." They are also better and more concrete. The individual self, on the other hand, is inherently weak and vacillating; for the human being in his individuality is necessarily limited by inherent and acquired sin. He can lose his sin only by loyalty to a community.⁵

The reason for this will be clearer if we recall Royce's theory of Reality and his proofs of that theory. Reality is the Absolute: the interpreted knowledge of the whole of being. In his proofs

Royce argues that man's basic purpose is to know all things from the point of view of the Absolute. He concludes that not only Reality and Truth but also Goodness will be found in the fulfillment of this purpose. The highest good, then, is found in the Absolute, and those goods that are less than the highest are valuable in proportion as they approximate it. The more inclusive a mind is, the more real, the truer and better, it is.

The communal mind is superior to the individual mind because it is more inclusive. The individual is dependent on his society even for self-knowledge. But the superiority of the community is as great in the moral sphere as in the psychological. The communal mind is the container of customs and communal values against which the individual rebels. As the tension increases between individual desires and social values, their respective weakness and strength can be seen more clearly. "The individual is naturally wayward and capricious. This waywardness is a constant source of entanglement and failure." Communities, on the other hand, are much more "potent and enduring."⁶

To the extent that the self is a fragmentary individual, it is necessarily involved in evil, for though men are basically social beings, they are also individuals having inclinations opposed to the group. Each man or woman struggles with these different and opposing tendencies. Moral self-consciousness and conscience are the product of their mounting tensions. And such conflicts, especially in a creature as weak as the human individual, produce disharmony, chaos and frustration. When the social will recognizes these evils, it seeks to create harmony by formulating its values into codes. It hopes that the individual will be "cultivated" and made more fertile and amenable to social growth. Yet the actual result of cultivation is to make the individual more self-conscious. The tension increases. Though a social creature, man fights against his sociality. The result is the production of Individualists. Though they are men created by the social will, they simultaneously oppose it and seek to use it for their own purposes.⁷

The individual can be saved neither by love for other individuals nor by a more or less abstract love for a community.

Both attitudes lead too readily toward friction and failure. The individual is too prone to egotism, too easily led astray, for him to find himself by his own efforts. Salvation comes only through conscious love of the "community as a person." Its customs cease to be commands to the individual. His rebellion changes to loyalty. He regards the community's "type of life, its form of being, as essentially more worthy than his own." Through loyalty, various energies that had previously been conflicting now become unified, while retaining differences in a common cause. The self has ceased to be "a mere individual." He becomes stronger and more harmonious. He is saved, even if his loyalty demands death. Giving oneself in loyalty is not just submission before a superior being: it is rather an activity of self-fulfillment and self-expression. As the self becomes a member of a community, it is by that much a more comprehensive part of reality—it is that much closer to being an ideal interpreter—than it was as a "detached" individual.⁸

But Royce is careful to add that loyalty to a community should not be taken to mean that one community is as good as another. Genuine salvation is not to be found in any "natural" social group—family, state or nation—but in that community which is more than natural and human. Societies in the natural world are finite, and are for that reason limited in knowledge. They are likely to create conflicts between themselves and to encourage individualism in their members. Men must be saved not only from "the flesh," which is their individuality, but also from "the law," which is the external rule of a natural society. "The creation of the truly lovable community," Royce says, interpreting St. Paul, "and the awakening of the highly trained individual to a love for that community, are . . . spiritual triumphs beyond the wit of man to devise, and beyond the power of man to accomplish." Genuine loyalty is therefore religious loyalty, whose ideals have been stated in the Pauline tradition of Christianity. It is a loyalty directed to the "Universal Community" including "all mankind." It is superhuman and more than natural because the "Great Community" is equated with

the universe and because the universe is an infinite and eternal interpretation of each to all and of all to each. Love for all mankind is possible, then, because it is a more than human love.⁹

Obviously the universal community does not exist on earth, and since it does not it is man's duty to create it. Loyalty must be created in people who have become cultivated to the extent that they are antagonists to their temporal societies. They must be loyal out of conscious choice, yet they have reached the place where they cannot make that choice. They must, indeed, already have loyalty in order to be able to choose it. What is needed is a leader of genius who can inspire men into unity. As a symbol of loyalty he can lead the individual to a new life in the community.

But the leader himself must be loyal, and even for him loyalty requires a lovable community. Hence a vicious circle: without the leader there is no community and without the community there is no leader. Nor can the problem be solved in the realm of nature and man. Resolution can only come through a leader who has insight into the "Realm of Grace"—that is to say, the ideal Universal Community or God or the Absolute. In his loyalty to the ideal community, he is then inspired to create or re-make the temporal community in its movement toward the ideal. By means of his life and death in the service of the community, the guiding genius becomes identical with the community spirit, and continues to guide its development. This is the act of Grace.¹⁰

The fact that the atoning individual, or any of the ordinary members, gives himself up to the community does not mean, according to Royce, that he loses his uniqueness. Loyalty is self-expression. True, the individual ceases to be *merely* individual—but he does increasingly fulfill his deepest aspiration, which is to be the ideal interpreter. By losing himself in love for the community—and, through it, for other individuals who have also lost themselves—he finds himself in a more intimate knowledge of other beings than he could possibly have had previously. And this is increasingly true as the individual approaches his ideal. The

individual now has a more comprehensive point of view in his unity with a higher being, but he still interprets from *his* point of view on *his* purpose and *his* history. All individuals are then unified in the community, yet each retains what is essentially unique to him—his purpose and point of view for interpretation. There is actual unification of “the one and the many” because each person loves the community and the community loves each person.¹¹

But the issue is never certain as long as the members of the community are human beings limited to temporal life. A community may be founded on the purest love and faith; it will nevertheless contain inevitable traitorous acts. There will be men who committed themselves to the ideal, who declared it to be their highest hope and salvation, and yet who will freely choose to betray that ideal. The choice must be left uncoerced, because it would destroy the very nature of the community to compel allegiance. But the act of betrayal destroys the faith and purity of the brotherhood. Once it is done the act cannot be undone. Remorse, repentance and forgiveness do not basically help the situation since they cannot remove the fact that evil is in the community.

The only cure for betrayal—the only thing that can reconcile the community to itself, and the traitor to himself and to the rest—is found in the act of the atoning genius. He alone can turn the evil of treason into the opportunity for an act so creative that the world is made better than it was before. The deed will be of such a nature that it could not have been performed *without* the betrayal in question. Through both of them the world will be of greater value than ever. While the evil was nearly disastrous to the brotherhood, it was also the necessary basis for a better community. The act of atonement is that expression of “nearly absolute loyalty” which can reinstate a united community.¹²

In temporal life men look to some act of atonement for expiation of their sins. Jesus’ life and death is an ideal example taken from the past; similar acts are demanded for the future, for without them there is no hope. The command, therefore, is to be

loyal: act according to the spirit of the Church, the ideal community. But men also want an assurance. They want to know that their loyal acts have meaning, that they will actually be effective. They demand, in other words, that the world have meaning, for if it does not their own acts will be frustrated.

Royce offers his view of the nature of the universe as the answer to that demand. According to his theory, once more, the process of the universe appears as a "complex sign" to the synoptic view of the Interpreter. Although the temporal process of the universe is endless, it is also interpreted from the point of view of the whole of things, and in that whole the purpose of the world is complete. All things are harmoniously interpreted by the Absolute. From the point of view of the temporal world, its purpose is not realized in any one moment of time. It is, however, an evolution in which every problem is resolved and every evil is made good. Final salvation in history is something looked forward to but never achieved as a single event. Even though each particular wrong is eventually righted, there is always another wrong to come. And yet there *is* salvation at each moment, in the realization that the purpose of that moment is fulfilled in the plan of the ultimate whole. This gives us the meaning of "the Kingdom of God is 'at hand,'" namely, that the divine interpretation is present in the whole process of the universe, and that we may even now be members of the universal community.¹³

Does Royce's Universal Community serve as a basis for democratic theory? The community he envisioned is made up of all mankind, presumably equal in status. Allegiance to the community is freely given by each man, and depends on his exercise of reason and love instead of institutional authority. The Universal Community is presented, at least in idea, as the metaphysical embodiment of the democratic ideals of liberty and self-determination, equality and fraternity. But even if the Universal Community exists as an absolute interpretation, what does it mean for the world of blood and bone? Let us grant that human problems are really superhuman. Let us grant the necessity of heroic.

atoning genius. What does the Universal Community mean as a democratic ideal for the ordinary man making his way from day to day?

Concerning democracy in the present world, Royce declares:

Since the detached individual is essentially a lost being, you cannot save masses of lost individuals through the triumph of mere democracy. Masses of lost individuals do not become genuine free-men merely because they all have votes. The suffrage can show the way of salvation only to those who are already loyal, who already, according to their lights, live in the spirit, and are directed . . . by a genuinely Pauline charity.

The meaning of this is not clear. Nor is it clarified, so far as I am aware, in any other passage. If clarification is to be found it will be in the implications of Royce's over-all philosophy. But the direction of his thinking is indicated by a passage at the beginning of the chapter from which the above quotation is taken. He insists that there are rights only insofar as there are duties. The "sole inalienable right," therefore, is the right "to possess some opportunity to fulfill the office of a man; that is, I have a right to get a chance to do my duty."¹⁴ One's duty, again, is to be loyal to the community. And because loyalty to the community is the fulfillment of the individual's deepest purpose, it is not only a duty but also the assertion of individuality and freedom.

Freedom and individuality are, for Royce, the same thing. Both refer to uniqueness of purpose. Royce says,

If your finite purpose is now different from that of any other finite being, and if your finite purpose now in any sense uniquely expresses, however inadequately, its own determinate meaning, in its own way, then, you can indeed assert: I alone, amongst all the different beings of the universe, will thus act. That it is true that God here also wills in me, is indeed the unquestionable result of the unity of the divine consciousness. But it is equally true that this divine unity is here and now realized by me, and by me only, through my unique act. My act, too, is a part of the divine life that, however fragmentary, is not elsewhere repeated in the divine consciousness. When I thus consciously and uniquely will, it is I

then who just here *am* God's will, or who just here consciously act for the whole. I then *am* so far free.¹⁵

The uniqueness of each individual is guaranteed by the unique individuality of the Absolute. For, although each finite purpose is fragmentary, it is an induplicable fragment of the Absolute Purpose. Given the Absolute Whole, then, it is necessarily expressed by each finite purpose in its own particular unique way. Any effort to replace it or duplicate it would change the Absolute itself.

Freedom, here, is a metaphysical birthright. One man or group of men is not distinguished from another by the possession of it, nor is it something to be achieved by any plan of action. It is something each individual has by virtue of his existence. Royce declares that his interpretation does not imply that the individual's purposes or choices are causally determined. Yet it must imply that human events are *in some sense* determined by the Absolute. For example: although Royce denies that the Absolute is timeless, he does say that it has a "synoptic view" of all events. It cannot, then, be in *human* time. Whatever kind of time it has, it views human history as a fulfilled purpose, a completed event. But the assertion that men's purposes are fulfilled does not, on this basis, lead to the conclusion that men create the fulfillment of their own purposes. For Royce insists that what we seem to create, out of what appear to be uncertainty and genuine alternatives, is in Infinite Fact already accomplished.

Perhaps one point should be added. It would seem to be in keeping with Royce's argument to say that one's freedom is enhanced by a conscious recognition of the nature of the Absolute Purpose. For one's deepest purpose is to know that Absolute. To the extent that such knowledge is attained, one not only has unique purposes, but they are also uniquely fulfilled in his own life. Let it not be forgotten, however, that the Ultimate Purpose is already in essence completed. In the synoptic view of the Absolute, temporal events express the Absolute Fulfillment. But now, if the extension of Royce's argument concerning freedom is cor-

rect, freedom means knowledge of the Absolute and, through it, the willing conformity to things as they are.

It must be made clear that Royce did not himself state his theory of liberty as I have just formulated it. He did, in fact, declare himself opposed to acquiescence in existing conditions. His philosophy would enable men, he said, to develop their individuality and freedom in daily affairs, to oppose authoritarian powers, and to change their temporal conditions for the better.

And yet Royce's philosophy seems to belie his intentions. If freedom and individuality mean only that each human being, as purposive, is a free individual by virtue of his existence, then those ideals are vacuous. The other alternative is that one is a free individual in proportion as he accomplishes his deepest purpose and knows Reality. The way to Truth, and with it freedom and individuality, requires self-surrender to the community, for the community is a higher personal entity. Whatever Royce's own intentions may have been, this theory has the acrid odor of authoritarianism.

A defense of the theory as democratic may be made by emphasizing the practical freedom of the community, namely, that no man may be compelled to allegiance. The defense is plausible if it is assumed that there is an inevitable evolution in history, through which all evils and betrayals are corrected, and that, indeed, they are already corrected in the Absolute. If this is true, it ceases to be important that the majority of human beings may not be loyal. They do not have to be forced into salvation because the pattern of salvation is already complete. There is no reason why all men could not be given suffrage, since their actions could only contribute to the inevitable outcome. All men have the same underlying purposes, and these purposes are assured in the Absolute. Why, then, worry about men's apparent intentions or the results of their actions?

But if Royce's philosophy thus avoids authoritarianism, it loses positive value. At its logical best it is conservatism at its worst. For better or worse, however, Royce asserts the truth of the idealistic metaphysics which underlies his social philosophy.

How convincing is that metaphysics? The answer depends first of all on the adequacy of the method used to substantiate the metaphysical conclusions. The method is logical consistency. Royce's idealistic argument assumes that consistent reasoning, from given premises and in accordance with the rules of logic, will produce truth, whether or not the conclusion is actually tested in human experience. The main premises are that the process of knowing will not stop short of Reality and that Reality is nothing less than the whole of the universe. Could we, as social beings necessarily seeking knowledge, but keep on talking long enough we would be sure to arrive at Truth.

Logicians have frequently pointed out—and Royce agrees—that logical deduction from premises leads to conclusions that are formally certain, but that the conclusions do not necessarily refer to the existent world. They are purely formal conclusions. Nothing is learned of things outside the consistent framework of premises, symbols and techniques. Though consistency has many uses, it cannot itself test the truth of the ideas it connects. But Royce intended more than that. He believed his premises to be based on experience—and, in their own way, the conclusions as well. Yet it is not enough to say that the conclusions are tested in Absolute Experience. That is what requires proof. The only alternative is to test the conclusions in finite experience of some sort. But by hypothesis finite men cannot experience the Absolute. Therefore, the insistence that the logical validity of the doctrine of the Absolute implies its experienced validity is an argument which is either merely formal or unverifiable. The metaphysical argument has lost its basis.

If this analysis is correct, there is no good reason to believe that Royce has derived a chart for life from a description of Absolute Reality. Consequently there is also no reason to believe his version of the inevitability of progress. Royce calls for loyalty to all loyalty. But why? Partisan decisions of some sort are unavoidable in this world, and loyalty opposes loyalty. The Universal Community has lost its metaphysical status and logically has no more claim to loyalty than any competing social ideal.

One may be sympathetic to Royce's desire to preserve the "uniqueness of the individual." But as it turns out, individuality is preserved by losing most of its recognizable qualities to the community, which is said to be a higher organism and personality. Again, one may be sympathetic to Royce for his insistence that the highest loyalty should be to nothing less than an ideal that would incorporate the deepest purposes of all men. But even if those purposes require the reality of the Universal Community, it is so remote and indistinctly all-inclusive that one may readily conclude that through loyalty to his own society he will be climbing aboard the Absolute Bandwagon. Yet, however inadequate or dangerous this may be, the very remoteness of the supernatural ideal may be psychologically pacifying. Without this as a conservative influence, Royce's moral command is easily converted into totalitarianism. If loyalty is the supreme moral virtue, and if the chance to do one's duty is the only inalienable right, why should one object of loyalty and duty be superior to any other, unless its superiority rests on its ability to enforce loyalty? If one's own form of loyalty conflicts with others, there is no reason to grant equal rights to those other loyalties. They are there to be manipulated or dominated. In short, Royce's doctrine of loyalty leaves the way open to an ethics and a politics of might.

William Ernest Hocking has sought to avoid this danger. But his efforts take him into a different formulation of idealistic metaphysics. If his goal of Absolute Reality is similar to Royce's, he makes a different approach. Instead of starting where Royce and the earlier idealists did, with the assumption that human knowledge moves inevitably toward the Whole, through a series of logical steps, Hocking takes pains to discover "direct evidence" of God as a personality. In this way, he is convinced, we not only have a surer foundation for belief in God, but are also relieved of the metaphysical obligation to endow social groups with personality. We are then free to assert that God is the only personality above men.

Hocking wants both to preserve the Absolute against natural-

ism and to save individual uniqueness from being absorbed in the community. Each of these factors has important bearing on the meaning of democracy. A defense of the Absolute is especially vital, if, as Hocking claims, democracy cannot have a stable foundation as long as it is built on a naturalistic view of human nature; that is, a view based on the experimental sciences.

Democracy [he says] is not based on what is but on what ought to be. As we find men, there is no overt equality among them. The bond of equality and fraternity is to be found, not in scientific measurements, but in common devotion to a goal which is beyond them all. Let men lose faith in their own freedom, that is to say in their own possibilities; let them lose their direct awareness of a divine thread in history; and the bonds of liberal union are cut at the knot.¹⁶

As Hocking would have it, then, the question of utmost importance for democracy is this: are we to "explain mind by physical nature or must we explain physical nature by mind?" The answer to this question begins, he asserts, with "the ancient intuitions of the race . . . which at some time or other come to every man, more or less clearly." First, there is the intuition that the obvious and superficial things do not belong to reality but to the world of appearance. Second, it is intuited that the natural world is not really self-sufficient since it is so easy to imagine that world to be illusory. Third, "at least some natural happenings are purposive." And finally, there is the explicitly idealistic intuition that absolute certainty is to be found in mind.¹⁷

Admittedly modern science seems to give more opposition than support to these intuitions. Pragmatists and instrumentalists in particular, as spokesmen for science, have capitulated to the "agnostic view of metaphysical truth." They claim that all knowledge is experimental, on the grounds that all things change and that only by experimentation can changing events be known. Hocking retorts that such assertions are self-refuting. The fact that experimentation itself demands a constant, he says, shows that there cannot be change without something changeless.

It is here, he says, where experimentation needs a "principle of changelessness" at the base of things, that philosophy seeks to know it as the source of certainty. The main source of confusion lies in the belief, on the part of scientists, that they look only for facts. Actually they, as well as philosophers, seek for eternal truth. The two disciplines differ, he continues, as to the aspect of God which they study, but both depend on Him in some sense for guidance. But because scientists have ignored the metaphysical foundations of science, they have made men seem like meaningless creatures in a meaningless world—and may yet make monsters out of them.¹⁸

Hocking begins, then, by affirming that whatever is really true must be certain, and that it is philosophy, above all, that aims at certainty. Like Royce, Hocking is critical of ideas which depend only on formal consistency for their validity. He differs from Royce in relying heavily upon intuitional knowledge. For it is in intuition, Hocking says, that we have our first knowledge of Reality. It leads the way by giving immediate knowledge about whole aspects of Reality. The immediacy of intuition means that its knowledge is not reflective or experimental, but a direct, unexamined awareness of truth beyond ordinary experience. But though intuition is declared to be the basis of all knowledge, Hocking adds that it cannot tell or test what it has found. Intuition is of little value, then, until it is examined, interpreted and extended by reason.¹⁹

It is through intuition that we know God and, since He is the primary Reality, it is through Him that anything else can be known. And God is experienced, Hocking argues, as we experience ourselves. Both the history of religions and individual biography show that the world is first taken as a living world. What happens is that we find ourselves to be both passive and creative. Yet in our creativity as well as in our passivity we find ourselves opposed, sustained and developed in such a way that our own selves are being created by a more powerful activity. Through this experience of a vast creativity we are in direct communication with God. The experience of God is not a conclusion

derived from the natural world. It is what makes knowledge of that world possible. For while we are justified in taking for granted the objectivity of physical events, we are justified because we find them publicly, as common objects, which means that human experience must be social. It is. But, Hocking continues, since we cannot be certain about the existence of other selves, social experience cannot begin with knowledge of other human beings. The fact that we find ourselves in a common, social world must, then, be the result of direct and infallible experience of a world-mind. "God is known as that of which I am primarily certain; and being certain am certain of self and of my world of men and men's objects." Paradoxical as it may seem, our knowledge of the natural world is an abstraction from the divine certainty.²⁰

Hocking gives numerous reasons for the importance of this "direct evidence" of God. Two of them are especially relevant for his philosophy of democracy. The first is based on the nature of man as a rational animal. Man's duty, as a rational animal, is to have a philosophy, to search for meaning. But, unless the world actually is meaningful, it is nonsense to search for meaning, and the world can have meaning only if it is based on a Purposive Mind. There must, therefore, be a God on which nature is dependent.²¹

The second reason is based on the fact of evil in the world. Men have always assumed, according to Hocking, that evil can be explained. If they are correct, he goes on, there is no evil that may not be explained as ultimately justifiable. But evil cannot be explained in this way as long as the means of coping with it are limited—as they are at the level of human existence. There is no hope of overcoming evil without force, but force cannot be used wisely unless there is a perspective and intelligence transcending the whole difficulty. Men's intelligence is too limited for any guarantee that they can, by themselves, transform evil into good. Sufficient intelligence and power can only be found in a being so transcendent that it is without defects which would make it dependent on a still higher power. Hence there must be an

infinite supernatural God.²²

It is possible to know of God's existence because He is a self, yet, because He is an infinite self, it is at best difficult to know what He is like—hence the great disagreement in religious interpretations. Actually, Hocking says, each interpretation has considerable truth to it, although each is also partially false. (He adds that even atheism is partly true, in so far as it chastens religions that are too ambitious. A rare meaning of truth!) The problem is to increase and clarify the knowledge of God. We already know, however, that God is an Infinite Self. We also know that He is the Absolute, the Real—that independent being on which all other things depend. But though Absolute, He is also an "individual subject," like men, but infinite. We know that nature is the content of his active mind, for without content there would be no mind, and without concrete, sensory content the mind would be without will. Nature, therefore, expresses God's individuality. But even though God is an individual self, he is not moral in the human sense. His aid to men consists in the fact that, being the completion of the world, he stands outside the finite "contrasts of good and evil," and transforms them. God is the "changeless Ultimate" behind all things. Still, there are "unfinished" regions of reality where the Absolute, by being so remote, leaves men to grow.²³

The human individual is a natural animal, as Hocking is mindful of him, but he is also more than natural. Nature is defined as that aspect of the whole of things which is dominated by causes and effects, the realm of facts dealt with by the sciences. Obviously men belong in part to this realm, but another part of human nature is independent of natural forces. Men are not just facts. They contain rational consciences which judge facts in the light of values, which are the most important part of the human world. And values are essentially beyond science. Biology, psychology and sociology can describe men accurately enough as far as they go, he grants, but quickly adds that they necessarily stop short of the whole view and, therefore, give a distorted pic-

ture. They can only reveal the nonrational phases of human nature.²⁴

The proper view is very different: "Body and brain . . . are the mind made visible, translated into the language of space and physical event." This does not mean that the finite mind creates its own finite body. Both are created together by God. It does mean that even the finite mind is more important and more real than the body. The mind, in the process of growth, "controls and builds the body," making both of them into a self. Psychology is misleading because it deals only with the part of the mind that errs, the irrational parts that are caught up in causal events. The mind is free and rational—they are the same—when it observes physical causes without being a part of them. "There is no reason for going wrong," Hocking remarks a little cryptically, "there is no cause for going right."²⁵

Reason or conscience—this free activity of mind—is not however, independent of instincts, even though these last are more bodily than mental. Instincts are organic drives which blindly express human purposes and in time become self-conscious. When self-consciousness increases, the sense of purpose and direction increases; reasoned conduct takes the place of unsure, instinctive activity; free conscience replaces causally determined action. Impulsive conduct is vacillating and liable to error, whereas the life of conscience is sure and stable; for reason, by its nature, increases our perception of reality, and in the process makes us more real.²⁶

Each man has a dominant purpose or vital impulse which runs through everything he does and is an inseparable part of each instinct. This dominant direction is "the will to power, i.e., the will to be in conscious knowing control of such energies as the universe has, and to work with them in reshaping the universe." In infancy the will to power is entirely biological and competitive, depending largely on violence. As the individual grows, he gradually ceases to desire the power *over* others, in competition for limited objects. Maturity is reached when he realizes that the only genuine outlet of the will to power is found in the realm of ideas. Here each man has his own point of view,

which he can extend as far as he desires without interfering with others, for the extent of ideas is infinite. Furthermore, the basic aim of all men, and hence of their ideas, is to know reality. That knowledge is the only true source of happiness. But the job of conquering that endless realm can only be achieved through mutual aid. Consequently a man can get the most power for himself by helping others.²⁷

The moral importance of God in this scheme is obvious: He is that which is most real, the infinite mind on whom depends the whole meaning of the universe. He gives men direction even when he is known only as the Most Real.

If God merely *is* [Hocking says], that existence of God is a promotive of human morality. For what is the essential morality of man if not this, that he make himself universal, escaping in thought and act from his self-enclosedness.²⁸

But God is not just real. He is also a self. We have something in us that is akin to Him and to His purpose, and we find ourselves by going beyond our finite egos and egotisms toward God.

Virtue is therefore the fulfillment of the will to power, the increase of one's reality. Sin, on the other hand, is the refusal to interpret one's instincts in such a way that they will genuinely realize the will to power. The unavoidable quest for virtue leads men to judge themselves and their society according to their purpose. They seek to make it prevail in both realms of life. Yet the impulse of the will to power to prevail does not in the long run intensify conflict between individuals, since that impulse is destined to become rational and altruistic rather than narrowly egoistic.²⁹

The rational will to power constitutes an inner drive to group life and ultimately to the State, for reasonable men will want the company of other rational beings. How does the inevitable process find its way? We must, Hocking insists, begin with the individual self. But the self acquires character only if it expresses itself in external objects and activities. These are usually shared with other selves. To the extent that the objects are identical, the

various selves coincide. There is a fusion of minds, whether the group is large or small. While the fusion, or "will-circuit," is a living thing it cannot be a self, because the whole circuit has only the characteristics possessed by each of its members. Nevertheless, as a fusion of many minds, the group unity may have a wisdom and reasonableness far beyond that of any single person. By committing himself to the group, the individual may acquire more meaning and knowledge than he is aware of. And yet, the group cannot be reasonable or just or whatnot unless each of its members has reasonableness, justice, and a mental identity of his own apart from the group.³⁰

Whether or not this account explains the origins of groups in general, it does not explain why the state specifically should be the chosen goal of the will to power. The explanation Hocking gives is, first of all, that the state necessarily has a monopoly of force. Smaller groups become distorted when they exercise more power than they can handle efficiently. They inevitably conflict one with another and impose burdensome duties on their members. When force resides in the state it can guarantee order in the community and free individuals from bondage. Moreover, the state inherently tends to universalize itself in space and time, extending its protection to citizens beyond its borders. The growth of the state, therefore, has allowed the individual to grow unhampered by irrelevant and accidental events, and has made it plain that he is the basic element in all society.

It is true that the exercise of so much power is dangerous, and it is also true that no actual state is perfect. The "ideal state" is the only one deserving "absolute prestige," but meanwhile the imperfect state can have prestige only so far as its members have committed themselves to it. ". . . Free surrender of their own power of resistance to the state's action" is requisite for that "monopoly of force" which is the basis of the state's effectiveness. Even though force is worthless if not based on right, morality is impotent if it is not backed by force. Mistakes will be made. Yet "one who has put it out of his power to resist has no recourse

except to the disposition of the people to rectify these errors. Confidence in this latent moral resource cannot be ultimately mistaken, because the capacity for justice is inseparable from human nature."³¹

The second explanation for the necessary supremacy of the state is that it is needed to guarantee justice. Justice grows out of the individual's attempts to universalize his moral judgments. When his judgments conflict with those of other men, he tries to find a way by which the various judgments can be realized. The state is the unified activity of will which results. It issues unified commands based on reason. The process is rational because the resulting judgment is not the individual's *actual* "wish," which is likely to be insufficiently rational, but "what he wished he might wish." It is also rational because the state, as the unification of these wishes, is a permanent onlooker which can test the more limited judgments through its greater knowledge and accumulated wisdom. Law, for example, furnishes the stability of the tested insight of the past; it makes men look at the consequences of their demands; and as an experimental tool it makes them participate in the working of those demands.³²

The third reason is that the state is needed to create and maintain moral activity. Actually, most of the creative moral activity is best carried on by individuals and small groups. But that fact makes it all the more important for the state to preserve the significance of these moral activities. The state "makes history" and helps its citizens make it; and

History is not a mere succession of events; it is a succession of significant events brought under the common judgment of mankind. . . . It is a play of action on action which is at the same time a play of thought on thought; and through this intricate but consecutive intercourse of minds a slow process of concrete thinking works itself out in the world. . . .

The state is an optimum condition of social organization, whose purpose is "to establish the objective conditions for the will to power in human history. . . ." There are, of course, many

smaller groups that attract members because of their greater intimacy and exclusiveness. The intimate play of ideas afforded by the smaller groups makes them invaluable as breeding places of new ideas; but the ideas are of little help unless they are tested in the larger area. When ideas are bred within the state, they tend to universalize themselves in the universal sphere of humanity itself. The state itself does not, however, become completely universalized. Geographical and cultural factors make it more natural for the state-making forces to culminate in the national state.³³

Human desire for a state—if not the existing state then another one—is inescapable. For a state, which is distinct from any particular government, is the sovereign authority by which decisions are made rationally, rather than in favor of special interests. Yet Hocking insists that sovereignty and monopoly of the instruments of force do not mean monopoly of authority. The state-will, like any other will, is self-limited by its purpose and moral obligation. And the state, like any other group, is subject to “opposition and criticism.”³⁴

According to Hocking, then, “the state is an arrangement whereby every man’s better judgment becomes his external ruler. . . .” Like any other group, it contains two different but hardly separable processes. One of them is the activity of getting things done (the “commotive” function, Hocking calls it), which in political affairs is spoken of as the executive and administrative functions. The other is the effort to reconcile conflicts (“term-making” is Hocking’s phrase), and is most commonly recognized as the legislative and judicial functions. Commotive action is that which creates the state, or recreates it, and in the process brings the purpose of the group into being. Performance of it requires a man of intuitive genius who can recognize the needs of a unique situation and call the populace to follow him. Important as the executive function is, its very sensitivity to uniqueness prevents it from being the essentially rational aspect of political activity. This last is found mainly in the politician’s activity. He realizes that men have to live together and acts to preserve the

society. Success in term-making—which seems to be much like compromise—depends on the inherently rational quality of human nature.

Self-consciousness, which is the basis of reason, has such a fear of disunity that even in deep passions it retains some degree of independence, and from its aloof watching place it seizes on factors making for unity and stability. Here are the function and importance of reason: they lie in its inherent drive to generalize, to pick out similar events and to build them into a stable structure, whether in the individual or in the state. While reason must recognize the existence of irrational factors, their existence "cannot obliterate the elements of reason . . . for after all, reason is there." Irrational events produce conflict and therefore tend to eliminate themselves. They cannot be stable. In the long run the irrational disintegrates and the rational remains and grows, embodied in the habits of the individual and in the rules and laws of society—especially in the state.³⁵

More than any other American Protestant thinker that I know of, Hocking has attempted to think through a philosophy of democracy that would bring together a comprehensive expression of his religious beliefs, a careful consideration of scientific developments, and a recognition of the realities of social problems. I am afraid that the present exposition of his ideas does poor justice to the over-all quality of what he has to say. One reason for this, perhaps, is that I have concentrated upon the logical structure of his main ideas. The richness of Hocking's insights is found not so much there as in his discussions of this-worldly human affairs.

It is true that Hocking himself believes the two aspects of his philosophy to be inseparable. His theory of the Absolute, he would say, leads to his insights into human behavior, and his knowledge of human experience provides evidence for the Absolute. Actually, as I shall try to indicate later in another connection, they are independent of each other. And Hocking's genuine wisdom concerning much in human experience lends a specious

plausibility to his claims regarding the Absolute.

This difficulty is by no means a rare one. In Hocking it is allied with another which is particularly frustrating. There is a determination to maintain both the traditional absolutes and the newer democratic ideals. The two sets of ideas are independent of each other, and may even be incompatible. But both must be held! Often he emphasizes one or the other more or less clearly. At other times he may strive to maintain both simultaneously. The ideas then lead off into conclusions of a frazzled vagueness.

Especially is this true, I believe, of the concepts of equality and freedom. Hocking does make a number of seemingly clear-cut statements about them. The clarity fades, however, on closer examination. In the effort to be as definite as possible about those ideals, I shall try to interpret them in terms of the basic commitments of his philosophy. Since Hocking has himself been carrying on that task for some forty years, the attempt may seem presumptuous. Yet I am convinced of its necessity, even though it leads eventually to an interpretation of Hocking somewhat different from the conclusions he seeks to affirm.

Let us begin with his theory of individualism. It brings the more general ideas to a focus which may sharpen our view of his theory of equality and freedom. The individual, he insists, has a "core of stability" and "permanent validities," for his conscience is rooted in an unchanging reality outside himself, his groups, and his state. Indeed, since his conscience expresses the absolute nature of things, he himself cannot alter it. And since these factors make the individual more real than the state, he is "the ultimate unit of social structures." If appearances seem to contradict this, we must go beneath the "surface of experience" to the unchanging core of stability. When we do so we shall see that the individual will ultimately come into his own, for the creative force of individuation is love, and love is the goal of the inherent will to power. The will to power, in turn, is rational and must therefore come to terms with the rational Absolute Reality.³⁶

Here, according to Hocking, on the metaphysical basis of individuality is the only ground for the doctrine of equality. Bio-

logical equality does not exist, and all that can be achieved on pragmatic grounds is a temporary, local equality. Universal equality can only be had upon the belief in a metaphysically rooted reason in all men, a native fund of reason which is qualitatively the same in all. Otherwise, if men are thought of merely as biological animals, they will be treated as things, as tools to be used for private ends, and the fact of inequality will remain a fact. If the existence of supernatural reason is admitted, he continues, each person will be an end in himself; for all his biological and social inequalities, he will be treated as an individual. Each person will then receive equal respect, because each will be recognized to be an end in himself. Our realization of this will be increased if we see that our knowledge of the essential natures of other individuals comes from inner knowledge of ourselves. We must give every person the same type of respect we give ourselves.³⁷

The meaning of freedom cannot be accounted for so briefly. Few people are as persistent as Hocking in asserting that freedom, whatever else it may mean, demands opposition to authoritarian power. That much is clear, at least within the area of political affairs, and must be recognized. But what is the relationship of his general theory of freedom to its concrete applications? Do they follow from it? Or do the general principles actually lead to different conclusions?

What does freedom mean, to begin with? When we speak of freedom as a right, Hocking says, we must mean, as with equality, that it is grounded in supernatural reality. Freedom is not a right just because we desire it. Desires are facts, not rights. Facts refer to what is, while rights refer to what ought-to-be, so that the fact that one desires freedom does not imply that he has any right to it. Nor can the right of freedom be based on social welfare. If that were the case, "whoever is authorized to represent the social welfare—the government, possibly the Leader"—may curb or eliminate freedom whenever it is deemed advisable.³⁸

But we still do not know what freedom means, even if we grant that it has a supernatural basis. Nor do we know what it

is about the supernatural that makes freedom a right. First, then, freedom means the absence of coercive restraints, especially as regards the expression of ideas. It does not mean the absence of restraints as such. That is neither possible nor desirable. It does not even mean the absence of penalties as such. Many penalties—including not only the commonplace disapprovals but also ostracism and boycott—are simply part of the oppositions which a thinker ought to expect, or at least to endure. "It is not the function of the state," Hocking says, "to protect any utterer of ideas from the type of pressure we may call moral, nor is it desirable that it should." In challenging new ideas the moral penalties—if they may be called that—help to make sure that the ideas are vigorous as well as new. "The right of freedom of speech," therefore, "ought to be a right to the facilities for winning the ear of men in an uphill fight, in the face of public disapproval." Freedom from coercion means "freedom from irrelevant penalties and inducements."³⁹

By prohibiting coercion we help to free expression. But expression is not important unless it expresses thought. Thought or reason, it may be remembered, occurs in self-consciousness, when the individual is no longer subject to natural causes but is instead aware of them. Without interfering with natural law, he comes to know the meaning of things. Becoming aware of meanings, the individual no longer blindly accepts the course of events. He is able to think of various possibilities, and to choose among them. Here is the second meaning of freedom. It may be called—although Hocking does not use the phrase in this way—freedom as the existence of alternatives.⁴⁰

Once again, however, the meaning of the idea must be found in its context. Why are alternatives significant? Does it make any difference to the meaning of freedom what the alternatives happen to be? Are there any crucial alternatives? How are they to be judged? To aid in answering these questions we have to ask another, modifying slightly the title of one of Hocking's books: what can man make of man? The crucial alternatives are reversion to animality or becoming truly human. The essen-

tial quality of humanity is rationality, and reason requires knowledge of the Absolute. An individual achieves his purpose as a human being insofar as he recognizes the knowledge he already has of the Absolute and is able to develop it further. And alternatives are relevant and valuable to the extent that they enable him to do so. "The prophet [that is, the most free individual] must know himself; and he must know his world, not in detail but in so far as it is relevant to his purpose: such knowledge as this must come to him through his relation to the absolute."⁴¹

This is the third and fundamental meaning of freedom: the ability to achieve one's purpose, to realize oneself in knowledge of the Absolute. It is a right because it is also a duty. Other meanings of freedom get their justification from this one. As one is obligated to make himself more real as a human individual, so he is obligated to think. But thought is necessarily free, since it necessarily works toward the goal of infinite reason. Hence the duty to think implies not only the right to think, but also the duty and the right to say what one thinks. The expression of genuine ideas is part of the extension and direction of thought. Further, the right to think and express one's ideas without coercion guarantees the existence of alternatives.⁴²

Freedom so conceived, the argument continues, avoids totalitarian coercion. Equally important, it avoids the vacuity and aimlessness of "Liberalism." For although the state, on this theory, must eliminate "irrelevant penalties," it must also avoid the delusions of false freedom. The state must "take the line that the genuine right belongs to the genuine good will and to nothing else. . . ." "Good will," as Hocking defines it, "is in general the disposition of the individual to submit to discipline, the course of training necessary to reach a due standard of performance." It follows

that freedom to express thought is *for thinkers*. Disgust for Liberalism is probably due more to this trait than any other, that it has called for liberty of thought for non-thinkers. Its institutions have sagged because they have assumed that the natural man thinks—voters, legislators, administrators, lawyers—people who ought to

think but who in fact imitate, absorb, pretend, rationalize, adhere far more than they think.

Hocking adds to this the remark that, because it is often hard to tell whether or not an idea was thoughtfully produced, the state should not be too vigorous in attempting to quell non-thinkers.⁴³

If we attempt to apply freedom to education, following Hocking's suggestions, we should not go at it in primary and secondary schooling as we would in higher education. By the time a student enters college he is fit to examine conflicting beliefs and new ideas. Prior to that time students should be brought up in the "prevailing tradition," together with the reasons which have supported it. . . ." Without an "honest indoctrination" the child would be left in a vacuum. He would have no background or framework from which to work his way.⁴⁴

When we turn to religion we encounter new problems. Religion is as superior to politics, Hocking says, as the "absolute" and "literal" is superior to the "relative" and "figurative." Yet the church as a temporal organization does not "take precedence" over the state. In principle the church is more universal than the state. Actually it is made up of various limited selective groups, each of which is striving to find its way toward universality. For that reason, and because religion is essentially supernatural, religion and politics do not conflict but reinforce each other as each performs its separate function toward the same goal. When it does happen to be necessary for the church, as a superior being, to influence the state, it does so primarily through the conscience of individual citizens. Still, there are occasions when the church may speak as a body to the state, because "there is no topic of legislation immune from judgment by the church if it has anything to do with justice or the ideal of social order."⁴⁵ The power of the state is so great that it needs God in order to keep its proper place and perspective. Its temporal success depends on the essentially supernatural nature of man, and at the same time the state is the supreme social agency assisting men to attain their ultimate—and therefore supernatural—goal. Either way the state is committed to religion.

But though the state has the duty to promote religion constantly, and though it could not possibly be neutral among all religions or sects, it should not take sides with any particular church or prohibit open discussion of religious issues. While no religion is wholly true, they all have some truth. "The differences," Hocking says, "remain important; but in the fundamental object of worship all churches are already parts of the church catholic or universal, so far as their gods are not inconsistent with truth." At the same time, not all religions can be equally true, and worse, there are imposters and charlatans in religion, as elsewhere. Error may be tolerated, but the line must be drawn somewhere. So the state, which is subject to control by religion, is in its turn "bound to try to eliminate the swarming frauds in this field. . . ." The job is difficult because it is necessary both to maintain free discussion and to pass "a swift negative judgment where public order, decency, good morals are transgressed." The decisions required to carry out a policy of this sort unavoidably run many risks, including "the risk of destroying some of the real prophets. . . ." But there is no other way of creating a strong and free direction for our social and individual growth.⁴⁶

Hocking's philosophy of democracy is, if anything, more difficult to evaluate than to interpret. And for the same reason. Just when you think you see where he is, you find that he is somewhere else—or at least says he is.

Take the ideal of individualism as an example. The lasting and really important elements of individualism, according to Hocking, are supernatural. Traditionally, however, concern for the supernatural aspects of man has been roughly proportionate to a lack of concern for his everyday troubles. Hocking seeks to avoid that aspect of tradition by his theory that the self, though supernatural, must have its body in order to have selfhood. The Absolute remains the human goal but we must improve existing conditions as means to that end. In what he calls the "co-agent state" the individual is not simply to consent passively to what others propose, as in what we now call democracy, but is to par-

ticipate actively in the state where it concerns his own interests. He should even initiate community activities which the state "picks up and prolongs." As examples, Hocking mentions Gandhi, Y. C. J. Yen (founder of the Chinese "Mass Education Movement"), and W. R. George (founder of the Junior Republic activities for boys). Very well. But what does this mean for the ordinary factory worker or church member? There is no clear answer that I have encountered.

Besides, the very meaning of this theory of individual participation is obscured by an allied argument, which we have encountered previously. It is to the effect that the individual may participate in the state, and acquire more rationality, by committing himself to group decisions, the meaning of which he is only inadequately aware. At times Hocking seems to be saying no more than something like this: that citizens who vote for the income tax law, say, have little idea of the meaning and consequences of such a law, yet by their commitment they indirectly acquire the wisdom of the accumulated social ideas and activities that develop in the application of the law. At other times he seems to be saying something different and much more dangerous. Let us begin with the idea that the state, as the embodiment of what the individual "wishes he might wish," possesses a superior rationality. Let us add to this the assumption that what all men basically wish for, whether they know it or not, is knowledge of the Absolute. We are led to the conclusion, surely, that the state's judgment is superior to that of its members, and that the state is justified in demanding allegiance to its ideals and participation in the carrying out of its decisions, even if those ideals and decisions are contrary to what men *believe* they wish.

It is true that Hocking rejects this conclusion as contrary to his theory of equality. Rationality in the state, he says, is impossible without rationality in its members—and all men, as supernatural creatures, are equal in that they all possess the quality of reason. Because all are supernaturally equal creatures each man is to be treated as an end. None may be coerced in matters of belief, because rational beings cannot be won over except by reason.

Like many other arguments for equality, this one seems not to be taken very seriously, and if Hocking were not so conscientious a thinker, one might conclude that it had been designed for that purpose. The fact is, I believe, that such arguments have little of the significance commonly attributed to them. For those who announce that all men are equal—that is, inherently the same—in being rational also proceed immediately to find reasons why not all men are to be treated equally. It may be said, for example, that men are equal in the quality, not the quantity, of reason. There is no particular reason in this case why some form of coercion should not be used to enforce adherence to truths beyond the reach of those who have quantitatively less reason. Hocking does not explore this possibility but he does recognize that not all men act rationally. There are those, for instance, who are in complete rebellion against society. They must be excluded or eliminated.

There are also the “non-thinkers,” for whom freedom is not a right. All men are rational, Hocking assures us, and reason is apparently identified with thinking. Yet the “natural man” is declared to be a non-thinker. Freedom of expression is not for him. I see no way to reconcile these two positions. Even if we assume that non-thinkers, as well as others, are really rational in the sense that their reason will inevitably develop properly when they are treated as equals, that is either a denial of the statement that freedom is not for them, or it leaves the idea of equality entirely academic.

But we should now turn directly to the concept of freedom. Hocking develops it at length, and for that reason if no other it will provide a better setting for our discussion. The general situation, as I see it, regarding his theory of freedom is this: when he talks about freedom in terms of the social conditions and problems, such as freedom of the press, as we find them here and now, he says a good many things that are relevant and valuable. Within that context, however, he is not able to present a rational basis for their value or relevance. The main point, perhaps, of Hocking’s whole philosophy is that the test of rationality cannot

be had within the natural world, so that in order to be rational we must somehow go beyond this world to the supernatural Absolute. We will not, I believe, find rationality in that effort. Consequently, Hocking's theory of freedom does not logically imply the opposition to coercion which he claims for it.

Let us begin again with freedom of expression—defined as the absence of coercion of expression. But why is coercion to be avoided? One answer seems to me especially pertinent and fruitful. It is that freedom from compulsion is necessary for the attainment of a more positive freedom in the existence of alternative ways of thinking and doing things. As with other ideas, however, the meaning of this one varies with its context. According to Hocking, the awareness of alternatives is an inherent characteristic of thought or reason. Thought occurs in the self-consciousness by which the self is aware of the natural causes bearing upon it, and goes beyond them to meanings. When meanings are known one possesses alternatives. Thought is therefore by its very nature free. Furthermore, thought is the essence of the self, which is metaphysically prior to its body, even though Hocking grants that it requires that body for its development. One would gather that freedom is a metaphysical affair, existing irrespective of the expression of ideas or the existence of alternatives in the natural, social conditions of living. It is an essentially supernatural something which the individual has by virtue of his existence.

As far as I can see this conclusion is unavoidable. And the other as well—that freedom as a social ideal is irrelevant. But it should be pointed out again that Hocking does not accept this conclusion, although he does insist on the premise. In one place he writes: "It is true that thinking as a mental process is inherently free and inaccessible to external control. Yet it is idle to say that freedom of thought remains when the expression of thought is restrained through fear of penalty."⁴⁷ I am unable to understand how the two sentences can be maintained together. Let us accept them for the present, nevertheless, in order to proceed to the next point.

Granting that freedom requires alternative possibilities, then,

including alternatives in this-worldly activities, there are two further questions. Are alternatives as such desirable? How are we to decide this question or to decide between alternatives?

Hocking's answer to the first question is obvious enough, at least on the surface. Alternatives are not valuable for their own sake. There are the positive evils of criminal activities, for instance, or the more elusive ills of "the public buffoon, the mischief-breeder or salacity-monger. . . ." Classical liberalism assured, according to Hocking, that one's ability to think was automatically increased with multiplicity in alternatives, whereas multiplicity by itself may lead to confusion and incompetence. Alternatives can be valuable only if there is "a common object of thought and regard," which exists apart from all minds and yet is common to all, from which it is possible to derive standards of truth and goodness.⁴⁸

In terms of freedom of expression this means, as we have seen, that there should be no compulsion—there should be no "irrelevant penalties or rewards." But what is it that makes a punishment relevant or irrelevant? Hocking uses Spinoza as an example:

If a man reasons against a form of faith, he can hardly complain if he is excommunicated. One who like Spinoza had become heretical no longer *belonged* to a synagogue; to be excluded from it was a relevant and indeed a necessary hardship. Of the further penalties which in that day attached to excommunication, being forbidden to teach theology was certainly relevant; to be forbidden to teach anything, doubtfully relevant; to be deprived of a living by being cut off from ordinary intercourse with the congregation bordered on the excessive and irrelevant.⁴⁹

There is here an implicit assumption that freedom to express different ideas and the freedom to have alternative courses of social action are entirely political ideals. The church, in this case, has no obligation to recognize or permit alternative beliefs. And since exclusion from the church, of those who differ with the established doctrine, is not an "irrelevant penalty," presumably

it is also not compulsion either for the excommunicated or for those who remain.

The tacit assumption that democracy and its allied ideals are limited to governmental matters pervades Hocking's social philosophy. But how can freedom, for example, whose meaning and roots are said to be found in the whole supernatural individual, be confined to one type of institution? If it is argued that the predominance of the state guarantees freedom in *some* area of life, permitting other institutions to be authoritarian if they see fit, the question remains unanswered. And besides, the argument makes another assumption, dubious at best, that people who are not taught to act freely close to home will somehow emerge as democrats abroad.

There is another restriction on alternatives. Freedom is for those alternatives developed in conformity with standards derived from the Absolute as the indispensable ground of Reason and Truth. Since knowledge of the Absolute is the ultimate goal of human existence, that knowledge is the true freedom which gives meaning and direction to the other freedoms. With freedom formulated as knowledge of the Absolute Truth, we seem to have arrived again at the conclusion that there is no freedom for error. Coercion of error is thus justified.

If an individual's beliefs about the supernatural are the most important thing about him, pervading the rest of his beliefs and actions, then the state must demand universal agreement on those beliefs known to be true. If we know with certainty that God exists, then atheists and agnostics either should be excluded from political and social participation in areas where that knowledge is significant, or their participation should take the form of obedience to those who have that knowledge. And if anything is known about God's nature, then those theists who offer contrary descriptions of it must be omitted or subordinated in the same fashion.

Religion and the state, from this point of view, can allow freedom of expression only in those areas where there is ignorance of God or where the existing knowledge of God makes no differ-

ence to action. Hocking dodges the issue when he argues that all religions possessing good will should be tolerated since they contribute insights into Reality. For they are valid religions, as he says, only "so far as their gods *are not inconsistent* with truth." Only when their beliefs coincide with the true philosophy, it would seem, is their any obligation to tolerate them.

Hocking denies this. He does so chiefly on the ground, again, that reason cannot be coerced. A man may be in error, but as long as he has the good will conscientiously to seek the truth he has the right to tolerance. That is, he has the right to find the truth for himself, aided by others only through "rational persuasion," for "there is a preciousness of the search for truth which cannot be replaced by a gift of the final result."⁵⁰

This is perhaps the clearest indication of what Hocking intends to mean by the right of "freedom for thinkers." It is still not enough. Just what is meant by thinking? When Hocking speaks of *rational* persuasion, he must have in mind a persuasion which is not merely capable of producing conviction, but does so by means of evidence examinable by the various parties. Otherwise, if there were no method which could openly verify or disprove the ideas in question, there would be no way to distinguish rational persuasion from persuasion of any other sort. And yet, while Hocking grants that there is a method of this sort, at least for certain types of questions, he insists that it cannot establish its own standards of validity. Those can be had only through the Absolute. But the Absolute cannot be arrived at through such a process of public scrutiny and test. If it were it would not be absolute. Absoluteness refers to that which is unconditioned, and the process of investigation under discussion requires concrete conditions in order to be carried on at all.

Is the meaning of thought or reason to be found in a method of investigation which is incapable of establishing the basis of its own procedures, or in an Absolute which is incapable of being investigated? That is the dilemma we are in. And Hocking is adamant in holding that the basis of reason can only be found in the Absolute. The Absolute is not tested and cannot be tested

for it is what makes the tests possible. Any process of inquiry gets its validity through the Absolute, rather than the other way around. And so again we come to the point that the Absolute is the essence of reason. A person thinks when he knows the truth, and without that knowledge he cannot think. When we speak of thinkers, accordingly, we do not so much mean those who are searching for truth as those who know Absolute Truth. Freedom for thinkers means freedom for those who have that supernatural Truth.

It is the Truth that is precious, then, not the search for it. If one already has some truth there is no virtue in continuing to look for *it*. And where it can be passed on to someone else, so much the better. Should the other person desire the effort of search, there is an infinitude of truths yet to be found. But if he rejects the Truths that are important for human existence and social order, steps should be taken to make sure that he comes to accept them, by coercion if necessary. There can be no objection to the coercion of reason, because reason now means the *possession* of Truth.

The apparent plausibility of Hocking's objection to coercion lies not in his logic but in the psychological fact that we do not usually like the feeling of being coerced. We usually have this feeling when we encounter overt compulsion. But we should remember that there are indirect and subtle forms of might which gain their ends without arousing feelings of antagonism. These are the most successful techniques. They manipulate people by creating, influencing and changing their desires. Excellent examples may be found in much of our advertising—the goal of which, according to one brochure I have seen, is “to get people to think what you want them to think.” When techniques of manipulation are skillfully employed in such ways as this, they may become extremely attractive to those who are controlled by them.

Hocking can avoid the conclusion that his philosophy supports the legitimacy, if not the necessity, of the coercion of error only by producing some way by which it is possible to demonstrate

the existence and nature of the Absolute. This is the intellectual problem behind his claim, reissued persistently throughout the years, that God must somehow be known in a type of experience which is immediate and unavoidable. As the basis of all proof the Absolute cannot itself be proved, so it must be known in our elemental intuitions.

But no matter how convincing an intuition may be to the person who claims to have had it, of itself it is private and cannot convince someone else. It is inaccessible and indemonstrable. If another individual finds no intuition at all, or has a contrary intuition, Hocking cannot convince him simply by insisting on his own. Hocking recognizes this when he says that intuition must be "interpreted by dialectic." In this case dialectical interpretation means that he spends about one hundred pages (in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*) endeavoring to prove that there *must be an intuition* of God. In other words the basis of the claim to truth is shifted from intuition to dialectic—which means, presumably, the reasoning of formal logic. But the truth of conclusions reached by logical consistency depends on the truth of the premises. Since the intuition of the Absolute is what has to be proved, *it* cannot be the main premise. The fact seems to be that Hocking actually rests his case on such dubious assumptions as "mind comes only from mind" and only another self "is able to act upon a self."⁵¹ As for the other methods of knowing, Hocking incorporates revelation and mystical experience into his argument for intuition. Scientific method is rejected as being inapplicable to fundamental problems.

When one finds himself in the midst of uncertainty, confusion and conflict, he may, nevertheless, have the faith that events will inevitably work themselves out for the best. Hocking's philosophy of democracy could easily be interpreted in this way, as a classic example of conservatism. If there is in all men a will to power which seeks power in rational Truth, and if God is the Changeless Ultimate which is at once the goal of man's will to power and the infinite creative force behind all things, it would

be difficult not to conclude that man's fate is changelessly guaranteed. All fear for the consequences of Hocking's social philosophy would then be foolish. For that matter Hocking's own fears for freedom would also be foolish. For the state, as the vehicle of Men's consciences, would move inexorably in the direction of man's greatest good. The state would be a slow but sure super-omnibus, on which the ideas and acts of different men would ride to their far-off destination.

Here, in the belief in an ultimately omnipotent purpose guiding human activities, is the basic conservative assumption. Concern for far-reaching social construction and reconstruction is not necessary, because the purpose and direction of man's activities is inherent in the universe independent of man's own conscious forethought and striving. If there is any consciousness in men of social aims, it is consciousness of an unchanging something already in existence. This is Edmund Burke's faith made explicit and detailed, although his God has since read Hegel; God's method is now the transforming of every evil into a good better than previous goods.

In the sphere of politics the conservative doctrine is a faith that existing institutions will adjust themselves to the problems that arise, so that they continue moving in their ordained direction—whether or not the members of those institutions happen to be aware of the direction. On the one hand is the politician who will conserve the direction of the state, probably working with others in the way of compromise. On the other hand is the social creator or executive who will create the conditions for social activity. Both types of activity, but particularly the former, will be absorbed into law, which is the embodiment of the growth of man's reason. Present institutions are the substance of past wisdom—and will, in time, be modified by present and future insights. Since the direction of activity is in the long run fixed and indomitable, it is not inconsistent to allow complete freedom for religion and other expressions of thought. Each wayfarer will turn to the truth when his turn comes.

But however appealing conservatism may be, especially in

contrast to might, it is not a rational alternative to might, since there is no way of establishing rationally its basic assumptions. Besides, conservatism is a form of surrender of human effort which most people, including Hocking, are unwilling to make. That leaves us with might, as long as we stay within the present framework of ideas.

For example: if freedom is for thinkers, and thinking depends upon knowledge of the divine Absolute, then freedom is for those who have that knowledge. There is no freedom for error. But the argument has now gone a step further. There is no way of persuading others rationally of the truth of one's ideas about the Absolute. One may, of course, be convinced of the infallibility of his ideas, but conviction and truth are not the same. A conviction, the truth of which is by hypothesis beyond demonstration, has no rational basis. The meaning of freedom must be rephrased. It is now the ability to carry out one's convictions in any way possible.

In these terms the individual's purpose would be a will to power in a fearful sense. The expanding personality would triumph over others any way it can. In society at large the state would have a monopoly of power which it would use not to maintain reason but to gain any end it wants. Instead of a conservative, rationally evolving society there would be an all-powerful state, which could make use of its monopoly of power to gain its ends by carnal violence if necessary. The commotive and term-making activities would be ways by which the rulers could acquire and maintain power over others. All of this we have seen abundantly in our time.

At the risk of understatement, it must be said that the Idealist movement is no longer as vigorous as it once was. While it is not dead, it exhibits a stiffness in the joints and a slowness of breath in its quest for new perspectives; and even, sometimes, a trembling of the hand, a shrillness of voice and a vagueness of memory concerning recent events. Why, then, if the problems at hand are so difficult, should we spend so much time with one

whose grasp is infirm? The reason is that I am not at all sure that Idealism's successors have done as well as the Old Gentleman.

In the history of supernaturalism, Idealism is the most recent widespread effort in the grand manner to deal with the problems of men rationally and demonstrably. Reinhold Niebuhr calls this presumptive pride. And perhaps it is. But the grand manner at least treated other men with dignity. Prominent among many successors to Idealism is the presumption of unreason, the pride of scorn for the human struggle, the strident voice.

And so: if Idealism no longer has the almost unrivalled leadership in Protestant thinking which it had for so long, it remains the most persistent and coherent of recent Protestant philosophical movements. In addition, there is enough similarity to the basic arguments of the different schools of supernaturalist philosophies that it is not necessary—if it were possible—to list their incidental variations. In fact some of the arguments are like the forearm of St. Francis Xavier: they are not only dead but cut off from a dead organism; yet they have been disinterred, put in a jewelled case, and paraded abroad for public display.

But more remains to be said. Many latter-day Protestants have made outstanding efforts to develop a theory of Christian Democracy. The efforts are formulated in different ways but they have certain tendencies in common. Even Liberals and Neo-Orthodox, bitterly opposed though they are in many respects, frequently make the same sort of argument for the Christian basis of democracy.

Neither label, of course, refers to a highly unified movement. At times it seems as though Liberal Protestants are brought together mainly by an absence of identifiable beliefs. Some people come by the label more or less unintentionally. Without seeking to abandon or modify orthodoxy they have been pulled away from it by preoccupation with more immediate human problems. Others have consciously revised their ideas so thoroughly that a common vocabulary is all that connects them to the traditional doctrines. And there are many other variations as well. Yet there

is a fairly distinct direction to the liberal movement, to which some of the most indistinct ideas also contribute. It is chiefly an increased emphasis upon the reality of the natural world, on man as a this-worldly creature who can find his salvation here, and a correlative tendency to limit the God of orthodoxy. The supernatural, infinite, eternal, omnipotent and omniscient Creator tends to become a finite deity, who is very much a part of the natural world and its historical processes. He is more than man but not, as one theologian would have it, "Utterly Other."

The Neo-Orthodox insist, to the contrary, that God is absolute, the Absolute Creator and the Absolute Judge. All else is created, finite and, therefore, relative. But the relative, they continue, can have meaning and can be judged only in terms of the absolute. Man can have knowledge in general, and specifically can evaluate his own life according to religious and moral standards, only because there is an absolute. Because his situation is relative, because he is a creature in history, man can attain to knowledge of God only by some more than rational method by which he gets beyond himself and his present circumstances. Even here man's knowledge of absolute truth is inescapably tainted by man's relativity. Man can have no knowledge, even of relative things, without an absolute, but even the absolute can be known only relatively. Here is a paradox to delight even the most insatiable lovers of paradox.

So far, this is much like Royce and Hocking. But the argument continues with a stronger affirmation of traditional orthodoxy. Men, the Neo-Orthodox insist unrelentingly, are incapable of solving their own problems. Solutions are obtainable only to the extent that men recognize their own fundamental incompetence and rely on God's will. The ultimate human sin is to reject God and to assert one's own competence to deal with the problems at hand. This is pride. It may be found not only in those who reject God openly, but also in those who assert that they have definite knowledge of God and His will, for they claim a knowledge they could not possibly have as human beings.

True or false, this is stronger stuff than most Christians will

take today. That is no argument against it. Indeed, Reinhold Niebuhr's own argument implies that Christians have seldom, if ever, taken it in that undiluted form. And yet few even among the Liberals would deny the main point if it were more generally stated.

Let us try it this way: there is a movement in the universe—whether a separate force or not—in a given, identifiable direction, the outcome of which is guaranteed. That direction is set independently of human intentions and the goal will be realized no matter what men attempt to do. This direction, its guarantee, and whatever other characteristics it may have are God. Since the cosmic end and means are already set it is man's first duty to direct his ideas and energies toward the universal goal. Not to do so would mean inevitable defeat for those who reject the divine plan. They could only try to substitute man's disorder for God's design. Such a God may not be infinite, omniscient or omnipotent, but he at least has enough wisdom and power to know how things should go and to underwrite the outcome. Man gets his meaning and direction, his religious bearing and moral ideals, from this. They are there. It is his job to find them and to fit himself to them.

Once again it is necessary to face the recurrent question. How do these ideas provide a basis for democracy? Do they do the job better than the theories already examined?

To begin with it should be mentioned that no distinctive method of knowing is introduced which avoids the difficulties of those already discussed. The ultra-supra-rational knowledge of the Neo-Orthodox is no more identifiable or accessible than revelation or intuition. Eduard Heimann, for example, in his *Freedom and Order*, argues that the fundamental political problem is set by the inevitable opposition of freedom, meaning absence of restraint, to order. Since both are necessary, they must be judged in terms of some criterion. The criterion is justice. But what is justice? It is a supra-rational principle, he says, and, therefore, one which is not verifiable.

Any authoritarian—fascist, communist or capitalist—could make the same claim, even in the same terms. Heimann is opposed to them, of course, as being evil. But opposition to evil is not a sufficient basis for truth, or else opposed evils would have to be equally true. The question is, what is it that makes things evil or good, false or true? There is no answer here, so let us continue.

The philosophy of democracy in question, whether Liberal or Neo-Orthodox in formulation, is one which rests on an assertion of ignorance of God's nature and will. One of the most honest and forthright statements of it is given by H. S. Tigner in his book called *Our Prodigal Son Culture*. Tigner is aware of the authoritarian nature of much of Christianity. He is anxious to show what he considers to be its true democratic nature.

Authoritarianism, he says, vitiates Christianity and can be avoided only if one is careful to "distinguish between God and men." Christian authoritarians "reason that, since God is absolute, the men who serve God are entitled to be absolutists. The inference is fallacious, because men are not God." Men cannot be absolutists because they are limited in respect to God. They cannot know enough to act as coercive agents of the divine will. Men can know God's general principles but the business of working out means for their realization is something men must do on their own. It is God's will, for example, that men must love each other, that they cannot treat each other as slaves or permit unemployment. This much is known; but if God has any specific plans for achieving those ends, the plans cannot be known.

I think we know enough about the will of God [Tigner says] to feel under moral compulsions and to recognize moral distinctions; we can know that some things are more in accord with God's will than some other things. But we do not and cannot know enough to dictate in God's name. This ignorance makes democratic government proper and necessary.⁴²

But there are dangers here, too, and Tigner is keenly aware of them: "The knowers of God's will do not agree," he observes,

"and can be shown to have made grievous mistakes." And feelings of moral compulsion vary widely with variations of culture and temperament. Taken historically, Christianity has not opposed slavery or unemployment more often than it has ignored them, or lent them its favor. God's principles, when Tigner gives them concrete expression, are less the doctrines of historical Christianity than of current liberal, democratic thought.

Even Tigner's qualifications of traditional theology are of dubious value for democracy. His main argument is an odd one, and no less odd because frequently uttered today. It may be summarized in this proposition: we should be democratic because we are, luckily, ignorant of God's will, which we must know in order to live adequately at all. The proposition tries to maintain incompatibles harmoniously. But we cannot have it both ways. If we are by nature ignorant of God, then appeal to His will is superfluous to human effort. If we do have some knowledge of Him and His will, however, to that extent relevant questions are to be settled by appeal to unquestioned authority. Christianity so interpreted is not essentially democratic—unless democracy and authoritarianism are indistinguishable—but democratic only where there is no knowledge of God's will.

To the degree that God's will is known or is believed to be known, civil rights belong to those who agree as to what God wills, not to those who differ. Or, if differences are to be permitted, it is in regard to relatively trivial matters or to those in which there are as yet no final answers. In either case the right to take part in policy decisions is essentially limited to those who know the truth. Others are excluded, except where there is mutual ignorance, or where their beliefs are determined, by possessors of the truth, to be in conformity with God's will. Non-democratic means are thus used to decide arbitrarily where democracy is applicable and where it is not. And to the degree that beliefs about God's will are considered to be clearer and more numerous, the area of democratic functioning is narrowed, and the area of authoritarianism is increased.

It would be foolish to say that the philosophies we have discussed in this chapter are identical with other authoritarianisms. But, in the logic of the argument, they differ from the others chiefly in the degree to which they permit democracy. In all of them democracy is either an expression of despair, before ignorance of the Absolute or the inevitable course of events, or a luxury to be granted in affairs of minor significance.

Instrumentalism — I

I have hoped to examine the essential characteristics of two types of philosophy—traditional empiricism and supernaturalism—and the democratic ideals they offer the modern world. The situation is a peculiar one. With notable and obvious exceptions the empiricists are not especially interested in social problems. Many supernaturalists, on the other hand, are greatly concerned with social welfare. But for the most part that concern expresses itself in a search for the moral nature of Ultimate Reality. Their efforts to develop a social program to embody the values said to have been found in the supernatural realm are, naturally enough, secondary, and even then they often show a reluctance to identify their concepts of welfare with a specific type of social order, such as democracy.

To the extent that democracy is claimed by either philosophy, it is in a position similar to that of a college student of humble origin who later “arrives” in the world of affairs. Big Men on the Campus who had patronized him, or even opposed him as an upstart, now write letters “reminding” him that they had once been his best friends. But though I believe the analogy is apt, it is not grounds for rejection of traditional empiricism or supernaturalism.

Their situation regarding democracy is more than just peculiar. There are fundamental difficulties in it. They are enough to make one wonder why there has been so little interest in the possibility of other alternatives. Before examining Instrumentalism as such an alternative, let me return briefly to some of the problems in traditional empiricism and supernaturalism.

They are radically opposed to each other, of course, yet they have one highly important belief in common—namely, that the function of knowledge is simply to describe whatever happens to be its subject matter. Both parties are convinced that the distinction between description and evaluation constitutes a logically unbridgeable gulf between them. From this the supernaturalists conclude that if men's moral ideals have the status of knowledge, it must be because they are Cosmic Facts, belonging to the world-scene independently of men. The aim of moral knowledge is then to read off the characteristics of those aspects of the universe which possess Value. But the empiricists reject the possibility of values existing in the world apart from men's minds. They conclude that values are altogether unverifiable. Knowledge is thought of as being applicable to moral issues only as the social sciences, say, may happen to describe existent or possible ideals and ways of attaining them.

There is another point of similarity following from the general theory of knowledge as description. Supernaturalists and empiricists have agreed that knowledge is found in an immediate apprehension of reality by a mind, whatever reality and mind happen to be.¹ As empiricists would have it, knowledge, as a product of the biological organism, is a describable event in the natural world of experience. But, to use Dewey's distinction, they place knowledge *in* nature without making it a part *of* nature. Knowing is somehow unlike other natural events. *Its* occurrence makes no difference to nature. Nature is left unchanged by it.

Knowledge is a descriptive record of what is—and, by extension, of what has been and may be. But as for our goals, purposes, standards, ideals, they concern what should be. They may be described. Success or failure in their attainment may be reported. But it is outside the scope of knowledge to say that they should have succeeded or failed. The decision to act and the evaluation of actions must occur outside of knowledge. It was suggested during the earlier, extended discussion of these ideas that, in these terms, evaluation as well as knowledge is a de-natured event.

Now, when empiricists get involved in social questions they usually remain within the framework of "political" democracy. This is in keeping with their desire to be descriptive, since in spite of recent events, even in England, the democracies have tended to be primarily "political" in character.

It is difficult to maintain a clear-cut distinction between political and other social affairs. But even if it were a simple matter we are not likely to remain content with a conception of democracy whose meaning and function were restricted to a separate area of life labelled political. (1) We have little right to believe, especially today, that "political" democracy can be effective if democracy is not more broadly operative. The freedom and equality of political participation and representation are considerably altered, for example, by the absence of freedom and equality in economic status. (2) Men have aspirations beyond the political and economic spheres, and these aspirations are seldom satisfied by traditional religion in its weakened state. When other possibilities are lacking men look with desperate hope to fascisms and communisms to unify and satisfy their desires for them. (3) The attempt to limit democracy to political affairs encourages the use of coercion even there. An authoritarian organization, especially if it believes itself to have ultimate truth, would chafe at having to be less authoritarian within the political sphere, and would therefore bring its nondemocratic weapons with it when it enters that area.² The result would be either a monopoly of force by the dominant authoritarian group or a form of warfare between opposing groups.

At the risk of appearing to contradict what was said earlier, it must be observed that democracy was probably never exclusively political. It is true that leaders in our various institutions have feared its growth. They have tried to keep it away from where they have been, and to that end they have tried to compartmentalize democracy into what they hoped would be a neutral area. "Political" democracy is more than anything else a name for that effort to segregate democracy by narrowing its meaning. But that can only be done, if democracy is a significant form of

human activity, by segregating one part of a human being from the rest of himself. In the light of what we know about human nature, this can hardly be achieved, and the attempt certainly produces new and serious problems.

These difficulties are recognized by those supernaturalist philosophers who aim their doctrines at the "whole man." By the whole man, however, they do not mean so much that the individual is or should be more than a political animal, or any other type of compartmentalized breed, as that the most important aspect of the individual is rooted outside the natural world. Human nature is ultimately based in the supernatural realm—that is, God—whose qualities it is man's highest duty to contemplate. The mind of man seeks to go beyond nature to Reality, and thereby to become more Real itself. That is the highest good, and the lesser goods are had by living in the natural world according to the qualities found in God.

What of those who do not see things this way? Here we have a tragic sense of duty. Rather than to see other men lose themselves by overlooking their means of salvation, it is natural for the supernaturalist to take steps to make sure that the others are saved. Yet the supernaturalist, as we have seen, cannot demonstrate his authority. He cannot show that he has the knowledge he claims to have. So he tends to be authoritarian. He has an advantage over the empiricist in that his beliefs seem to apply to the whole man of the men he happens to get. But at his most democratic there is still danger, because his democracy is arbitrarily limited by the demand for adherence to a particular set of conclusions. An authoritarian society may make provisions for equality and freedom, but only among those who accept the authoritarian order. This means both a limitation of democracy for adherents as well as heretics, and the need to rely on might. Might is necessary to keep outsiders in their places and to insure that insiders do not trespass the established bounds of truth.

The conflict between the traditional empiricists and the supernaturalists is indeed a peculiar one. It is involved in a sort of philosophical symbiosis. On the fundamental issues, each gets its

appeal from the weakness of the other. Empiricists seek a method capable of giving objective verification to ideas. In doing so they declare themselves impotent before the fundamental, pervasive and immediate problems of men. Supernaturalists intone the tragedy of this situation and chant their ultimate answers to the human quest. Empiricists then show the inadequacy of these claims and scorn the pretense. And so on.

Is there an alternative?

Instrumentalists, to begin with, deny the classical distinction between Appearance and Reality, where Appearance means the world of ordinary experience and Reality means a world that is never experienced. It is true that theologians often assert that God is an object of experience, yet always of an inaccessible experience, different in kind from the familiar realm they refer to as *mere* experience. On this basis the grand philosophical problem is—as it has been traditionally—that of how to *find* Reality. The search for Ultimate Reality is like looking for a needle in a haystack where: (1) the haystack is illusory; (2) the needle will not stick you even if you sit on it; (3) the only reason to believe the needle exists is that the *haystack* is experienced; and (4) the needle is asserted to be the cause of the haystack.

If the original assumption concerning Reality is insisted upon, or taken for granted, the problem of how to find it and demonstrate the finding cannot be solved. If the assumption is denied to begin with, the problem disappears. Are not these the earmarks of a gratuitous assumption and of a false problem?

By way of a positive development of their alternative instrumentalists assert that the world of ordinary experience is real—as real as anything else. Reality includes all that men find in the processes of life—the many, various, rich, changing events that men live in—and more, too, since men are always encountering realities that were not there before. But the “more” is not an other-than-nature, nor is it more *real* just because it is more than is had in any of our experiences. There are many problems, of course, involved in the efforts to find particular realities. But there

is no problem in finding reality in general. It is the sort of thing we have about us, whether we like it or not.

Instrumentalists are not satisfied with traditional empiricism any more than with supernaturalism. If supernaturalism removes nature (and the man of nature) from Reality, empiricism removes the humanity of men from nature. It does this by insisting that knowledge and values are subjective. Neither makes a difference to nature. Knowledge makes no difference because it is no more than a description of nature. Values make no difference because they are no more than an expression of the individual's isolated emotions and preferences.

Against this isolation, to put it differently, of one part of nature from another, instrumentalists find that one aspect of nature makes a difference to other aspects. Just as a body of water, say, is found to make a difference to air and soil and their inhabitants, and as those things make a difference to the water, so the existence of men and their activities makes a difference to the world in which they live. It is a fact of experience that the occurrence of one event makes changes in other events in its context, and they in turn change it. Dewey remarks that "associated or conjoint behavior is a universal characteristic of all existences," and existences get their natures from the associations they share. Men are no exception. They also are natural events interacting with other events.

It is impossible to say what the world is like without reference to human experience. But as the world evolves human existences, it and they together produce human experiences. There is no more reason to deny the reality of the *world* of experience than there is to reverse the argument and assert that it alone is real. What is being asserted, then, is that when the world's events include human experience, they really have the qualities they are experienced to have. As Dewey says it:

Interactions of things with the organism eventuate in objects perceived to be colored and sonorous. They also result in qualities that make the object hateful or delightful. All these qualities, taken as directly perceived or enjoyed, are terminal effects or

natural interactions. Thus "tertiary" qualities . . . are as much products of nature as are color, sound, pressure, perceived size and distance.³

As real participants in a real world what human beings find is the sort of commonplace that so many philosophers would like to ignore, deprecate or explain away: namely, that we encounter realities with all the qualities of experience, including moral and esthetic qualities. If this be tautology, it is high time the most is made of it.

Obviously our discussion of reality leads inescapably to a discussion of men, for we have been talking about a humanized reality, in the sense that it is impossible to say anything about the nature of things out of any perspective. The realities that men find or anticipate or even talk about are human vistas. Reality is found to be what it is because men are what they are, and men happen to be what they are because reality is what it is.

Reality is change, among other things. As it changes new qualities evolve. Whatever reality may have been, it came to produce suns and planets, and one of the planets came to have plant and animal life. If each of these things is what it is because it is a real aspect of reality emerging from other aspects, reality is also what it is because of the evolution and continued changing existence of these things. Man is one of the natural beings that has emerged in reality. And it is not merely man that has emerged but also nature; nature with man is different from nature without.

If this is a valid way of thinking it becomes highly inaccurate to talk of man *and* nature in those instances where the speaker means man *or* nature, as though man could take the credit and let the cash go. Man and nature means *inter-connections*, *inter-actions*, *inter-relations*, such that there is no place where human nature stops and nature begins. Men are biological creatures, continuous at once with the whole physical, biological and social evolutionary process and with the physical, biological and social

environments existing at a given time. Environment acts through men as much as they act in and through it. According to Dewey:

We may . . . say that natural operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like speech and honesty, are functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person. They are things done *by* the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions.⁴

This does not mean that men and their environments are indistinguishable. Instrumentalists do not seek to reduce men (or anything with distinctive qualities) to anything else. A man is unique. So is a color. And so is a skunk cabbage. The fact that a color or odor changes as the sources of light, the air or the experiencing organisms change, does not mean that the color or odor is not of the quality it is experienced to have. The claim that human qualities are a function of a certain type of environmental structure as well as of a certain type of organic structure, is not to deny the humanness of those qualities any more than it is to deny their naturalness.

Let us take as our starting point as regards the human individual, then, that he is a unique but not separable part of nature. In attempting to keep the individual unmistakably within the scope of his larger context, it was said that the organism and environment were interactive aspects of a continuous process. One can focus attention more narrowly upon the individual and say, briefly, that the human organism is active.

This may be a platitude. Or it may be one of those common-places that we brush over to our own disadvantage. But it is still, of course, no more than a starting place. We may go a step further and say that organic activity tends to take the form, to use Dewey's terminology, either of impulse or of habit.

Impulsive activity is essentially an undifferentiated expansion of energies. It is most nearly found, perhaps, in newly born children, before their activities and emotions have become specific acts. But even predominately random activity is directed at least somewhat by the structures of organism-and-environment. Ac-

tivity is obviously not chaotic in the organism that succeeds in living. It must have some direction and skill to continue acting at all.

A habit occurs as the result of a successful encounter with the environment, in which the organism's more or less undifferentiated needs are directed and in some sense fulfilled. The pattern of activity tends to be repeated under similar conditions until it becomes an established way of dealing with events. The environment which is encountered includes other human beings, of course, and the settled, social habits—customs and institutions—are extremely important in formation of the growing individual's habits. So it is into an environment of men and institutions, as well as a physical and biological environment, that the infant is born. As all of these factors become integrated into his growth, his impulses develop into increasingly skillful and variegated habits.

Most of what has been said so far is applicable to all higher animal behavior, whether human or not. It may be extended a bit further into a statement of a general pattern which emerges from activity that encounters an obstruction. Something happens which breaks up the harmony between organism and environment, something which makes life noticeably less satisfactory. There is, in other words, something which interferes with the competent flow of activity. Because of the obstruction there is an accumulation of energy. Activity increases in order to be rid of the restraining tension and to develop an adequate state of affairs. There is more or less random activity until the obstacle is overcome or a desired object is reached and competent activity is restored. This is the beginning of a habit, and, as similar situations recur, the solution is easier and there is less wasted effort.⁵

But the characteristically human factor is missing from this statement: it is the development of language and through it the ability of men consciously to control themselves and the circumstances of which they are a part. The important thing is that as the ability to speak and write slowly evolved, men ceased to be

slaves of the present and its dangers, and gained the ability to postpone action. The postponement of action made it possible to avoid the necessity of immediate pressures and to choose to act in the light of possibilities not present. In short, thought evolved in language.

The first important point about language is that it permits reflection by creating activity on a non-temporal level. Man lives in time, it is true, and the actual solution of his problems is a temporal activity; but when he is confronted with problems he need not deal solely with particular objects confronting him in space and time. In his *Logic*, Dewey identifies these two aspects of human activity by a distinction between the relations of sign to significance and of symbol to meaning. During the life of an organism, human or not, it is possible to get a high degree of sensitivity to the "significance" of events—sensitivity, that is, to the fact that a certain object or event indicates the presence or coming of another. Indian potters in Mexico are frequently acute at determining the temperature of the kiln by observing the color of the flame. Much common sense shrewdness is of this sort. But useful and necessary as it is, its utility is limited to situations which closely resemble previously resolved difficulties. When new difficulties are encountered the familiar skills are ineffectual and the individual is lost until luck or persistent groping enables him to find his way again.

With the emergence of ideas in the symbols of language, on the other hand, the quality of human activity changes. Existent signs refer to a limited number of things signified and that is all, but "symbols" may "mean" an indefinite number of things, none of which need be thought of as existing in space and time. Thinking takes place when habits are freed from the limitations of overt action and become imaginatively projected in symbols. For thinking involves the rehearsing and examining of alternative ways of acting to see, before any is acted upon, which is likely to be the most valid. It is then possible, when danger or difficulty arises, to hesitate long enough to take precautions before one commits himself, to see whether the trouble is as it appears to be,

and imaginatively to examine previously tried solutions and others that seem reasonable.

This leads to the second important point about language—namely, that it enables one individual to take the role of others. In the natural history of communication, as George Herbert Mead develops it, man did not speak because he has something to say; he had something to say because he could speak. Non-human animals may influence each other without communicating, in the present usage of that word. The female hummingbird responds to the male's soaring flight; the kitten ruffles at the puppy's bark. In each case the response is conditioned by the structure of the organism or by established habit.

A great deal of human behavior is of this sort. But not all of it is. When a kitten responds to dangled twine or a dog to a thrown stick, the response is different in quality from the stimulus which brought it forth. There are various participants acting together, but there is no meaning common to them in what they do. A human individual, however, may respond to his own behavior as he finds others responding to it. A community of meaning is then possible. Communication can take place. And the behavior (the "significant gesture" as Mead calls it) which symbolizes the common meanings becomes formal language.

If it is true that, to begin with, we had something to say because we could speak, it is also true that, having developed something to say, we seek new ways of saying it. This in turn assists in the development of new things to say. Once symbolic activity comes into existence it is capable of indefinite extension. It can, for example, not only act as a channel for established meanings, but also open the way for new meanings. The capacity of language to operate in this way—and this is the main point here—makes it possible, as a part of communicating with others, to learn their points-of-view and their successes or failures in relevant problems. Added perspectives both enrich one's thinking and correct it by showing its limitations and biases.⁶

Finally, both of these aspects of language, plus the fact that symbols may be physically durable, make for a cumulative char-

acter of knowledge. Thus, to summarize briefly, the use of symbols frees thinking from limitation to those existent things which are actually encountered in experience. Symbols can refer to numerous events not necessarily similar, or can refer to possible situations that have not been encountered, or they can be manipulated entirely in regard to their form without reference to existence at all. The use of language may also force one to be acquainted with other points of view than his own, lifting him out of the extreme limitations of his own vision, decreasing prejudice and increasing the number of alternatives that may be worked with. In addition language may be preserved over long stretches of time and space. Knowing resulting from many different problems and points of view may be applied to present and future problems. Men's abilities to handle their environments are then greatly increased, as may be seen in any science or technology where present skills are possible that were hardly thinkable in the near past.⁷

The preceding section points out that symbolic activity may take a wide variety of forms, and that symbols may even be used without reference to spatial and temporal events. But it was also observed that all thinking takes place in space and time. This last point should be developed further.

The point is that all human activity, including thinking, goes on in some particular "situation," to use Dewey's word. A situation is that interaction and interpenetration of organism and environment which is the condition of human activity. Because both organism and environment are constantly changing, each situation is unique, having a dominant quality of its own—charm, desperation, depression, joy, cheer, frustration, hope, puzzlement, curiosity, etc.—which flows "without seams" into the next. Among the types of "qualitative situations" are those that are "harmonious" and "problematic." Awareness of the peculiar quality of the problem means that attempts at solution acquire direction and relevance. Without this "feeling" of the quality, activity is either a blind, headlong rush or a mere collecting of

data irrespective of their relevance and worth.⁸

The concept of problem is basic in Dewey's thinking. Yet it is surprisingly little discussed or, perhaps, understood. Usually it is interpreted in terms of those circumstances referred to commonly as "practical," pressing problems. Much common usage supports this interpretation. But often people speak broadly, too, so as to include problems in art and play and curiosity. It is this wider usage with which we are here concerned.

Although the appearance of words may be to the contrary, problematic situations are not simply problematic. They are complexes of factors in which now one quality and now another is dominant, and all of the factors contribute to the nature of the dominant quality. Problems are not necessarily either urgent or to be avoided. When men run out of problems in the ordinary course of life they create new ones. Nor is this so strange. A well-fed kitten will play at hunting. What differentiates men, in this respect, is the quality and variety of problems they can solve, and create. Boredom itself is a peculiar type of problematic situation, the main solution for which is the creation of new problems. Busywork is another example. It is usually produced as a solution to boredom, although it may result in an intensification of the problem it is supposed to solve. Artistic activity and scientific curiosity, which are not separate, are classic types of problem-creating activity. But here, too, the quality of the problem and of the resultant developments are not entombed within the individual. A curious and artistically sensitive child, for example, is alert to the interplay of conditions that have stimulated him. And as long as these conditions sustain his interest he assaults them with questions. But if his conditions act to dull him so that he becomes an anesthetic adult, he does not cease to have problems but they do become burdensome.

In general the idea of a problematic situation refers to conditions which call forth or demand a redirection of activity. It also indicates a framework for that activity, and even a direction, at least in the negative sense that not every proposed activity would be appropriate. Problems obviously vary a great deal in

urgency and in the extent to which they center on an individual or a group of individuals. They may be as obvious as a broken arm or as difficult to define as the need to enjoy living. In each instance a problem is there because there are human beings, but its existence does not depend on them alone. In fact they may not even be aware of it.

When problems occur human beings may react like other animals—and often do. The individual may respond with fixed habits operating in a stimulus-response manner, in which case the difficulty may increase. Or he may behave in a random manner, still trusting to luck. Or the individual may think about the question.

If the present state of our information about thinking permits us to say anything, with a possibility of verification, about its origins, we can say that it developed in the course of evolution, and that it functioned as a means of survival. In that respect it is like the gills of a fish or a rat's whiskers. But we may not jump from this to the conclusion that thinking will inevitably contribute to survival or that it is limited to that purpose.

Thinking, Dewey remarks in *Human Nature and Conduct*, is based on "a certain delicate combination of habit and impulse."⁹ Except where thinking has become habitual, it arises when the smooth flow, the competent continuation, of habit is blocked. There is first a rush of rather undirected impulse, taking what form it has from the habits at hand. Impulses are direction-giving in the sense that they are the stuff of continued action without which habits are impotent. Habits are direction-giving to the extent that impulse must operate through them to get anything accomplished and to have an increasingly clear vision of alternative outlets for action.

There is a distinctive pattern to the activity of thinking. As opposed to routine or random manipulation of ideas, it begins with a recognition and identification of the difficulty. The best available ideas are sought as alternative solutions. They are examined in terms of themselves, each other, and the evidences they help to gather. Finally, one of the alternative possibilities is

chosen in the light of the evidence and is acted upon. If the procedure was adequate the problem is solved and the organism is able to act with renewed competency. If not, the inquiry must continue.

The suggested alternatives, in terms of what has been said, are symbols of habits that "come to mind" habitually or with the stimulation of impulse. If one habit or series of habits dominates from the beginning there is no reflection. But often several habits strive for dominance at the same time. When this check occurs there is conscious evaluation of alternative possibilities, instead of unhesitant overt action.

The elaboration and clarification of habits also gives the impulses more definite form as desires and interests. Further intellectual collaboration of habit and impulse transforms both into hypotheses which, on the basis of past ways of acting, project the anticipated consequences of the various possible courses of action. These hypotheses specify the individual's various aims—that is, the goals he is seeking, the means leading to them, and their envisioned consequences. Thinking, then, is the imaginative "dramatic rehearsal" of the possible ways of resuming competent action. Choice results when one of the aims appears more likely than the others to end in satisfactory activity. The choice is reasonable if the conflicting desires fulfill themselves in that desire which was acted upon, and if the activity leads to a harmonious relation with the environment.¹⁰

This brings me directly to a point which clearly marks the decisive difference between instrumentalism and the other philosophies that have been examined, a difference of great importance for democracy. It concerns the instrumentalist theory of ideas and knowledge. A reference again to the theory of reality, developed earlier, may help clarify the point. If reality includes whatever we find, there is no reason to look for reality as such. And for the same reason it is both pointless and impossible simply to describe reality, in the accepted usage of the term description, where it is held to be separate and distinct from evaluation. So far as I am

aware, there is no record that anyone has attempted literally to apply the established theory of description. How could he? Where would he begin? How would he proceed? When would he stop? Knowledge functions, not in finding reality-in-general or in describing it, but in deciding what to do about the realities we have. Knowledge is not a wonderful machine that reduces reality to scale and reproduces it, but a function of human living which aims to help us become increasingly competent in dealing with ourselves and our world.

Ideas are therefore tools, instruments or guides to action. They arise in response to the demands of a situation; they attempt to clarify the situation and to seek ways out of it; and they are true to the extent that they lead to a successful handling of the problem. They arise in experience and are aspects of it which are judged by their relations to the rest of experience. Nor are they passive. They are symbols of habits diverted from overt activity into intellectual activity.

Ideas, then, are not reproductions of qualities or essences of reality. They are symbols of operations; that is, of ways by which the world is acted upon and changed. They are based on past operations and indicate possible future operations. Their reference is general—to the *way* of doing things, rather than to the detailed characteristics of a thing or series of things. The idea of "hammer," for example, does not "describe" any particular tool or collection of tools having that name, but indicates a general technique by which force may be applied sharply to certain types of materials. A tool becomes a hammer when it has characteristics that distinguish it because of their efficiency when used to carry out the operation in question. It is in this sense that it may be said that ideas refer to possibilities rather than actualities. Even in what may legitimately be called description, ideas do not strictly speaking reflect or picture any state of affairs. They are that aspect of experience which serves to interpret, relate, clarify and redirect the ongoing present.¹¹

What has just been said may, in spite of its brevity, serve at least to introduce three points of primary importance: (1) Ideas

are natural events not altogether unlike other natural events. (2) The function of ideas is highly selective. As they arise out of a tremendously complex situation, it is obviously impossible to reproduce the entire situation as it existed before the ideas emerged. It would, moreover, be worthless since the reproduction would not solve the difficulty but only duplicate it. Ideas, therefore, select those factors which are relevant and significant for the problem at hand. (3) In all this it may also be seen that ideas involve "overt doing." Ideas not only arise in experience, but as they work together as hypotheses they lead to new experiences, in which the hypotheses may be verified or found wanting. Because the new experience is not now present, it must be sought for. The search requires that the environment be modified until one arrives at the conditions necessary for valid testing. This is the experimental procedure. It may alter the object directly to see what relations it has been sustaining, or it may create new relations to see what further characteristics the object may acquire. The method is one of correlating controlled changes rather than describing previously existing realities. And central to it is the role of ideas as the principles directing control of the changing conditions.¹²

The over-all, rigorous development of these procedures, according to instrumentalists, is to be found in scientific method. And it is that method, they say further, that makes possible the solution of any solvable problems. When it succeeds—that is, when the problem is solved—the result is knowledge. The hypothesis which led the inquiry to its conclusion is then, as James liked to say, true in so far forth. One of the characteristics of this method, however, is that "failures" also produce knowledge, and in that respect cease to be failures. Knowledge that a hypothesis was demonstrated to be false may be an important contribution to the body of information used to test further hypotheses.

Truth in general is the collective name for those ideas which have withstood continued examination, criticism and testing, and which have been fruitful in leading to new truths. The search for truth involves the desire to use the best available evidences and tests, and to eradicate extraneous considerations, in arriving at

conclusions. Among the extraneous factors may be our emotional commitments. Yet we would not improve ourselves or our chances for obtaining truth if we tried to eliminate our emotions and desires as such. Without them neither scientists nor anyone else can proceed at all. Indeed, without them, reason not only cannot function, it cannot even be rational. The problem then is to prevent desires and emotions from dictating the conclusions, and to remold them into participants in rational investigation.¹³

The reason for the supreme importance of the search for truth does not depend on the sanction of any absolute, nor is it arbitrary whim. If men did not exist, or if they existed in isolation and without uncertain activity, or if (as Santayana puts it) they were gods singing to themselves, there would be no need for truth. But truth is important because life is both precarious and important. When men are driven by special desires to secure certain conclusions, irrespective of the evidence, they will succeed neither in establishing those conclusions nor in satisfying those desires. For man lives in a world he never made, and which he can never control by wishing or bullying, without courting futility or destroying himself in the process. To control his environment he must control himself—and vice versa. In order to know what can be done, he must know what is and has been. Truth is important to man not because it can be molded to whim or made subservient to power, but because it cannot. It is because truth is objective that man can live and learn, and live because he learns.

Perhaps the basic assumption of instrumentalism is that knowing is a public activity. Instead of being something privately contained in the organism or mental substance of each knower, it is a natural event taking place in a natural world where it can be observed and checked in a similar way by various knowers. In the words of Dewey:

The fundamental advantage of framing our account of the organs and processes of knowing on the pattern of what occurs in experimental inquiry is that nothing is introduced save what is objective and is accessible to examination and report. If it is

objected that such an examination itself involves mind and its organs, the rejoinder is that the theory we have advanced is self-applying. Its only "assumption" is that something is done, done in the ordinary sense of that word, and that this doing has consequences. We define mind and its organs in terms of this doing and its results, just as we define or frame ideas of stars, acids and digestive tissues in terms of their behavior.¹⁴

This statement does not, as it may appear, mean a denial of the existence of privacies in experience. Negatively, it is an assertion that there can be no knowledge of privacies that have *no* publicly observable aspects and consequences. Positively it is a statement of the way in which any idea, whether concerned with private or public events, is to be examined and tested.

An experience by itself is not knowledge. It does not tell us anything about anything. An idea by itself is not knowledge. It must be judged true or false in terms of relevant evidence. If anyone should claim to have evidence establishing the truth or falsity of an idea, yet insist that the evidence is inaccessible to public view, his claim rests further on a personal claim to authority. But the additional claim itself can be rationally examined only in the light of evidence like that in question. If there is no evidence that is even theoretically examinable, the one claim is no better than the other. And if the history of man indicates anything it is that isolated points-of-view and claims to special forms of truth are excessively liable to error and conflict, in terms of any broader standard of judgment.

So, knowing is public, and is to be tested by the degree to which its public procedures lead to anticipated results. Or, to state the theory in other words: the aim of knowledge is to locate and define the significant problem, in a given time and place, and to develop the solution for it. Theories are formulated as instruments to this end. When they are successful in one problem they are applied and modified in relation to later problems. In this way knowledge grows as a self-corrective activity, continually checking and re-working the accumulated information, in fact and theory, at its disposal.

The instrumentalist assumption is itself one such theory which is tested by its consequences when acted upon. It is a program of action for which the evidence is not conclusive. Yet it is different in kind from other assumptions, since, as a plan of action, it seeks a conscious control of consequences by which it may be progressively tested and modified. Whatever its shortcomings may be, it is at least an assumption for which evidence may be had.¹⁵

Contrary theories, despite their differences, hold in common that knowledge describes realities as they are independently of the knowing activity. In supernaturalism this assumption is begged outright. Beliefs about the supernatural Reality are either incapable of verification by any sort of experience or the experience which is claimed to be proof is so inaccessible as to have no test beside itself. Traditional empiricism also has the problem of catching realities unaware.

Concepts are . . . simply memoranda of identical features in objects already perceived. . . . But they have to be *proved* by agreement with the material of particular antecedent experiences; their value and function is essentially retrospective.¹⁶

Even here the assumption—that knowledge is descriptive of objects unchanged by the act of knowing—is a belief for which there can be no evidence. Since “descriptive” knowledge is, by hypothesis, a “retrospective” view of an unaffected reality, it is passive and isolated. It has no consequences which can serve as evidence for its nature and its success.

In recent years both supernaturalism and traditional empiricism have been moving from epistemological arguments for their respective theories of description to logical arguments on the nature of absolute presuppositions. The precise remoteness of Formal Logic seems to be reassuring. Any philosophy, it is said, necessarily rests on absolute presuppositions, or, in other words, on assumptions that are not examinable. This fact, the argument continues, refutes the very basis of instrumentalist logic, although it may operate well enough otherwise. At its very best, therefore,

instrumentalism can only be instrumental to a philosophy which recognizes the absoluteness of presuppositions.

Supernaturalists and empiricists violently disagree concerning the nature of presuppositions. The alternatives seem to be these. (1) Presuppositions are absolute not only in being undemonstrable, but also because they have specific content which is indubitable. This theory has all the difficulties we have already found in supernaturalism. (2) Presuppositions are absolute in the sense that they are simply unexaminable. As the initiators of a logical sequence or system they cannot be judged by that system itself. But neither can they be judged by any other, since their relevance and meaning depend on the system they initiate. Here, again, there are two alternatives. One is that, since any philosophy must begin with propositions which are absolutely presupposed, one philosophy is as good as any other. But this cannot be maintained without introducing a further presupposition: namely, that we do not live in a world. Only then can it make no difference what we believe. The other possibility is that scientific method remains the one way by which evidence may be examined and tested, even though the method itself is ultimately unexaminable. This is the sort of argument which makes people wonder why anyone who has anything else to do should bother with philosophy—because the argument makes no difference. You can say that knowledge rests on absolute presuppositions, or not. It is the same either way. There is still only one way of proceeding.

This brings us back to the starting point. What does it mean to say that a philosophical position is absolutely presupposed when the contrary positions have no basis and there is at least some evidence for the philosophy in question? Call the argument circular! Yet the circularity, if it is such, is not vicious and gives every appearance of being beneficent.

The theories of knowledge as aseptically descriptive, according to Dewey, encourage and sustain the unfortunate distinction between theory and practice. "Descriptions" cannot give practical activity the guidance it needs. "Practice" cannot have the status

of knowledge because it involves doing, making and re-making rather than describing. The result is to eliminate theoretical knowledge from the possibility of contributing to the direction of human affairs, and to deprive theory of the ways in which actual problems can increase its relevance. The supernaturalists additionally encourage the separation of theory and practice by removing theory to another realm of existence.¹⁷

Practice is flesh and blood of the common sense world. Ordinary life thrives on judgments of the immediate job to be done in order to make life more livable. The common sense world is the realm of qualitative experience, where the qualities may be esthetically enjoyed or used as indications of further qualities. In the latter case, activity is guided by rule-of-thumb evaluations of what is best to do next and by accumulated rules and maxims concerning the environment or moral behavior. These guiding principles are expressed in street-language, with all its richness and ambiguity. The realm is dominated by the urgent problems of life, and the constant emergence and pursuit of ends. Common sense activity is thus marked primarily by its concern for the qualitative aspects of things and, due to the insistent pressure of human affairs, its concern with moral judgments.

In contrast with common sense, experimental science is not interested in relatively uncontrolled generalizations. Useful as they may be they are clearly limited, both in success and in the range of objects to which they apply. Science wants conceptual tools that apply with great precision to as many different objects as possible. It tries to abstract from qualitative objects in order to study their relationships. To do this the highly developed sciences create non-qualitative data. Language is extended in new and different ways, too, in the quest for precision and generality. The looseness of ordinary language is abandoned for one in which meanings are related to each other as meanings, in order to have the greatest possible intellectual consistency and breadth of application. Also for the sake of generality and objectivity science excludes the urgencies of the ends involved in life as a whole.

The differences between the ways of science and of common sense are so great that they are usually thought of as coming out of two entirely different realms and ways of knowing. According to instrumentalists, however, the differences do not follow from essentially different logical methods but indicate a difference in subject matter within the same general realm. It is then the difference between dealing with qualities and dealing with the relations sustained by those same qualities. Actually, they argue, science starts from the common sense world and in the end returns to it, so that the ends of life, for instance, may be greatly enriched and increased from the impact of a science which strives to exclude those ends from immediate consideration.¹⁸

Both common sense and science follow the same general logical procedures. The pattern of thinking has already been delineated: the formulation and choice of alternatives, first to locate a problem and then to solve it, and the action taken upon the proposed choice. The difference is that science consciously strives to enlarge the number of alternatives, to increase the precision of their formulation, and to increase the control of the gathering of data and the testing of conclusions. In general it seeks to make its tools as precise and as applicable to as many different problems as possible, in order to increase its ability to regulate the different factors of the situations to which it is applied. This would be an impossible task if the world were accepted as it is ordinarily found. Science has found it necessary, therefore, to change the world in all sorts of ways by creating artificial situations in which relations can be altered and developed with the greatest possible control. For we learn what an object is by changing it. In short, science is controlled experiment, instead of haphazard experience, which is guided by elaborate and precise conceptual systems, instead of more casual and customary language. To quote Dewey once more:

The formulation of ideas of experienced objects in terms of measured quantities, as these are established by an intentional art or technique, does not say that this is the way they *must* be thought, the *only* valid way of thinking them. . . . For purposes

except that of the general and extensive translation of one conception into another, it does not follow that the "scientific" way is the best way of thinking an affair.

Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that ideas are symbols for actual operations, and are "intellectually . . . worthless except as they pass into actions which rearrange and reconstruct in some way, be it little or large, the world in which we live."¹⁹

The distinction between common-sense and science, then, is not a rigid separation but primarily a question of what techniques are best for a specific problem. While it is true that the techniques of many of the sciences are very different from those of ordinary life, it does not follow that one uses "reason" and the other "experience."

All controlled inquiry [as Dewey says] and all institution of grounded assertion necessarily contains a *practical* factor; an activity of doing and making which reshapes antecedent existential material which sets the problem of inquiry.²⁰

Both common-sense and science use the basic method of intelligence, which means imagination in formulating alternative ideas, sensitiveness in evaluating their relevance to particular problems, willingness to evaluate them in the light of the evidence, and objectivity in endeavoring to test them publicly.

If what has been said so far about scientific method is correct, it opens the way to a further point—that science is inseparable from judgments of evaluation. The point is not that evaluation alternates with description, but that evaluation is so integral a part of description that without it there is no description. Evaluative judgment is also basic to overt action. In short, there is no knowledge without evaluation. There is judgment as to the existence of the problem and as to its nature. Evaluation is also involved in suggesting solutions, in their elaboration as hypotheses, and in the gathering of data, for these are judgments as to what may be the better ways of acting and as to what constitutes relevant evidence. And finally the choice of one alternative to be

acted upon is a decision that it is better than the others.

Two things should be kept in mind. First, a completed judgment—one that has completed the pattern of problem, hypotheses and action—is not a single judgment standing by itself, but is made up of other judgments which grew as part of its own construction. Second, each one of these judgments itself involves some type of practical and evaluative activity. Hence all judgments, from physical science to common-sense, are evaluative, although with some the problem is so urgent that they may be singled out as value-judgments. Judgments of this sort have as their explicit subject-matter human behavior and its goals. The very stuff of social studies is made up of the problems—by hypothesis, one would think, in spite of the literature on the subject—that pave the course of common activity.²¹ If the natural scientists attempt to abstract themselves from direct concern for human welfare in their special investigations, on the grounds that it might divert or prejudice their efforts, that is itself an evaluation of their aims, their tasks, and the best ways of fulfilling them. It is, in other words, not an exclusion of evaluations, but an insistence that evaluations be appropriate to the matter at hand. And that, in general, it seems to me, is not essentially different from the integrity of workmanship that we ask from a mechanic, a butcher or an artist.

But we are not now so much concerned with evaluations in general as we are with *moral* evaluations. Do they have a valid basis? Can moral activity correct itself and improve its goals? Or is McGilvary right in asserting that moral knowledge is exhausted in the description of our desires and their consequences? Let us at least keep in mind the implications of his doctrine. The first is that when desired goods come into genuine conflict there is no alternative to might as a solution. The second, as Dewey points out in other connections, is that in any case there is no way of regulating our desires.

These points are no refutation of McGilvary's argument, but they may lead us to pay more attention to it and to the possibility of a rational alternative. Let us remember, to begin with, that

McGilvary does not say that the analysis and description of desires and their consequences have no effect on the desires. To the contrary, he observes that even "basic" desires may change, and often because of anticipation or experience of their consequences. Yet in each case the object of desire, whether it has changed or not, is held to be good, irrespective of the elaboration of its results. That is to say, if the desire does change as a result of knowledge about it, the change is an accidental or external result of the knowledge. An ideal can only be criticized by asking if it and its results are really what one most desires or if another want is greater. Once a basic desire is found, the only thing to be done is to achieve its object by any possible means. In other words, as was pointed out much earlier, though ideals may change as a result of examination, there is no rational connection between the examination and the change. Logically it is the same whether ideals change as a result of greater knowledge about them or as a result of any other causal factor.

Now what must be assumed in order to argue that the adequacy of men's desires and aims is judged solely in terms of what they happen to desire at the time, or in other words that a desire's consequences have no bearing on the validity of the desire? I am convinced that the answer is clear. That theory could only be true, although its proponents would deny this implication, if the desire did not *really* have any consequences, which is to say that it did not exist in a world. If desires are to be judged solely in terms of themselves, if their impact on a world and the world's impact on them are logically irrelevant to judgment of their worth, then it is as though nothing existed except the desires. Or at least that they existed in total isolation.

The alternative, if there is one, is that genuine good is something emerging from the use of the same method of intelligence we have examined in connection with the established sciences. All of the objects desired by men may be called good solely because they are sought, yet in so far as they are not critically examined they are goods in a primitive sense only. They are not so much the objects of desire as of rather vague impulses. When

the impulsive enjoyments are intelligently examined the impulses become more fully conscious desires and the enjoyments become full-fledged "values" and genuine goods.

But this, again, is only a beginning. Such values or goods are still not tested, and will not be unless they are brought to bear on moral problems. A moral problem, like any other, arises in a situation in which the existing mode of action has been checked. As the attempt at solution progresses, various aims and principles are recalled as having been successful in the past. This is helpful but it does not settle the question at hand. The present situation is exactly like no other, and even previously tested aims and principles must operate as hypotheses in the present. The inherited aims must compete with new ones created in the course of inquiry. The various alternative moral possibilities conflict with each other, and indeed without conflict it is doubtful that there would be consciousness of a moral problem. This is true not because the environment is irrelevant, but because people tend to be preoccupied with their own aims. When one aim is clearly dominant to begin with, we seldom halt our activity to examine it—even though the activity might be involved in trying to override the environment, to force it to conform to the heart's desire. Hitler did not bring about his own destruction because he sought it but because—if I may be permitted a gross over-simplification—the dominance of a set of ideals made him insensitive to the existence of a moral problem. The problem as set by his aims was one of making the world fit them. But he was mistaken as to the nature of the problem.

The question, then, is to find which alternative will solve the *whole* problem in which the individual finds himself. When one of the aims appears to do this it is chosen as *the* good in this situation; not because it was desired previously—for that was true of each alternative—but because it *comes to be found desirable* under the present circumstances. And if it functions successfully, then it *is* the good for this situation.²²

Two things are necessary for an adequate "construction" of the good. The first is to find an aim that inclusively satisfies as

many as possible of the conflicting desires. If this is not done the resulting satisfaction will be incomplete or even dangerous. If one or another of the previous aims triumphs *over* the others, the desires which give rise to these other aims will not be eradicated but merely suppressed, with the likelihood that they will emerge later in a more vicious manner. If, instead, a compromise among desires is striven for, whereby each is deprived of part of its claim without anything to round out the claim in a new fashion, then the fulfillment is at best a mediocre affair. On the assumption that any desire is morally good, it is necessary either to satisfy every desire according to its original demand or to let them fight it out. I am arguing here, to the contrary, that when desires and their projected aims conflict, the presumption is that they are all inadequate as they stand. The method of creating an inclusive aim is not the discovery of a previous desire but a process of creating new desires in which the individual's energies will be modified, harmonized and redirected in the new activity.²³

But this is not enough. Aims and desires do not exist in a vacuum and cannot operate solely with regard to each other. They are ways of acting in the world. They are affected by their environment and have consequences in it. In addition to being harmoniously related to each other, they must be able to operate competently in the world. In fact, the one cannot be done without the other. An aim is also to be judged, therefore, by the extent to which it can be formulated into a particular plan of action. Judgment is carried out when the plan, in competition with alternative plans, is tried out and tested.²⁴

It might be objected that this analysis does not actually avoid dependence on antecedent desires for the good, on the grounds that any individual to whom it applies would *really* have as his basic desire the solving of the problem. But the difficulty seems largely to be the result of word-play. The impulsion to solve problems is life itself and very different in quality from specific desires. (Moreover, life itself may be called to account for itself, as some suicides indicate.) Intelligence is indeed for life rather than life for intelligence, but this does not mean that life tells

intelligence *what* to do, because life does not know what it wants. Intelligence helps by collaborating with life in the formulating and choosing of alternative ways of living.

Whatever moral goods there are, then, are found in conjunction with the guidance of aims in the solution of problems. Each one of these goods is unique. It was found to be good in some particular situation, but *that* situation will never recur. Yet there is a generic good. It is not the solution of problems for that in itself could be an empty activity. People solve problems to live, to modify the earlier phrase, and do not live in order to solve problems. Nor is it enough to argue, as some have, that generic good is found in the growth of meaning which comes with the competent solution of problems.²⁵ However important growth may be, it is of little help to talk of growth in general, without direction, as though in the idealist sense the mere expansion of personality is eventually identified with reality. Growth, like problem-solving, must be to some end—the aim of living—and it is that which constitutes the generic good.

What is it? The best statement I am aware of has been given by M. C. Otto, when he speaks of it as “the most livable life for all who have a life to live.”²⁶ Taken as it stands there, the statement is so broad as to be virtually meaningless. But taken in the context of the theory we have been examining it becomes extremely meaningful.

It is, first of all, an indication that the aim of living can only be found, literally, here and now. It should be a common-place—but is not—that living can never occur anywhere but in the present. This is not to say that past and future are insignificant; it is a hint concerning the nature of their significance. A large part of the meaning of the present is found in remembrances of the past and anticipations of the future, so that the taste of candy to a diabetic, for instance, is affected by a memory of the consequences of other candies. Aims give meaning and direction, of some sort, to the present. But when our aims become preoccupied with the glories past or the triumphs yet to come, the present

becomes something mainly to be endured. Aims enrich the present progressively when they enable us to work out means to their realization and to anticipate their consequences. Life is vacuous and blundering unless it has goals which are made so concrete in present activity that each step taken is itself an achievement of the goals. A gardener, for example, cannot be successful (or even a gardener) without a goal. But his chief aim is not the gathering of produce. That can be done with much less effort and frustration by going to the grocery store. But if he concentrates on being a skillful gardener, he has not just a goal but one whose meaning demands full attention to each moment's effort. The goal is then realized in the immediate task, or nowhere. The function of aims, therefore, is to make present living as rich and enjoyable and significant as possible.²⁷

Second, the very generality of the statement is important. To say that life should be livable—or rich or satisfying or meaningful—is like saying that the aim of living is to achieve the best possible life. This certainly gives nothing, as it stands, of the specific guidance we have been asking for. Oddly enough, as we usually think of these things, that is what is important. The point is that it is not possible to settle that question concretely ahead of time, and for all people. For each situation, as previously noted, is unique at least to the extent that judgments are not automatically applicable to it. And it is for this reason that Otto, after his sentence concerning “the most livable life” immediately adds—where each man is “the final judge of what ‘most livable’ means for him.”

It does not follow from this, however, that each man's aims are automatically valid, that “one man's opinions are as good as another's.” If anything is clear to us at this stage in history it should be that we do not know very much, either about ourselves or about the world we live in. This applies to the experts as much as to the rest of us. The first half of the twentieth century—hailed with hope, even smugness—should be enough to humble anyone. But more is involved in our ignorance than that. The very nature of reality—ever changing, bringing forth novelties by day and by

night—is such that we could never possibly know enough to say, “Well, that *is* enough; there is no need to search further.” There is no need to conclude that we know nothing, or that what we do know is not extremely significant, or that we do not know enough to deal adequately with many problems. But if it is true that in the nature of things we do not and cannot—and need not—have knowledge with finality about the things that matter most to us—then it does follow that one person cannot adequately decide for another how he should live. It also follows that the individual by himself has insufficient knowledge about his own life and aspirations.

Well, then, how is it possible to know enough to judge our aims validly? By what criterion can we evaluate them? Perhaps the most familiar statement in instrumentalist literature is that they are to be judged by their consequences. But this does not take us far enough, even when one adds—consequences for satisfactory, rich and meaningful living. How are the consequences to be judged? We are in the same position here as we were with regard to aims. The consequences are not self-evident any more than the aims, ideals, and goods which led to them.

The answer, as far as I have been able to determine it, is nevertheless involved in what has already been said. At the time of decision regarding aims, a rational judgment cannot be made concerning any aim taken in isolation. To the contrary, the possibility of valid judgment is increased to the extent that there is knowledge of alternative aims, including their histories and probable consequences. The same is true of the actual consequences that occur. To the extent that any result or series of results is examined in relative isolation, valid judgment is not possible. It is necessary to examine them in the light of the largest possible context of relevant actualities and possibilities—which includes, again, their histories and probable further consequences.

At the risk of its being cumbersome I would venture this as the criterion of moral judgment: an aim or good is to be judged in terms of the genuine possibilities alternative to it, the consequences that result from action upon it, and the possibilities alter-

native to those consequences. I have used the qualification "genuine" to indicate that the alternatives must be relevant and significant. But still more important, it indicates that intellectually formulated possibilities are not enough. The actual conditions of living must embody the alternatives so that the individual would have had first-hand experience of the possibilities in question or would be able to attain it. A warning should be added, that it is not necessary or advisable to try out every possible alternative. One of the things the criterion does is to make it possible to judge those conditions and possibilities which would narrow its application or eliminate it. Authoritarianism, for example, is bad because it prevents the conditions under which valid judgment is possible. It is possible, similarly, to tell in terms of the criterion when the use of opiates, say, is justifiable and when it is not.

If the argument so far is valid, instrumentalism is a naturalistic, objective moral theory which is free from authoritarianism and the reliance upon might, and also from conservatism. First, it is an objective ethics because the qualities objects have in moral experience are as much qualities of those objects—in relation to the organism, of course—as any of the other qualities of those objects. A good object *is* good, enticing, and what not, and a bad object *is* bad, hateful, and so on. A person telling why he finds something good can point out moral qualities found in the object. The fact that different people find different characteristics does not make those characteristics any less a part of nature. Nor does the fact that they are a part of nature mean that they are automatically valid, and do not need to be tested as to their further significance and value.

Second, established customs, out of which moral judgments emerge and which suffuse moral experience, are a part of the cultural inheritance of the individual. They originated as efforts to deal with the conditions of living, and they constantly mold our attempts to make our way in this world of ours. But this, again, does not mean that they are necessarily valid.

Third, our ideas and ideals have consequences whether we

know them or not and whether we like them or not. The reactions to them, including our own, are social patterns of behavior as objective as the reactions of the physical world. Not only do the reactions take place whether we are conscious of them or not, in neither case can they be controlled or eliminated by personal whim or preference.

Fourth, on the hypothesis that man is social, the consequences of our ideas and ideals may be examined by others as well as ourselves. The method of examination and the conditions necessary for it are also publicly examinable.

Fifth, the criterion of moral judgment is objective. A thing is not morally good simply because it was *found* to be good before it was examined. It must be examined and acted upon and tested. Even if the results are satisfactory, they are subject to correction in the light of later results and the examinations of them. In other words, the criterion is not logically dependent on personal opinion or the accepted standards of a culture. It is, to the contrary, capable of judging them.

Perhaps the basic factor in these types of objectivity is the social nature of the human individual. One does not slight the importance of the organic structure the individual is born with, to point out that it can come to nothing without the social environment. It not only depends on that environment for its continued existence, but also for its molding and direction. In that sense what men turn out to be depends on the habits and customs into which they are born and through which they grow.

The intelligence which judges those conditions is also social. This does not mean, as some idealists would have it, that society is a higher organism that thinks in a superior fashion. Thinking is a social process because the individual is social, not because there is a distinct entity called Society. The originality of thinking comes from the individual's impulsive spontaneity. But though impulses cannot be duplicated and handed on, the social environment is necessary for their existence and direction. Short of death, apparently, impulses operate to some extent, and for better or worse, to modify old habits and customs and to create new ones.

Whether they are repressed or warped, or liberated in intelligent activity, depends on the conditions in which they emerge.

The individual who tends to isolate himself from others, either by removing himself physically or by setting himself in a special position, is likely to become dominated by impulse or habit. His capacity to envision alternatives becomes restricted. It becomes easier to misinterpret people and events. The conclusion to be drawn is not that society should decide moral questions for the individual. It is that the individual finds objectivity in width of vision, by maintaining communication with others and observing from their points-of-view. This makes him more objective in analyzing his ideas, in observing events, and in experimenting with his ideals. There cannot be the same sort of control over events in moral experimentation that there is in the precise sciences. Yet experimentation there must be. And experimentation, to be examined and tested, demands participation of others.

This leads to another point. When morality does become experimental and attempts to create self-corrective controls, it knowingly changes the social conditions in which people live. Morality consists above all in ways of acting. If existing habits are not adequate, the possibilities for improvement are hampered in proportion as existing institutions and customs serve to frustrate new habits. The institutions themselves must be changed to make morality effective. The moral quest requires an experimental formulation and trying out of alternative ways of thinking and acting, which in turn call for a flexibility in institutions that is far from the present state of affairs. Even movement toward such institutions would create radical changes in those we have and in the attitudes with which they are regarded. Moral questions are thus inseparable from social questions.²⁸

Instrumentalism — II

Instrumentalism is designed to enrich life—but this does not distinguish it from other philosophies. If instrumentalism makes a unique and valid contribution, one must find it in the meaning given to life and to philosophy. Living comes first, chronologically and logically. But the process of living, at a given time and place, is not automatically good even when one is convinced that it is. It must be tested in terms of the further possibilities of life in the world of which it is a part. Theories emerge in the effort to make living increasingly satisfactory.

This argument is not a defense of willful belief. Intellectual honesty is perhaps the cardinal virtue. Whatever truth may be, life is better served by knowing it than by overlooking it. Even if the truth is not as we may hope it to be, life is better off with that knowledge than with frustrated hopes. There is another conviction as well: that reality is of such a nature that truth is developed through the experimental use of ideas as tools. Instrumentalist theories of reality, life, truth and philosophy are themselves examples of such tools. If they enrich life it is because they are true, and true because they truly enrich life.

Every man is unavoidably involved in the quest for truth and the good life. Success in the quest depends on the extent to which each man participates in it to the best of his ability. Probably most philosophers would assent to these statements, as to the earlier one. But in most cases, at least, the apparent agreement rests on the qualification that the abilities of men are so divergent that most men must depend on some to tell them what to believe and what to do.

Against this instrumentalism poses a faith in the ability of men, collectively and individually, to improve their lot by their own efforts, if they are given the chance. The faith is not merely a hope "that human nature when left to itself, when freed from external arbitrary restrictions, will tend to the production of democratic institutions that work successfully."¹ It seeks to develop a positive program applicable to all areas of life. The aim of the program is to create conditions in which each man may control his own life to the extent of his capacities. It is not necessary to assert that all men have the same capacities in order to avoid judging them by their conformity to established ideas, institutions, or special interests of any other sort. Their capacities may be judged by the extent to which they are able to control their own affairs when there is the opportunity, and by the extent to which they can contribute to the working out of new opportunities. It is on this basis that instrumentalism claims to be the philosophy of "democracy as a way of life."

The faith in the ability of men to deal with their own problems is based on faith in what Dewey calls "the method of intelligence"—that is, experimental science. This faith has been rejected by many, as we have seen, on the grounds that science has nothing to do with values. Commitment to science, it is argued, is not only erroneous, but also makes it possible for special interests to control science for their own purposes. Like an ax, science is indifferent both to the Lincolns and to the Lizzie Bordens who use it. But the argument is one which is peculiarly reversible. If scientific method is incapable of judging values, then it is indeed at the mercy of any ambitious and powerful group. For there are no other methods capable of dealing with the problem. Moreover there are good and, I believe, sufficient reasons for rejecting the theory of science on which the argument rests.

There are plenty of problems remaining, of course, but they are of a different sort. They are not the peculiar problems of a man who declares his own incompetence, becomes offended with those who disagree, and sets out to prove his claim. They are the

problems of a man who does not demand his competence to be proved before it is tried, but is willing to test it in the daily encounters of life. It is obvious, for example, that science and technology have been made tools of anti-democratic forces, both abroad and at home. And the democracies have been uncertain, sometimes to the point of failure, in their handling of the dynamics of science and of their enemies. It has become almost a conditioned reaction, when one is confronted with these difficulties, to declare the neutrality of science and the limitations of democracy. It would be of greater help to clarify and strengthen the relationships between science and democracy.

In *The Public and Its Problems*, Dewey remarks that "the cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy."² Democracy should be widened from a narrow sphere to the whole community. It should be much more than a quadrennial or biennial ceremony for a fraction of the voting public. It should become thoroughly human, involving the various activities of the varieties of men. To accomplish this we should not only be grateful to science for the technological improvements it has made in our material welfare. We must also liberate scientific method from its bondage to special groups. The cure for the ailments of science is more science. It, too, should be humanized and used in all areas of life. Science helped in fundamental ways to free men from past limitations. It must now be used to free men from those groups that have used science narrowly as well as from those who oppose science. Without its direction—for it is the only method by which change can be genuinely controlled—men will court disaster by drifting or by relying on dogmatic authority and might.

Not even the physical sciences can remain aloof. Atomic energy only made melodramatic the incalculable effects the physical sciences have had on the lives of everyone. Many have been tempted to argue that society should, in some way, directly control the aims and results of scientific investigators. But the achievement of the scientific attitude, the development of high integrity and devotion to truth, are the result of hard battles and are not to be dismissed or slighted. There are, however, other

considerations. If reality needs only to be described from one end to the other, and if the purpose of science is just to discover what that reality really is, then it would be foolish to attempt any sort of control of science. But this is hardly the case. However much the scientist may exclude extraneous elements in the laboratory, what he chooses to do is motivated by his interests and by the problems to which his interest is drawn. He has reality with him always. What he wants is to find out what can be done with reality.

To a considerable extent the directions of science have been set by problems of war, fears of war or the quest (whether under capitalism or communism) for power over others. If so, it is possible to create a redirection of scientific efforts, without dictating methods or results, by encouraging attention to those problems affecting people in general. Furthermore, the scientists themselves can do much to help people meet their problems. By carrying their highly developed scientific habits out of the laboratory into the rest of life, and by developing means for the "contagious diffusion of the scientific attitude," they could change established habits and greatly extend the influence of science. Both of these factors working together could improve the functioning of the natural sciences in a democratic society—and it would be done democratically.³

The social sciences have avoided social problems by assuming that they would not be sciences at all unless they had the precision of the physical sciences. This is impossible, naturally enough, since the subject matter is too complex and immediate for that sort of precision. Yet by setting an unattainable goal, it has been possible to maintain a respectable neglect of existent problems. At the same time, attempts to apply knowledge to pressing social ills usually err by taking certain moral standards for granted before the actual process of inquiry has started. But moral preconceptions disrupt efforts at genuine investigation by forcing the activity into conformity with the accepted standards and by directing attention from the problem at hand. The moral quality of social inquiry does not come from the effort to maintain cer-

tain standards but from a direct concern with human problems. Moral praise and blame, as we are accustomed to use them, are so far from being basic to moral evaluation, that they are irrelevant to it where they are not dangerous.

Although both social science and morality, as traditionally conceived, have sought purity by excluding the other and by pursuing remote goals, neither should suffer by turning away from quixotic romance. The suggestion that both should attempt to be as scientific as intelligence at its best is not an exorbitant one. The first step is to make sure that the problem has been clearly located and defined. The complexity of most human problems makes this especially necessary. It also necessitates action to make sure that there is some control over the complex changes that are taking place. With these precautions, the inquiry can continue to formulate and test alternatives.⁴

There is another argument, in addition to those previously examined, for the assertion that science is irrelevant to democracy, or even that it is authoritarian. Scientific method involves experimentation, and experimentation in the natural sciences involves manipulation of the subject matter. If, the argument continues, social studies are to be scientific, they must become experimental. This means they must manipulate the subject matter, which is people, according to the inclinations of the experimenter, not according to the preference of the subject. Therefore, it is concluded, the social sciences must be authoritarian as long as they are scientific.

There is much word-play in the argument. It also risks the mistake of defining scientific method in general in terms of a special subject matter or special techniques. These difficulties may be avoided only by resting the case on a more familiar argument. It is that the average individual is by nature incompetent and must be told, by those who know, what the good life is.

It is certainly a tragic fact that few people have control over their lives, or awareness of what they would use the control for if they had it. But it does not follow that this knowledge is had

by a select group. The argument for rule by an elite of experts is usually based on the complexity of our knowledge and of our conditions of living. Ordinary men and women, it is said, are not bright enough to comprehend the multitude of factors entering into decisions of policy. Only the especially intelligent few can do so. Peculiarly enough, the argument proves too much. If there ever has been a time—and I do not believe there has—when some men could adequately run the lives of all, that time is past. The more knowledge accumulates and ramifies, the more the experts must specialize, and the less any man by his own efforts can grasp of the whole realm of knowledge and its particular impacts. The same applies to any special group of men.

This gives added point to my earlier remarks concerning our ignorance. The limitations of existence are no respectors of claim or status. This world of change, variety and novelty is not such as to enable us successfully to tell others what they should believe and do, however much we may try to do so. And the problem is not basically different when we try to live our own lives. None of us does—or can—know enough by himself about himself. What follows is that for any of us to live the best possible life we must be willing to work with anyone who is willing to work with us. The result is a cooperative search for individually satisfying lives.

In the long run it is the individual himself, as the history of the battles for freedom suggests, who must determine whether or not his life is the way he wants it. Various factors may keep him from doing so, but it cannot be done for him. Besides, the efforts to solve an individual's problems for him leave him that much less able to face his own destiny: those inevitable problems which are fundamentally his own. Such efforts increase his fear and dread before a more precarious life. Those who praise the stability of the Middle Ages, for example, usually overlook the uncertainty of conditions which made it necessary to rely on magic of all sorts, in and out of the Church. On the other hand, the greater ability a man has to deal competently with his world and with himself, the more enduring are his satisfactions.

In terms of the individual, therefore, his life is best directed when it is his own intelligent responsibility. A similar conclusion is to be found in terms of social inquiry. No matter how beneficent—or ruthless—an elite group may be in striving to solve social problems, it is, for its own purposes as well as those of others, limited in perspective. It is likely to define the problem in terms of threats, real or imagined, to its own power. But beyond this, it is narrowly limited in the observation of data, in the suggestion of plans, in the vision of dangers, and in the testing of its plans. Genuinely scientific experimentation, however, needs all the points of view it can get. In the social sciences, particularly, it needs the perspectives, ideas and beliefs of all who are affected by the experiment, in addition to those of the experts who may be engaged in its direction.

In this way, naturalistic method requires the utmost liberation of individuals from conformity, so that the uniqueness of each will contribute not merely to the richness of associated life, but also to the progressive ability to meet individual and social problems. But the greatest possible liberation of individuality depends on cooperative activity. Cooperation is basic to the encouragement and communication of individually different points of view. It is necessary for the acquisition, testing and communication of knowledge of all sorts.⁵

The way of instrumentalism is thus democratic as well as scientific. As Dewey remarks, this does not mean that every man will be a practicing technical scientist, but that the effectiveness of democracy will be increased by the spread of the "scientific attitude." As a democratic force, this attitude cannot be segregated to a certain area of life; it must become a way of life. Democracy will then be striven for wherever there is associated life, in homes and churches as well as in legislatures and industries. The mechanics of political suffrage—important as they may be—are much less important than democracy as a general method of group activity.

I have already suggested a preliminary definition of democ-

racy based on those conditions in which the individual is encouraged to exercise control, to the best of his ability, over his own life. He cannot do this by himself, and must be assisted by others, as long as assistance does not mean the imposition of their ideas and standards on him. In terms of group activity this means that each person will take part, to his fullest capacity, in the examination, criticism and formulation of the common purposes and ends—and of the ways of achieving them—of the organizations in which he lives. To become effective in the present day the method would have to be extended to include communication between groups which once were isolated from each other.⁶

But it is dangerous to stop here. Conflicts do not stop just because people participate or share in common experiences. It must not be forgotten that serious conflicts, as well as harmonies, arise out of association, even out of close and sympathetic association. It is here that M. C. Otto has suggested an extension to the argument. Creative Bargaining, as he calls it, was developed out of explicit recognition of the need for a method capable of dealing concretely with conflicts of desires and aims, arising both from friendly and from hostile situations.

The method begins with a survey, by each person, of his needs and objectives, which are then formulated clearly and firmly put forth. One's position is not likely to be considered unless it is resolutely presented. And besides, it is a fair guess that almost as many problems are bungled by a blurring of differences as by mutual intransigence. The next step is for each, so far as possible, to understand the points-of-view of the others. The effort gives insight into the reasons why the others are opposed to oneself and how they got that way. It also enables one to see his own position, and its limitations, more clearly. Still further, it gives new perspectives on the phases of the problem that go beyond the people immediately concerned. The third step is to create a specific, inclusive program of action in which all those involved can find satisfaction, more satisfaction than they could have obtained otherwise. Finally, the new plan should be tried out to see if it does in fact do the job. The testing is not simply a matter of recon-

ciling interests, but of modifying the conditions which produced the difficulty. Consequently the individual and group activities have new direction under new conditions.⁷

Creative Bargaining is, of course, faced with immense difficulties. But that is hardly an argument against it. Should we let him, who would say that human problems are easily solved, solve the first problem? Of course not. The problems do not wait.

The method is not authoritarian. It does not rely on chance, drift or inevitability. I believe that it gives eyes, body and muscle to the criterion of judgment. If so, it indicates how human beings may be able to come to grips with conflicting aims and ideals in reasonable hope of improving upon them. It also serves to pass judgment on those who would risk bitter conflict, loss of friendship, destruction of personal integrity or widespread hardship rather than modify their beliefs. And the method has been used. Rare though its use may be, it may not be so rare as we think. We may mislead ourselves by looking for something to appear before us with clarity, drama and finality. It may well be that each of us has used such a method in some form and to some extent. We may overlook it because of its common-place quality and neglect to apply it to any but certain areas of life. Friendships and families have been held together and strengthened by it. Creative bargaining, though without the name, has been a recognized working principle in the T.V. A. A variation upon it was used in small communities by the Montana Study project. H. M. Kallen reports the successful use of the method by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, when members helped both to solve their own unemployment problems and to stave off employer bankruptcy by the creation of new relations between labor and management.⁸

The concept of democracy as a *way of living* casts the traditional slogans of Individualism, Equality and Freedom in a new perspective. Our verbal reflexes still predispose us to the notion that democracy is impossible unless all men are in fact distinct and separate entities, each of whom is equal to all others and, by

himself, free. Experience is so counter to these suppositions that the conflict must be a major source of the wide-spread confusion about democracy and indifference to it.

Individualism, Equality and Freedom are not existent facts which, in traditional language, need only to be described to be validated. They are ideals. And they are important because they are ideals. They help give present direction in the struggle to make it possible for each man to work out his own life in his own way, and to make his life better. In the natural sciences information is had about the nature of an object by changing it to see what it becomes. By using the same general method, we can learn whether or not men are free and equal by changing conditions to see if free and equal individuals can be created. "Man's nature," as Otto puts it, "must be held to include what he may become."⁹

The quest for individuality must begin with the realization that men, like all things, get their characteristics from association with other things. With men this includes the formative habits of other men. But what is here suggested is clearly opposed by ideas which are still dominant, where individuals are thought of as independently existent beings. For Christian doctrine they are unique souls who find salvation through supernatural love of others. For capitalist theory they are also discreet entities, but they are to find salvation through competition for profit.

Not only is the dominant general theory contrary to experience, but in recent years social conditions have become increasingly corporate. And to complete the irony, the traditional theory of individualism has been used to justify corporate business structure. In these conditions the man who is told, and who tells himself, that he is an independent individual is in a tragic situation. He is like some men I have heard of. They work in different parts of the country for a huge corporation. One of their jobs is to give an identical speech, written by another man, on the virtues of independent individual initiative. When a man's old ideals no longer guide him, and he has nothing to take their place, he is lost. He vacillates in his behavior between intense conformity

and anything that may help break the pattern. He is not an individual able to determine his own aims and activities, but something dominated by external pressures and internal compulsions. He has no control over the events that engulf him, and he will not acquire individuality until he can develop ideas that enable him to achieve competent control of the conditions of living.

Individuality does not mean independence if that means to be cut off somehow, metaphysically or otherwise, from one's fellow men. The independence that is in individuality is an independence of judgment—the capacity to make intelligent decisions, the refusal to submit to unquestioned authority. Similarly, individuality does not mean just uniqueness, where uniqueness means no more than the existence of differences of some sort. Everything is unique in some way and to some extent. The important thing is the quality and value of the uniqueness. A Mongolian idiot is very different from other offspring of human parents, but that hardly makes it more of an individual. Eccentricity may be a sign either of individuality or of insanity. Differences become valuable for individuality when it is possible to judge them and to direct them intelligently.

Individuality is a social development. This is so partly because human nature is social. But there is more to it than that. New ideas always develop in some particular individual. Yet not all social conditions encourage this capacity and it is probably most frequently discouraged. It must be protected and fostered. To do so intelligent method is required, both because it guides and evaluates individuality, and because its effectiveness as a method is increased with rich development of individual differences. On the one hand the fruitfulness and authority of individually developed ideas depends on cooperative, public inquiry. On the other hand, to have rich, flexible and satisfactory results, there must also be rich, flexible and satisfactory lives on the part of many varieties of individuals. The great absence of these factors in the world today, at home as well as abroad, brings us to the conclusion that extensive social reorganization is necessary in order to produce a truer individualism in all areas of life.¹⁰

Many people who agree that the unique, independent, democratic individual is desirable, are nevertheless convinced that such possibilities exist only in those who have superior ability. In other words, democracy is held to be impossible except for those who are equal in the possession of superior ability. Democracy is then out of the reach of the bulk of the people who are, by comparison, unequal. It must be admitted that there is not now equality either of ability or of opportunity. But this does not settle the question. The fact of inequality calls for democratic procedures whereby a working equality can be created.

In principle the democracies have a good deal of equality in political suffrage. If the practice falls far short of the goal, at least there is pretty clear recognition both of the inadequacies and of the achievements of our political processes. It is doubtful that as much can be said regarding economic affairs. Are we to say, for example, that economic equality has increased or decreased? Economic conditions have improved in some parts of the world. But the proportion of economically blighted areas and of malignant economic penalties remains high, regardless of proud national or local pronouncements. And what is worse, such conditions still seem commonly to be accepted as normal. Further, the centralization of economic power has increased almost beyond comprehension. However, it is neither possible nor necessary to pursue, here, the details of these issues. It is enough to point out that in general the lack of economic equality of opportunity is so great as to be an important contributing factor to other inequalities, including much of what passes for inequality of ability. In the light of recent developments in psychology and biology, it is fantastic to suppose that people who are born, who grow and die in areas of squalor and oppression, who endure lives dominated by drudgery and filth—it is fantastic to suppose that such people are not deprived of ability, imagination and sensitivity by their environments. The same thing is true of those whose lives are made up of mechanical routine duties and of the routine or random recreations through which they seek escape. If so, then by increasing equalities of opportunity, other inequalities should

be lessened.

Presumably inequalities of capacity will remain. Whatever the environment is, it must work with inherited biological structures, and these vary in potential. But this much may be said as a beginning: before birth it is extremely difficult to make accurate predictions as to the ability of the child to be born. This is a negative statement, but it gives another reason for rejecting any attempt to penalize children because of the economic status, education, race or religious beliefs of the parents, since biological potentialities are not based on such factors. There are indeed obvious biological handicaps, as in the feeble-minded, the deaf-mutes and others. But these conditions are rare, and are not always insurmountable barriers. There may also be less obvious inherited draw-backs. As yet there is so little known about them that they may be difficult to distinguish from inequalities imposed by the environment. Whatever significance they may turn out to have, such questions as this are incidental to the problem of acquiring democratic control of the social environment. Without it whatever eugenic knowledge we may come to have will not have relevance and intelligent purpose.¹¹

But in general the issue of biological inequalities of capacity is virtually irrelevant to questions of democratic theory. If intelligence is social rather than an isolated psychic thing, it is not improved by excluding others, even the unequal. The problem of equality is that of applying democracy, not of limiting it. Inferior abilities can be improved as well as the superior, but not by cutting them off from the superior. "Given a social medium," Dewey says, "in whose institutions the available knowledge, ideas and art of humanity were incarnate, and the average individual would rise to undreamed heights of social and political intelligence."¹² And this applies to the superior as much as to anyone else. Under these circumstances the chance to help make decisions regarding the things affecting oneself and others, where one takes part as an equal, is both a stimulus and a framework for the realization of underdeveloped potentialities.

The issue is confused by the assumption that equality must

mean identity or sameness, whether of position, status, wage or intellectual rating. Differences of ability—even those of the sort I have called unequal—may contribute equally to democratic enterprise. Equality of contribution does not mean that all contribute the same conclusions, or in the same way, or to the same extent. It does mean that each has the equal right to contribute whatever he has in the way of ideas, information or perspectives, and the equal right of having his contribution examined on its merits.

The same remarks apply still more to differences of personality and of interest. Democratically speaking these are clearly differences without being inequalities. As H. M. Kallen insists, equality means the right to be different and to maintain one's differences without penalty. The differences contribute both to the successful solution of problems and to the richness and joy of living. Equality means, on this basis, that no one is arbitrarily excluded because he is different; that all are invited to share in a way of life, whatever their beliefs (unless they are actively engaged in the effort to destroy that way of life) and abilities. In other words, the democratic enterprise seeks to encourage each individual equally to determine his own mode of life, and to join with others so engaged in the various areas of common concern and endeavor, to the extent of his ability—and to increase that ability.¹³

Two theories of freedom have been dominant historically. Of the two, one is impossible and the other has been a persistent excuse for authoritarianism. The first defines freedom as absence of restraints. When stated in principle it is also stated without qualification. But everything we do involves restraints of some sort: we could not even exist without them. Breathing, for example, makes life possible, but the possibilities of life are restrained by the limitations of lungs, oxygen and other factors. It is doubtful that anyone ever seriously attempted to apply this concept of freedom, yet it is still put forth as though it were self-evident.

The second theory of freedom recognizes those difficulties. It therefore defines freedom as conformity to proper restraints. A person cannot be free, it says, simply by casting off restraints, whether all restraints in general or some in particular. A person cannot be free until he knows what is good for him. Only then can he know what restraints will help him attain what he should, and what will hamper him. In order to have this knowledge one should know the Truth. While it may happen that an ordinary person may come to know the Truth directly, as a rule (Truth being what it is) he must obey those few who are able to know it directly. True freedom, therefore, is freedom to know the Truth and to act on it, or to obey those who know the Truth and to act on their word.

Men have in time come to resist this idea of freedom. It rests, as we have seen, on a concept of truth which is inaccessible to public examination. The truth rests on some unquestionable authority, and freedom is *libertas obedientiae*, as Kallen names it—the liberty of obedience to that authority.

Neither of these theories of freedom is tenable. Moreover, the first has been ignored in practice and the second has been resisted. But they have remained the dominant theories of freedom. What seems to have happened is that each got its strength from the weakness of the other. Because freedom as obedience to the truth led some men to impose their beliefs on others, those who resisted sought to be free from specific oppressions. Through intensity of devotion to *this* freedom it became identified with freedom from *all* restraints. But freedom as absence of restraints in general gives no direction to activity, except the implication that each should try to get whatever he wants. This reintroduces conflict. The result was to reinforce the concept of freedom as conformity to the truth, since it remained the only alternative. In other words, freedom from restraint has come to mean freedom from specific restraints resulting from *libertas obedientiae*, while *libertas obedientiae* has been interpreted as freedom from the chaos of absence of restraints.

Freedom has had other meanings besides these. Some of them

have come to be expressed, like those already discussed, in philosophical, theological or political doctrines. But a more important reason for considering them is that their common usages, while vague and elusive, are often tied to broad human experience or to intimate personal experience. At the same time they do not stand by themselves and, even at their best, need the framework of a more comprehensive approach.

One of the oldest convictions about freedom is that it must somehow be based on the nature of reality. Obviously there is no point in being concerned with freedom if reality is such as to make it impossible. But the general conviction usually becomes a demand that freedom, in some completed form, be an inherent characteristic of reality; and this demand is usually channeled through philosophical or theological preconceptions. The traditional alternatives have been either a mathematically precise, rigid determinism or chance in the form of absence of causation. Whether the conception of determinism was physical or divine, it had an outstanding characteristic: novelty was excluded. Every event took place in the only way it could possibly have happened. Theoretically every event could have been foreseen, or actually was foreseen, from the beginning by any being who could, or did, fully understand the original events. Freedom on this basis was clearly the freedom of obedience—without even the opportunity to decide whether to obey or not. Opposed to this was the concept of freedom as a gap of some sort in the causal sequence. Sometimes the gap was called chance and sometimes it was called free-will.

Without attempting to go into the arguments over these theories, I might point out that neither is helpful to freedom—if the meaning of freedom has anything to do with man's effort to live better. On the theory of predeterminism an individual's life is set for him anyway, even to his ideas concerning predeterminism and betterment. On the other theory also, as has been pointed out frequently, a man has no control over his life. In this case he cannot count on any significant continuity for his decisions or his actions or their consequences.

All that is required of reality for freedom is a genuine factor of novelty in events. Men want to be assured that reality is not cut and dried, an eternal diet of chipped beef. For, as Dewey puts it,

If change is genuine, if accounts are still in process of making, and if objective uncertainty is the stimulus of reflection, then variation in action, novelty and experiment, have true meaning.¹⁴

The particular type of novelty is not important as long as it allows both for genuinely new possibilities and for knowledge.

There are two complementary possibilities which might be mentioned. (1) Both the alternatives mentioned above seem to think of causal sequences as taking place with the precision of mathematics. On that basis reality is essentially mathematical in its processes. But if the instrumentalist theory is valid, mathematics, as an especially precise language, is a tool for dealing with realities, instead of the essence of reality. Mathematics must conform to reality, when they are related at all, rather than reality to mathematics. The fact that mathematics is rigorously precise does not mean that realities have to behave with the same precision. And in fact they do not seem to do so. Uncertainty or chance, then, are not names for the absence of causation but for the imprecision of reality. Things happen with more or less leeway or play. The way is then open for considerable variation in the long run.

(2) There is every reason to believe that novelties do occur. Perhaps they occur so frequently that we do not notice them. Things happen which, so far as we can tell, could not possibly have been predicted even with the most complete knowledge of what had happened previously. It has often been pointed out that such things as the color of magenta or the odor of burning rubber could not be predicted solely in terms of the physical and chemical factors into which they may be analyzed. This is true even if the similar factors of the biological organism are included in the effort at prediction. Once the color or odor has been experienced, its recurrence can be predicted; but that is a different

matter. This argument, like the previous one, does not deny causation. It simply asserts that, however these novel events occur, their novelty is real.

These remarks lead to another aspect of freedom. The two qualities of reality which I have just mentioned are found in human behavior to an extraordinary degree. Human beings never do things exactly as they had been done before. This is true even of the most conscientious conformers. Also, distinctively new qualities of human behavior constantly develop. There are of course marked tendencies to conformity. But the main problem of authoritarians everywhere comes to be that of getting people to conform and of keeping them in conformity. Recent events, in addition to history, show how conformers break away even while affirming that never have they conformed more thoroughly. Authoritarians seem to be able to deal with heresies thoroughly only by slaughter and, as in the case of some concentration camps, by reducing individuals by torture to a non-human state.¹⁵

There is also a third aspect of freedom. It is an elusive and various something which might be called the *sense* of freedom. There is a feeling of exhilaration and efficacy and power which individuals have, under different circumstances, and at these times they are likely to say (if they say anything at all) "*I feel free.*" The feeling is difficult to identify, and it may lead to trouble, but it should certainly be understood.

Although these feelings, like others, tend to escape us I think three forms of it may be indicated. (1) Sometimes it is found in the resistance to particular restraints. The things that are felt to be restraints vary and change, but the feeling is there. Just as a captured bird flutters its wings violently when it is held, or a dog that is grabbed unawares tries to wriggle away, so we react impulsively against many things. And if we break away, we say we free ourselves. We feel free. It should be noticed, though, that the results of these actions and feelings may be disastrous. We may, for example, fight free of someone who is pulling us away from an oncoming car.

(2) Sometimes the feeling is found in a sense of achievement.

It may result from overcoming a large obstacle or it may result from the effective accomplishment of any job. But here again the job may not have been worth doing, or it may have led to subsequent failure.

(3) The feeling of freedom may be found in obedience. In the act of submission itself there may be a sense of efficacy and power and liberation as real as any other feeling of freedom. I believe the strong appeal of authoritarianism bears this out. In submission, to oversimplify the picture, one is freed from the cares of the world.

One thing should be emphasized concerning all of the meanings of freedom I have mentioned. As important as they are in the human struggle, they help to set the problem of freedom rather than to solve it. I find it difficult to understand how a person can be said to be free when his decisions lead to failure, worse conflict or disaster. How free is a person, for example, whose actions have led him into defeat, even if his actions involved any or all of the types of freedom I have mentioned? The difficulty is that none of the types I have mentioned gives any clue to the value of the consequences it leads to. Novelty, absence of specific restraint, sense of achievement, obedience—any of these could lead to any result, including bondage. These factors may conflict with each other and with themselves. What one man finds to be freedom is slavery to another. Such difficulties have to be dealt with, but they cannot be resolved in terms of these concepts of freedom. So far, freedom could often be little more than an honorific name for what someone wants to do. If this is as much as we can say about it, freedom is logically irrelevant to man's efforts to solve his own problems. Perhaps it is. Or perhaps there is another possibility. If there is one it must involve an alliance between freedom and validity. Only so, I believe, can freedom be a support to man's efforts instead of a multiplier and intensifier of his problems.

Let us consider another traditional meaning of freedom—wherein freedom is involved in the making of choices. Choice implies the existence of alternatives to choose from. But choices

are not always made when they seem to be made, because alternatives do not always exist when they seem to exist. We frequently find that our training prohibits us from taking certain possibilities seriously even though we go through the motions of weighing them. Or we may find that we are anxious to try out new possibilities, but that we do not know enough about them. Or we may find that the physical or social environments prohibit the realization of possibilities which are appealing and intellectually justified. The ability to make choices, in other words, is not a quality inherent in each human individual. It is a function of certain conditions of living.

Here we come upon the meaning of freedom which, I am convinced, is fundamental. Freedom may be defined in terms of those conditions which possess genuine alternative possibilities for thought and action. This means, first, that the conditions of living permit and encourage the individual to know as much as he can about the events that affect him and about the ways in which those events may be changed. Secondly, it means that it is possible for the individual to apply and test the ideas he has acquired. Both of these factors are crucial to freedom. If one of them is lacking, so is freedom.

Examples of the point are not hard to find, when they are looked for, and they open holes in the veil of democratic symbols which has been used to cover problems of democracy. There is, for example, a city in a region which has made great use of migratory labor. The laborers come from a different country. They come into a strange land, with a strange language and strange customs. Frequently, for various reasons, they move into the city. There the strangeness increases. These people live more or less as a group, out of economic necessity and for mutual comfort. Many of them are afraid to go from their familiar area to other areas of the city. I am told that they are even afraid to go more than a few blocks into the business district. What stops them? They are, as we say, legally free. The police do not stop them. Their more established compatriots are not prevented from trading in the stores, and they are not excluded from the movie

houses. But are the newcomers free? I think not. They lack knowledge. Not only are they ignorant of their "rights" but they feel the positive barrier of fear, the fear of a different and unfriendly world.

There are other groups in that city who are aware of their rights. Many of them are familiar with the Supreme Court ruling that, although they are of different color from the majority of the population, restrictive covenants may not be enforced against them. Are they free to live where they want? Economic and psychological pressures are almost as effective by themselves as when they were combined with legal restrictions. These people are intellectually aware of alternative paths of life, but they are prevented from stepping out upon them.

For neither of these groups are the alternatives genuine. And freedom is correspondingly absent. Freedom is to be found in the widest possible area of significant, genuine alternatives. But then, freedom is integral to the very basis of valid judgments as I have tried to state it. Without freedom we are unable to tell whether our beliefs are true or false. Knowledge and freedom are inseparable.

So stated, I believe, freedom is both a standard by which existing conditions may be judged and a goal for present activity. We should seek to change those conditions which eliminate or discourage a variety of possibilities. At the same time we should try to create conditions which would multiply meaningfully the ways of thinking and acting. The only possibilities which *may* not be acted upon are those which would eliminate freedom. For no idea can be adequately developed and examined and tested without freedom. Freedom is no more a luxury than truth.

To be free, therefore, one must work actively for the freedom of others. It is an obligation to liberty to consider the other person's point of view. But this does not happen automatically. Freedom does not just expand. It must move in some direction, and it must surmount conflicts as it goes. This brings us again to Creative Bargaining, the method through which men's imaginations are directed to the effort to understand the points-of-view

of others in the conflict. Out of understanding and imagination an alternative can be created jointly for the specific purpose of changing conditions to bring about the best possible satisfaction for all concerned. New desires can be created around a new aim, which may utilize activity better than the old desires and aims. Creative Bargaining is the embodiment of freedom.

One of the consequences of this concept of freedom is to suggest a re-casting of some familiar social problems. It is customary, for example, to oppose freedom and security to each other. We assume that if we seek freedom we must leave security, and *vice-versa*. Most people desire both, however, and so we must attempt a fragile compromise between them.

But if security means anything it is the ability to control the circumstances that affect us. And if the preceding argument is valid, intelligent control demands freedom. Freedom and security, then, are not incompatibles but two aspects of the same process. The elements of that process are interdependent, yet we may clarify them somewhat by saying that the achievement of freedom leads to control and control results in security.

At the same time, freedom cannot be developed without control and security. We must plan for it. We must strive to reorganize our social processes in such a way that freedom becomes traditional. It seems generally to be recognized today that planning in some sense is unavoidable. A conservative senator has been quoted as saying that we must plan in order to cross a street. The question is whether planning should be a coordinated activity, or whether it should be left primarily to diverse organizations in their diversity.

All too often the objection to more or less centrally coordinated planning is the expression, on the part of powerful groups, of the effort to maintain special privileges. But there are good reasons to fear concentrations of government power, to say nothing of an all-powerful state. Those who are conductors of power may confuse themselves with the source of power, or they may become a political short-circuit, causing injury and destruction.

It is not alone the obviously power-hungry who are vicious. Those we think of as well-intentioned may be equally dangerous, especially when they are narrow, isolated, ambitious or self-important.

And yet I think the issue is in general incorrectly posed. In the first place, the problem is not that of power as such. Of itself power is neither good nor bad. We tend to identify power with might or coercion. But the fact that might involves power does not lead us to the conclusion that all power is coercive. Power is indispensable for doing anything. The problem concerns the purpose for which it is used and the method for controlling it.

In the second place, even when this is granted it is often with a reservation concerning governmental power. Whether or not it is clearly formulated, there is the feeling that governmental power is by nature suspect, where it is not clearly bad. Commonly the feeling is the vague expression of a distinction, on this score, between government and business. And it is not just the apologist for business who feels this way. But if power as such is neither good nor bad, why make an exception of governments? On what basis are they to be distinguished, as naturally suspect or bad, from other institutions?

Indeed, how, in general, are governments and businesses to be distinguished from each other? Usually, I suppose, governments are labelled public institutions and businesses are labelled private. But if publicness has to do with human activities, more than legalistic distinctions, it refers to the extent to which people are associated in common activities. There are many organized publics, as Dewey states it—that is, many groups that have created organizations for the sake of handling problems arising from their activities. These organizations are public, in addition, to the extent that their decisions and actions affect others. In these respects, industries and business are public institutions. As Thurman Arnold hints, so-called private corporations could well be called “governments.” And a number of them exercise more control over people’s lives than many of our state governments.¹⁶ The analogy is one that can be carried too far, but it does point

out that most Private Enterprise is private only in the sense that it is *controlled* by relatively few people. In other words, Private Enterprise is private only in so far as it is not democratically organized—is not subject to control by the public it grew out of, and which it serves and governs. But this type of privacy characterizes many governments as well.

In principle, Dewey argues, governments are distinguished from other organized publics in that it is their specific job to guide and regulate those other publics. That is to say, it is the job of government to provide a framework within which the other publics can carry out their various functions most adequately. There is no way to decide ahead of time, with validity, just how extensive the state should be. That is a matter for decision in the light of the problems existent at a given time.¹⁷ But one conclusion is evident. The thing that should distinguish governments from other guiding and regulating organizations is the comprehensiveness of its planning activities. If the development of freedom is something that must be planned, it is the obligation of government to take the lead in formulating the goals and to coordinate activities toward their realization. It is the responsibility of government even to create new goals and activities. When, for example, freedom is absent or restricted, government may create new alternative possibilities, such as the T. V. A., and should do so.

There is another point. The problem of the emergence of increasingly powerful organizations is not that governments are bad and businesses are good, or *vice-versa*. The problem is that the bases of power, in our various institutions, are most commonly held to be beyond examination by those over whom the power is exercised. In all areas of life men are increasingly affected by policies and other factors over which they have little or no control. What is called for once more is the making of a society in which men may acquire more and more competent control over themselves and the events which contribute to their shaping. We need democracy and more democracy.

We are coming to the end of the argument. I am convinced that the argument is a valid one, but there are many difficulties with it. There are gaps in it, and loose ends, and there is precious little concrete evidence in display. Some of the difficulties result from limitations of space and time. Some of them result from ignorance. But ignorance is a general problem, as well as an intensely personal one. We need to know a great deal more about all these things, and will always need to.

At the very most these issues are never settled beyond question; they are never settled once for all. At any given time the next step is always an act of faith, as a small child exhibits when he concentrates his energies on that next step. But the faith need not be a blind one. It makes a vast difference to us whether our faith is itself examinable, as we act on it, or whether we maintain it *because* it is impervious to examination.

Instrumentalism involves a faith in democracy as a method, a way of formulating goals, of judging them and of working toward them. The faith is humanistic and naturalistic. This is implied by the method. It rests, negatively, on the conviction that supernatural goals and sanctions are neither necessary nor helpful, that, in fact, they distract attention from the problems men actually have here and now. Positively, employment of the method is a recognition that if human problems are to be solved it will be through men using their own abilities and the natural tools at their disposal. The chance is ours and we must chance it. There is no other that we know of. On this basis all individuals, whatever their natures and beliefs, are equally admitted to free, cooperative activity. But on the same basis, those who seek to impose their own beliefs and ways of doing things are to that extent excluded from such activity.

This last point has already been touched on in passing, but it may be well to discuss it more directly. A democratic society is not obligated to open itself to all without qualification. When people, including those who depend on unquestionable authority, attempt to establish their ideals through the use of might, they are to be restrained from doing so. The same point applies to

foreign policy. If men are capable of deciding questions adequately, in the long run, only when they are free, then democracies are obligated to foster the conditions of freedom throughout the world. It is well to warn ourselves against identifying democracy with particular institutions and mechanisms that are familiar to us. But a proper modesty should not prevent us from realizing that the principle of democracy is generally applicable.

Instrumentalism is now open to fire from two sides. From the McGilvary side the claim may be urged that instrumentalists, in speaking of the enforcement of democracy, have relied on might after all. Instrumentalists, they will say, have abandoned the weapons of might only to return to them when they were amply camouflaged. The supernaturalists will argue, similarly, that instrumentalists threw authoritarianism out of the police station, only to turn it over to the national guard. They will insist that democracy and scientific method are now the unquestionable authorities.

In reply it may be pointed out that there is a difference between a set of fixed conclusions to which all citizens are forced to give assent and a method through which they work out their differences. If the method in question is one whereby persons with different beliefs can continue to act together, without imposing themselves on each other, in such a way that their problems are progressively solved, then it is not a method of might making right. "The essential characteristic" of the philosophy of might, as M. C. Otto points out, "is the deliberate ruling out of the other side as having any right to be considered."¹⁸ By whatever accident democratic method may have emerged, if it becomes and continues to be a means by which each individual can, in his own way, work with increasing knowledge of the good life and increasing skill in attaining it, it is a method different in kind from the use of might. Nor does this mean that democracy forsakes the use of power, since nothing is done without power of some sort. But it does mean that power can be an instrument of human intelligence, used for inclusively human instead of partisan ends.

As for the similar charge of authoritarianism, what the naturalistic method means is that no individual or group is justified in acting in an authoritarian way. To the extent that any group seeks its ends to the automatic exclusion of others, or in general insists upon the acceptance of its beliefs because of some fixed authority, whether supernatural or not—to that extent it has declared itself outside of a working democracy. When these activities become adamant or belligerent to the point of blocking or destroying democratic processes, it becomes necessary to use restraining or redirecting force. But force should get its quality and direction from the aim of maintaining a free society and of incorporating differences within it. For everyone is invited to make his contribution to the democratic way of life. From whatever source they come, ideas and ideals, suggestions and criticisms, are to be welcomed as alternative hypotheses to be tested according to the standard of public, experimental truth. The source of an idea gives no more basis for automatic rejection of it than for automatic acceptance. The one limitation to the welcome is the refusal to honor any claim that a belief should be accepted without examination or independently of it. Even the claims of democracy should be subjected to public scrutiny. But the limitation leads not to authoritarianism but to freedom as a vital alternative to it.

These considerations, I have said, involve a naturalistic faith. It is a faith that men can, by their own efforts, achieve richly rewarding lives. Some men have succeeded. Vast numbers may not succeed in the days to come, but if they do not, nothing will do the job for them. The naturalistic faith is that they can—if they are given a chance.

The outcome is not guaranteed. One of the requirements for success is a willingness to act with faith. But faith of this sort is not a substitute for knowledge. It is not a faith in something which cannot be known, if it can be known at all, prior to death. It is a faith in things which can be investigated, and is a faith in inquiry itself. Every day of our lives we have unspoken and

perhaps unconscious faith in fellow-men whose unspoken, and perhaps even embittered and degraded, loyalty to their jobs makes it possible to carry out our own plans. If we hope that this area of dependable trust may be widened, and that the lives of the participants may be enriched, such a faith is examinable now and through our future actions.

Naturalistic faith can be deeply religious. But faith by itself is not religious. It becomes religious, as Dewey says, "when the ends of moral conviction arouse emotions that are not only intense but are actuated and supported by ends so inclusive that they unify the self." To begin with, then, religion is found in a unified direction of activities, a release of energies, a joy of living, that may occur in any area of life where conditions permit. A religious faith brings with it an enthusiasm for its aim that focusses lesser desires on the central purpose. It demands a show-down decision as to what one most deeply wants, and in the choice it may be that deeply felt desires and aims are sacrificed. But sacrifice does not exist for its own sake. It is performed for a more satisfactory life. There is sacrifice in order that all energies may be better employed in living. The naturalistic faith insists that the religious life is the most deeply and enduringly satisfactory life.

There is a composing and harmonizing [says Dewey] of the various elements of our being such that, in spite of changes in the special conditions that surround us, these conditions are also arranged, settled, in relation to us. This attitude includes a note of submission. But it is voluntary, not externally imposed. . . .¹⁹

The "note of submission" is an important part of the religious life, but, as Dewey goes on to remark, it is not a stoic bowing of the head before fate. It follows from an attitude of humility. A humility of this sort cannot be directly sought, for then it is self-conscious, forced and distorted. A humility that heals comes with perspective. It is found in the imaginative way in which we place ourselves in the context of our world. If we project our ideals into the expanding context of the universe they may lose an aggres-

sively personal quality. They merge into the context in all directions until the ideals become woven in the patterned texture of events coming out of the past and moving into the future, and the texture moves on until there is no pattern. One here attains a sense of his place, at once large and small, in the long sweep of events. His aspirations make a difference to man's adventure, but without the support they receive from the physical, biological and human world they would be nothing at all. But in the perspective of religious experience—if it is a true perspective and not simply an imposition of personal demands—the realization of support also reveals the possibilities of defeat. It shows that our ideals may work better than we think, and also that they may do worse. It shows the futility of anxiety at the same time that it calls for responsibility.²⁰

One other quality of religion should be mentioned. There is a sense of mystery, found in wonder at things as they are. For naturalism retains this direct and ingenuous feeling that men sometimes have when they confront themselves and their world. It *is* a mystery that anything should be as it is. But this quality of experience is not the mystification of life that we find in the doctrines of theologians. It is not an explanation; it is an experience. We can find it indoors and outdoors, in a sleeping child and a sleeping city, in a street full of faces and in a seedling pushing its way out of the earth.

There is more to this sense of mystery. Perhaps, in a way, it is the *more* that is the heart of it. However much any of us can comprehend individually, however much all of us can comprehend collectively, there is always more that is beyond us—it is what Gilbert Murray calls the "uncharted." In recent centuries the frontiersmen of science have with increasing vigor and thoroughness scouted the intellectual wilderness. After them have come the pioneer settlers who establish small communities and extend the systematic humanization of the new land. The rest of us who come along later find the terrain built up and populated, laid out with paved highways and other utilities for thought and communication, and we find ourselves and others

equipped with intellectual machinery and handy tools for carrying on our daily tasks. As we go our busy, routine ways the uncharted seems remote and unimportant. Or if we think about it we may regard it as a puzzle whose pieces are one by one being fitted into place by competent hands. And we may feel a bit smug.

But I daresay that the feeling is most pronounced with reference to those things that we have heard about from the confident voices of others. When we come closer to home, to the areas of personal acquaintance, we may react differently. Here, where our own skills are greatest, we are likely to find that greater knowledge does not decrease the sense of mystery. It is likely to be deepened.

Or it may be that the point should be made a bit differently. When we are absorbed in the routine business of life, affairs seem neatly clear and under control. But at those times, when it appears that we can take matters for granted, something will probably jar us. More often than we care to admit that something is an unexpected encounter with the uncharted. We are then bewildered, and perhaps angry that the comfortable regularities have been disrupted. And we wonder, uncomfortably, at loose ends. We fear the wonder as an upsetting intrusion of the unknown, and we become obsessed with restoring the familiarity of established ways, even though that effort may actually lead to greater bewilderment. But when we do so we are unwittingly allowing the fear of mystery to dominate us. It would be better to recognize mystery for what it is. And not only to recognize it but also to incorporate it into our deepest attitudes toward ourselves and our world, so that we might be more alert to those things that are not to be snared by confident vision and a firm grasp. As M. C. Otto says it:

A conscious awareness of this mystery does a healing work on the inward man. It is the healing work of acknowledged ignorance in the revered presence of that which eludes comprehension—the incomprehensible in each other, in the life we are called upon to

live, in the great cosmic setting that reaches from our feet to the infinities.²¹

Religion in these terms is the deepest and most pervasive sense of life and the human struggle, and a sense of the fundamental mystery even of much that we dismiss as commonplace. The recognition of the human quest and of its possibilities is not a sterile or a gloomy project. And if it lacks the respectability and apparent stability of established orthodoxy, men have been known before to venture out where the divines fear to tread, with results that do not usually conform to the maxim about fools and angels. The religious aspect of naturalism makes a broad foundation for intelligent method, and opens a way for its absorption into the habits and customs of men. Intellectually and emotionally it moves toward a democratic kinship of men. Intelligence depends heavily on emotions, as worthwhile emotions depend on intelligence, and these foundations may be deepened and strengthened in a human direction by a feeling of awe before the universe and man's estate.

Notes

CHAPTER I

1. Quoted in a review of his book, *God Is My Co-Pilot*, *Time*, August 9, 1943, p. 98.

2. *The University of Chicago Round Table*, No. 582, May 15, 1949, pp. 24, 27, 28. The booklet includes a radio discussion based on the Declaration, the text of "The UNESCO Questionnaire on the Meaning of Democracy," and a "Report on the Analysis of the Questionnaire."

3. Both quotations are from *The Folklore of Capitalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 41

and 356-7.

4. *Language, Truth and Logic* (London, 1948), pp. 108-109. In the Introduction to this edition, Ayer qualifies his earlier statements but does not change his basic argument.

5. Quoted by Wilfrid Parsons, S. J., *Which Way Democracy* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939), p. v.

6. Parsons, p. 3.

7. D. C. MacIntosh, in *Is There A God?* (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1932), p. 141.

CHAPTER II

1. Professor McGilvary has not written exhaustively on this question, but his articles are extraordinarily acute. My discussion of his theory is based on the following articles: "Ethics, A Science," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 12, 1903; "The Warfare of Moral Ideals," *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 14, 1915-1916; and "Ethics," *The New International Encyclopedia*, Second Edition, 1915, pp. 122-134.

2. McGilvary, "Ethics, A Science," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 12, p. 629.

3. McGilvary, "Ethics," *The New International Encyclopedia*, p. 129.

4. McGilvary, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 638, 636, 634, 632.

5. Ralph Barton Perry, *The General Theory of Value* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), p. 183. In the following pages the discussion of

Perry's basic ideas is derived from this book. His recent *Realms of Value* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954) does not seem to make any departure from the position here indicated.

6. Perry, pp. 27 (see also 115-117) and 25 (see also 180-182).

7. Perry, p. 139.

8. See the use made by Jacques Maritain of Positivistic arguments, *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 31-32, 40-42. See also below, pp. 97-98.

9. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (London, 1948), p. 38. Other material relevant to this whole section may be found in Rudolph Carnap, *The Unity of Science* (London: Trench, Trubner and Co., 1934); Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," in *20th Century Philosophy*, ed. Dagobert Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943);

"De Principiis non Disputandum . . . ?" in *Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Max Black (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950); and "The Difference Between Knowledge and Valuation," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. VI, No. 4, 1950, pp. 39-44; Felix Kaufmann, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944); Arthur Pap, *Elements of Philosophical Analysis* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949); C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).

10. Moritz Schlick, *Problems of Ethics* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939), pp. 67, 144, 147.

11. Ayer, pp. 122 and 53.

12. Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, p. 252.

13. Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," in *20th Century Philosophy*, p. 397.

14. Ayer, pp. 57, 153, 151; Feigl, in *20th Century Philosophy*, p. 392.

15. Schlick, pp. 1 and 2.

16. C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*, p. 161.

17. The above quotations are from Stevenson, pp. 286 and 290. In an earlier passage (p. 161) Stevenson, in speaking of ethical analysis, remarks: ". . . nor is ethical analysis an excep-

tion to this general principle [that inquiry is guided by evaluations]. But ethical analysis can, no less than science, mathematics, and logic, limit itself *solely* to those evaluations which are essential to the pursuit of its descriptive and clarificatory studies." This might seem to imply that there are two distinct kinds of evaluation—cognitive and non-cognitive. But presumably Stevenson does not attempt to dodge the issue in this manner, for he gives no basis for a distinction of that sort. A question must nevertheless be raised as to the nature and basis of the evaluative judgment by which knowledge is limited to "descriptive and clarificatory studies."

18. Bronstein, Krikorian, Wiener, *Basic Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1947), p. 177.

19. The above quotations are from the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 12, p. 634, and *The New International Encyclopedia*, pp. 130 and 128.

20. All of the above quotations are from *The Hibbert Journal*, pp. 57, 53, 44, and 48.

21. M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1924), pp. 102-103.

CHAPTER III

1. The quotations are from Perry, *Shall Not Perish from the Earth* (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1940), pp. 21-22, 19-20 and 20-21; and *Puritanism and Democracy* (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1944), p. 437.

2. Perry, *General Theory of Value* p. 661.

3. *General Theory of Value*, pp. 655, 659, 658. In Perry's analysis the other standards are: (1) "Correction" or "Enlightenment": the examination of the consistency and the consequences of beliefs. (2) "Intensity": this means

that an interest is better in the degree to which the whole state of the body serves it. (3) "Preference": this standard is applied when a desire exercises preference among the various objects that might fulfill it. Perry says that the method of correction does not really make judgments of better and worse, since it cannot *measure* values; it can only alter desires, as we have seen in McGilvary's "scientific criticism," through an analysis of fact. I have not been able to avoid the suspicion that the principles for measuring

interests, including inclusiveness, are essentially passive criteria. They do their jobs whenever objects and interests are had and looked at along with other objects and interests. They seem patterned after that theory of "esthetic attitudes" according to which one work of art is immediately felt to be better or worse than another.

4. *Puritanism and Democracy*, pp. 49-50.

5. *Realms of Value*, pp. 119, 370, 214-215.

6. *General Theory of Value*, pp. 674 and 394; *Realms of Value*, pp. 92-100.

7. *Realms of Value*, p. 274.

8. *Puritanism and Democracy*, pp. 480, 484, 483.

9. *Realms of Value*, pp. 288-289 and 285-286.

10. *Shall Not Perish from the Earth*, p. 125.

11. *Realms of Value*, p. 136.

12. *The Rocky Mountain News*, July 5, 1955, p. 42.

13. *Realms of Value*, p. 97.

14. *Realms of Value*, pp. 122 and 132.

15. The above quotations are from Moritz Schlick, *Problems of Ethics*, pp. 33, 178, 179, 160, 182.

16. Schlick, pp. 185 ff., 192, 201, 200.

17. Schlick, p. 98.

18. G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1937), pp. 617, 616.

19. T. V. Smith, "Compromise: Its Context and Limits," *Ethics*, Vol. LIII, pp. 1 and 2.

20. T. V. Smith, *The Democratic Tradition in America* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1941), p. 47; *Ethics*, p. 7.

21. *Ethics*, pp. 4, 5, 10-11.

22. *Ethics*, pp. 8, 13, 7, 9, 8; and *The Democratic Tradition in America*, pp. 11 and 13.

23. *The Democratic Tradition in America*, pp. 35, 34, 74.

24. *The Democratic Tradition in America*, pp. 67, 65.

25. *The Democratic Tradition in*

America, p. 47; *Ethics*, pp. 13, 4, 7.

26. *New York Times*, August 5, 1951, p. 2E. The Wage Stabilization Board anticipated the probable consequences of the Butler-Hope and Capehart amendments by issuing a regulation to permit increases in wages equal to increase in the cost-of-living index.

27. A friend has provided me with the following example from the WSB: "Question: May an employer pay a Christmas bonus pursuant to Sec. 5 (b) and also pay a year-end bonus under the authority of any other provision of GWR 14? Answer: No. The phrase 'Christmas or year-end bonus' contained in Sec. 5 (b) is construed to include both Christmas and year-end bonuses." (Question 10, from Questions and Answers in Section 5 of GWR 14, Amdt. 2, dated November 27, 1951.)

When such tendencies are brought to fruition in compromise, they result in utterances like the following: "The Wage Stabilization Board today amended Resolution 80 to authorize meatpackers, under specified conditions, to put into effect without prior approval an increase in the wage rates of certain women workers where such an increase will not reduce the male-female rate differential to less than nine cents an hour. The Board's action was taken to carry out its established policy of equal pay for equal work as expressed in its Resolution 69." (From WSB Release No. WSB-185, Tuesday, March 4, 1952.)

28. E. Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1936), Chapter X; Morris Ernst, *The First Freedom* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), Chapter V; and M. C. Otto, "Speech and Freedom of Speech," in Hook and Konvitz, *Freedom and Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947). For a suggestive exploration of the far-reaching aspects of such problems, see Baker Brownell, *The Human Community* (New York:

Harper and Brothers, 1950). Though I believe he has overstated his case, Brownell does show how we may intensify our problems even when we think we are solving them.

29. In *Hammonds vs. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co.* (255 Ky. 685 75 sw (2d) 204, 205, 206) both of these arguments are used in reference to the same point.

CHAPTER IV

1. *A Catholic Dictionary*, ed. Donald Attwater (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941), pp. 522 and 523.

2. Etienne Gilson, *Medieval Universalism* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), p. 16.

3. Paul Blanshard, *American Freedom and Catholic Power* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), p. 11.

4. Some Catholics have privately expressed similar fears. But few have done so publicly, and I know of none who has done so at length, in this country, until Thomas Sugrue published his intensely honest book, *A Catholic Speaks His Mind* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1951).

5. In "A Brief History of My Opinions," *The Philosophy of Santayana*, ed. Irwin Edman (New York: The Modern Library), p. 7.

6. Gilson, pp. 20, 17.

7. For Jacques Maritain's proof of the existence of God, see *The Degrees of Knowledge* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1938), pp. 273-276.

8. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 136, 139, 64. See especially pp. 134-142, *passim*.

9. The phrase is Richard M. Weaver's. See his *Ideas Have Consequences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 18. Weaver does not label himself a Thomist, but the phrase seems appropriate as he uses it.

10. Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940), pp. 49-50.

11. *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 258-278.

12. *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp.

50, 51.

13. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom* (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1944), pp. 102-103.

14. *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 54, 101-107. Etienne Gilson writes of this question in a simpler style than Maritain's, but the point is still more elusive. In his *Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1936), p. 37 he says: "Thus I call Christian, every philosophy which, although keeping the two orders formally distinct, nevertheless considers the Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to reason." Recently Gilson delivered a lecture at Rutgers University on "Dogmatism and Tolerance" (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1952). The question of the relationship between theology and philosophy is crucial to that subject, yet for some reason, which he does not give, it is not mentioned.

15. *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 49-50, 61, 63, 37, 3, 5; *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 48, 58-59, 63, 64, 214, 72.

16. *The Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 168; *Science and Wisdom*, p. 52 ff.

17. *The Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 245; *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 31-32, 40-42.

18. *Science and Wisdom*, see Chapters on "Science and Wisdom," and "Philosophy of Nature." *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 28-34, 51, 56, 58 ff., 60, 80, 168-178; in general, Chapters I and III.

19. *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 81-82, 239-240; *Scholasticism and Poli-*

tics, p. 47 ff.; see also *A Catholic Dictionary*, p. 190.

20. Gilson's argument in "Dogmatism and Tolerance" appears to be an exception to the interpretation of Thomism presented here. And it may be. It would be difficult to speak with conviction concerning such an elusive argument. On the surface it seems plain enough. Tolerance, Gilson says, requires dogmatism. Dogmatism means "the philosophical attitude of those who maintain that some propositions are not merely probable, or practically certain, but unconditionally true, provided only we agree on the meaning of their terms and are able to understand them." (p. 1) "Tolerance," he continues, "does not consist in accepting all philosophical statements as more or less probable, but, being absolutely certain that one of them is true and the others false, in letting everyone be free to speak his own mind." (p. 8) Furthermore, the only alternative to dogmatism is philosophical skepticism concerning the existence of truth.

There it is. But aside from an exercise in adroit definition, what is it? In the first place, this is not an argument for the advisability of tolerance, but only a statement of its meaning. Gilson does, however, assert that tolerance is advisable—or at least permissible—on the grounds that philosophical truths must be rationally demonstrated and that we must still keep the peace even with those who have not received the demonstration. In the second place, the issue concerns questions of social policy as well as of private conviction. Gilson says that tolerance helps maintain peace. But since he does not argue for peace at any price, tolerance is presumably good only in so far as it does not prevent the attainment of something better. Concerning this Gilson says

nothing, in this lecture. What he does say is sufficiently qualified, however, that there is not necessarily any conflict between his ideas in "Dogmatism and Tolerance," and the ideas of such Thomists as Maritain.

21. *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 79, 80-81, 85-86, 106-107.

22. *The Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 307.

23. The preceding five paragraphs are based on *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 291-313. Specifically, the references are to pp. 313, 297, 208, 311, 312, 298, 308, 311, 291-292, 308, 313. Also see *A Catholic Dictionary*, p. 52.

24. *Science and Wisdom*, p. 19 f.; *The Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 314.

25. *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 294-295, 336 ff., 314-315; *A Catholic Dictionary*, p. 372. See also *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 145-146, 149-150, 153.

26. *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 141, 108, 112, 196, 111, 143, 214.

27. *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 23, 1-2; Maritain, *True Humanism* (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1938), pp. xii, xi.

28. *True Humanism*, p. 221; *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 60-61, 135, 71, 61-62.

29. M. J. Adler, "A Dialectic of Morals," *The Review of Politics*, 1941, Vol. 3, p. 210; *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 64, 63. See also, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 284-287.

30. *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 118-131; *True Humanism*, pp. 2, 4, 11-12; *A Catholic Dictionary*, pp. 228-229, see especially articles on "Efficacious Grace" and "Prevenient Grace."

31. *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 131-136, 140-143.

32. *True Humanism*, pp. 8-10, 22 ff.; *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 16-17, vii.

33. *A Catholic Dictionary*, p. 183.

34. Wilfrid Parsons, *Which Way Democracy*, p. 3.

CHAPTER V

1. Pope Leo XIII in the Encyclical Letter "Immortale Dei," November 1, 1885, reprinted in John A. Ryan and Francis J. Boland, *Catholic Principles of Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 284; Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 68, 64.

2. Parsons, *Which Way Democracy*, pp. 81-82, 80, 89; *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 69, 71; see also Maritain, *True Humanism*, pp. 90, 127, 130.

3. *True Humanism*, p. 104n.; *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 98, 70-73.

4. *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 85, 222, 229; see also pp. 247, 23 f. and 224; and *Catholic Principles of Politics*, pp. 285 and 210.

5. Parsons, p. 73.

6. Pope Leo XIII in the Encyclical, "Au Milieu des Sollicitudes," in Ryan and Boland, p. 171, Parsons, p. 125; see also Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 104-106, and Ryan and Boland, pp. 174, 284-285.

7. Pope Leo XIII, in the Encyclical "Immortale Dei," in Ryan and Boland, p. 297. In commenting upon this passage, Ryan and Boland remark (p. 335): "Only the unthinking and the malicious will see in this paragraph a condemnation of democracy, or of the doctrine of the consent of the governed." In order best to determine the meaning of that paragraph the reader should re-read it for himself, then examine it in the context of the whole Encyclical and of Thomist political theory.

Chapter VII in Ryan and Boland reports some of the disagreement among Thomists concerning the meaning of "consent." It also gives a reformulation of what seems to be the main Thomistic tradition, following the Jesuit political theorists, Cardinal Bellarmine and Francisco Suarez.

8. Blanshard, *American Freedom and*

Catholic Power, p. 256. The Papal attitude toward Mussolini and Fascism was ambiguous. (see Gaetano Salvemini and George La Piana, *What to Do with Italy* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), pp. 80-100; and Blanshard, p. 240-248. Ryan and Boland refer to Papal condemnation of Fascism and quote from a speech by Pope Pius XI, given in December, 1926, three years before the Concordat and Lateran Treaty. Yet it was in that same speech that the Pope referred to Mussolini as "the man sent by Providence."

9. Ryan and Boland, p. 140; Pope Pius XI, in the Encyclical "Divini Redemptoris," quoted in Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, p. 111 n.; Ryan and Boland, pp. 286, 287-288.

10. Parsons, pp. 16-17; Ryan and Boland, pp. 289, 288 (also pp. 70-71, 297-297 and Chapter XXIII).

11. *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 219, 82, 75, 101 ff.; Ryan and Boland, pp. 169, 173.

12. *A Catholic Dictionary*, p. 213; Ryan and Boland, pp. 297, 299.

13. *A Catholic Dictionary*, p. 213; Maritain, *True Humanism*, pp. 159-161, 61 n., 175-176; Ryan and Boland, pp. 303, 174.

14. Joseph M. Pernicone, *The Ecclesiastical Prohibition of Books* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1932), pp. 123-187, especially pp. 125, 126, 131, 133.

15. *Catholic Principles of Politics*, p. 318. In this quotation Ryan and Boland state the theory in a clear and forthright way. But as they continue they shift ground. Instead of insisting that non-Catholics should realize that the Church and its doctrine are established for the benefit of all, including non-Catholics, they chide non-believers for fearing Catholic domination, on the ground that it is not likely to happen. "It is true," they say,

"that some zealots and bigots will continue to attack the Church because they fear that some five thousand years hence the United States may become overwhelmingly Catholic and may then restrict the freedom of non-Catholic denominations." Meanwhile, they are "confident that the great majority of our fellow citizens will be sufficiently honorable to respect our devotion to truth, and sufficiently realistic to see that the danger of religious intolerance toward non-Catholics in the United States is so improbable and so far in the future that it should not occupy their time or attention." (pp. 320-321.)

16. Parsons, pp. 87 ff.; Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, p. 106, italics in the original.

17. Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 1-2, also pp. 8, 87-88, 96, 239-242, 6; *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 74-78; *True Humanism*, pp. 152 ff., 70-74, 267-277, 101-104.

18. *True Humanism*, pp. 229, 233, 156-161, 200-201, also pp. 236-239.

19. *True Humanism*, pp. 156-158, 195, 255; *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 112-113, also p. 115 n.

20. *True Humanism*, p. 251; also pp. 251-261, 235-237, 248-250.

21. *True Humanism*, p. 135; *Science and Wisdom*, p. 78.

22. *Scholasticism and Politics*, p. 109; *True Humanism*, p. 246; see also pp. 240-248.

23. *Scholasticism and Politics*, p. 247 (also pp. 204, 224, 219); *True Humanism*, pp. 264-265 and 267 (also pp. 281-283).

24. *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1909), Vol. V, p. 757.

25. *A Catholic Dictionary*, p. 455.

26. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XIII, p. 4.

27. *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 327, 336-339.

28. *A Catholic Dictionary*, pp. 183, 107, 559.

29. "Sectarian Absolutes and Faith in Democracy," in *The Humanist*, 1941, Vol. I, p. 106.

CHAPTER VI

1. See Royce, *The World and the Individual* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901), Vol. I, Lecture VII.

2. Royce, *The Problem of Christianity* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913), Vol. II, pp. 270, 323, 264 f.

3. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. II, pp. 378, 286.

4. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, pp. 61-66, 166 ff.; Vol. II, pp. 18-67 *et passim*.

5. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, pp. 166, 167, 173, 94, 39-44.

6. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, pp. 70-167.

7. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, pp. 136-155.

8. The quotation is from *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 67; see also pp. 158, 349-350, 66-74, xxv, 79-83.

9. The quotation is from *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 179; see also Vol. I, pp. 171-172, Vol. II, p. 103.

10. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, pp. 359-360, 180-187, 172, 192, 375-376.

11. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, pp. 189-191; Vol. II, pp. 212, 219 ff.; *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, Lecture X.

12. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, Lecture VI, pp. 377-380.

13. *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. II, pp. 373-379, 383-390.

14. *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), pp. 48-49, 1-2.

15. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, pp. 467-468; see also p. 465.

16. *What Man Can Make of Man*

(New York: Harper and Bros., 1942), p. 62.

17. *Types of Philosophy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), pp. 248-260.

18. *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 171, 168-169, 501-502; *What Man Can Make of Man*, pp. 27-35.

19. *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 208-212.

20. The quotation is from *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), p. 296. For the development of this argument see Chapters XVI-XXII. Summaries of it are given in *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 295-299, 314-322.

21. *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 322-324, 495 f. This argument is developed at length in *Science and the Idea of God* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

22. *The Meaning of God*, pp. 218-225.

23. *The Meaning of God*, pp. 321-324, 330-332, 335-337, 186-187, 140; *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 499, 312-313, 508.

24. *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 499-500; *What Man Can Make of Man*, p. 28; *Man and the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), pp. xi-xii, 199-203.

25. *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 328, 330; see also pp. 325-332; *Man and the State*, p. 202.

26. *Man and the State*, pp. 214-218; *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, (New Haven, 1918), p. 122 n.

27. *Man and the State*, pp. 309, 312-324, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 329-333.

28. *The Meaning of God*, p. 331.

29. *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 117, 140-143; *Man and the State*, pp. 154-157, 335-356.

30. *Man and the State*, pp. 132-134, 237, 376-378, 363-372.

31. *Man and the State*. The quotations are from pp. 190 and 191. See also pp. 53-58, 113-119, 151 f., 325, 76.

32. *Man and the State*, pp. 39-44, 154-157, 326-331, 407-409.

33. *Man and the State*, pp. 165-166, 325, 235-267, 372.

34. *Man and the State*, pp. 370-372, 380-382, 390-403.

35. The quotations are from *Man and the State*, pp. 46 and 50. See also pp. 7-34, 49-51.

36. *The Lasting Elements of Individualism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), pp. xii-xiii, 179, 3-5, 31-32.

37. *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 344 ff.; *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, p. 35; *What Man Can Make of Man*, p. 62.

38. *What Man Can Make of Man*, p. 44; see also pp. 41 and 50.

39. *Freedom of the Press* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 137, 138; also, pp. 66-69, 136-138; *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, p. 77, also pp. 77-79.

40. *The Self: Its Body and Freedom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), pp. 159-162, 149-155; *Man and the State*, pp. 201-202.

41. *The Meaning of God*, p. 51, see also Chapters XXX-XXXIII.

42. *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, p. 136; *The Self: Its Body and Freedom*, Chapter IV.

43. *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, pp. 172-173; see also pp. 78-82, 177-179, 175.

44. *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, p. 81; see also pp. 176-178.

45. *Man and the State*, p. 435.

46. *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, p. 172; see also *Freedom of the Press*, pp. 117-118.

47. *Freedom of the Press*, p. 89.

48. *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, p. 175; *Freedom of the Press*, p. 19.

49. *Freedom of the Press*, p. 138.

50. *Freedom of the Press*, p. 108.

51. *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 299 and 321.

52. H. S. Tigner, *Our Prodigal Son Culture*, (Willett, Clark and Company, Chicago, 1940,) pp. 153, 155, 161, 157.

CHAPTER VII

1. Perhaps special mention should be made of Logical Positivism as a variety of empiricism. Some of its leaders have exhibited a good deal of flexibility and willingness to modify their ideas. Yet so far as I know positivists in general still hold to a conception of knowing as both immediate and passive. It is usually stated in terms of "sense-data" or other phrases similar to Hume's "impressions" or Berkeley's "ideas."

2. See for example *The Bertrand Russell Case*, ed. John Dewey and H. M. Kallen (New York: The Viking Press, 1941).

3. John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1929), p. 239.

4. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: The Modern Library, 1922), p. 14.

5. The foregoing discussion is based chiefly on John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, Parts I and II, and also on his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938), Chapter I.

6. *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 45-46, *passim*. See especially George Herbert Head, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

7. *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 19-20, 45-47.

8. *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 66-70, 104-108.

9. *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 177.

10. *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part Three, Sections I, II and III; also, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 12-13, Chapter VI.

11. *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 110-112, 166-168, 289-300; *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 108-111, 166-167, 289; *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part

Three, Sections VI, VII and IX.

12. *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 178 and Chapter IV; *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 127 ff.

13. See M. C. Otto, *The Human Enterprise* (New York: F. C. Crofts and Co., 1941), pp. 259-260.

14. *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 229.

15. *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 16-19, 20-22, 24 f., 40 f.

16. *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 166; see also pp. 182 ff.

17. *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 22 ff., 196. For a discussion of traditional empiricism, which by implication includes Perry and others, see *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Chapter VIII and pp. 516-520. The last reference is also directed to tendencies found in logical positivism.

18. *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Chapter IV and pp. 114 ff., 160; *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 81 f., 87, 99, 123 ff.

19. *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 135 and 138.

20. *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, p. 160.

21. *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Chapter IX and p. 179.

22. *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 258 ff.; *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part III, Sections V, VI, VII, VIII.

23. *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 130, 156 ff., 249-250; M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals*, pp. 113-122.

24. See below, pp. 214-215.

25. See for example, *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part IV, Section I.

26. *The Human Enterprise*, p. 137.

27. *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part III, Sections VI and IX.

28. *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 321 ff. For a general statement of some of these issues, see *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Chapter XXIV.

CHAPTER VIII

1. John Dewey, *Freedom and Culture* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 124.
2. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1927), p. 146.
3. *Freedom and Culture*, p. 153; M. C. Otto, *The Human Enterprise*, Chapters VIII and IX.
4. John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 493 ff., and p. 503.
5. *Freedom and Culture*, pp. 96-98, 102; John Dewey in *Intelligence in the Modern World*, ed. Joseph Ratner, (New York: The Modern Library, 1939), pp. 634-635; John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1930), pp. 154-157; *The Public and Its Problems*, pp. 176 ff.
6. *Freedom and Culture*, pp. 148 ff., Chapter VII; *The Public and Its Problems*, Chapter V; John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 80-81, 199; John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935), Chapter III.
7. *The Human Enterprise*, pp. 146-153; M. C. Otto, "Professional Philosophy and the Public," in Blanshard, Ducasse, Hendel, Murphy and Otto, *Philosophy in American Education* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), pp. 159-162.
8. Regarding the Montana Study project, see Baker Brownell, *The Human Community*. For the report on the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, see H. M. Kallen, "Responsibility," *Ethics*, Vol. 52, pp. 350-376.
9. *The Human Enterprise*, p. 208.
10. In general see Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* and *Intelligence in the Modern World*, Chapter IV; Otto, *The Human Enterprise*, Chapter VII.
11. See H. S. Fries, "Science and the Individual," *Antioch Review*, Winter, 1942; also M. C. Otto, *Natural Laws and Human Hopes* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1926), Chapter VII.
12. *Liberalism and Social Action*, p. 69 f.
13. *The Public and Its Problems*, pp. 208-211, 103-106, 157 ff., 176 ff., 149-151. For Kallen, see especially *The Liberal Spirit* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1948), pp. 166-178.
14. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 310.
15. On this last point, see Hannah Arendt, "The Concentration Camps," *Partisan Review*, Vol. XV, No. 7, pp. 743-763.
16. Thurman Arnold, *The Folklore of Capitalism*, pp. 121 ff., 185 ff., Chapter XI.
17. *The Public and Its Problems*. Chapters I and II. The relevant parts of these chapters may be found in abridged form in *Intelligence in the Modern World*, pp. 365-385.
18. *The Human Enterprise*, p. 140.
19. John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New York: Yale University Press, 1934), pp. 22 and 16.
20. *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 302-308; *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 262-264, 330-332; *A Common Faith*, pp. 18-19.
21. *The Human Enterprise*, p. 342.

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